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Camilla E. Watson
2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 883
ABSTRACT
Currently, there are 44.7 million Americans holding student loan debt
collectively totaling over $1.5 trillion. This massive debt has a
profound effect, not only on the lives of the debtors but also on the
national economy because it prevents the debtors from buying homes
and cars and creating new businesses. This debt is also speculated to
be a likely trigger for the next housing bubble because student loans,
like the subprime mortgage loans underlying the 2008 financial crisis,
are securitized and sold to investors. But many of those with student
loans struggle to find jobs that will enable them to pay off their debt.
In some cases, they leave school without graduating because they
perceive their debt as too overwhelming. When that happens, their
lack of a degree exacerbates their struggle to find decent jobs.
Moreover, fear of undertaking substantial debt leads some individuals
to forego higher education altogether, thereby condemning them to a
lifetime of low-paying jobs. This Article traces the development of
federal student loans and examines the numerous problems
comprising the student loan debt crisis, among them the high cost of
postsecondary education, the crisis-level amount of debt undertaken
by students, the difficulties of repayment, and the fraud and abuse
perpetrated by proprietary institutions and predatory lenders. It
attributes these problems to Congress, which it argues has at times
both acted, and failed to act, due to misjudgments that at least on
occasion have bordered on an animus to students in need. This Article
also critiques proposed legislation to reform federal funding of higher
Ernest P. Rogers, Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of
Law. I am indebted to Margaret V. Sachs and Alan Watson for comments on an earlier
draft of this Article. I also am indebted to T.J. Striepe and Hamed Roodposhti for
technical and editorial assistance. Any errors or omissions are my own.
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education and questions whether the mistakes of the past will soon be
repeated in the pending reauthorization of the Higher Education Act
of 1965.
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INTRODUCTION
In today’s global economy, education and access to education
are more important than ever before, not only for individual workers
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but also for the national economy.1 But nearly three-quarters of a
century after the enactment of the original GI Bill,2 five decades after
the initial establishment of a federal student loan program,3 and more
than four decades after the creation of a national basic grant program
for low-income students,4 “the central commitment to federal support
for higher education and the [mechanics] of [that] support are under
attack.”5 This attack has been fomented, in part, by the level of
outstanding student loan debt that has reached such crisis proportions6
1. Education facilitates social inclusion and mobility, improves socioeconomic outcomes, and increases productivity, which in turn lead to greater tax
revenues, lower social burdens on the government, and greater social contributions.
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2017:
OECD
INDICATORS,
76,
118
(2017),
https://www.oecdilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2017eag-2017-en
[https://perma.cc/
7XC9-TZUN] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). As then Treasury Secretary, Timothy
Geithner, stated,
The moral case for doing a better job of giving Americans the opportunity
to succeed is very compelling. The economic case is just as strong. If more
Americans are educated, more will be employed, their collective earnings
will be greater, and the overall productivity of the American workforce will
be higher.
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE ECONOMICS OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 13 (2012). This would mean higher tax revenues, greater consumption,
and reduced reliance on financial support from the government. See Anne Johnson &
Tobin Van Ostern, It’s Our Interest: The Need to Reduce Student Loan Interest Rates,
FOR
AM .
PROGRESS
(Feb.
13,
2013,
9:47
AM),
CTR.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/reports/2013/02/13/53061/itsour-interest-the-need-to-reduce-student-loan-interest-rates [https://perma.cc/6S6AK7A6].
2. See discussion infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
3. See discussion infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 71.
5. Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History and an
Assessment, FINANCING POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: THE FEDERAL ROLE (October
1995), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OPE/PPI/FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html [https://
perma.cc/8NUC-286X] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019); see, e.g., Roger Yu, Millions of
Student Loans Could Be Headed for a Shakeup in Coming Months, USA TODAY (July
5, 2017, 7:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/07/05/proposalschange-student-loan-rules-could-upend-industry/99594768 [https://perma.cc/R6HETU8A].
6. See, e.g., Randi Weingarten, Public Service Debt Relief is Broken, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/opinion/publicservice-loans-education.html [https://perma.cc/CY77-CSCM] (noting that as of
summer 2018, student loan debt has reached $1.5 trillion); see also Zack Friedman,
Student Loan Debt in 2017: A $1.3 Trillion Crisis, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2017, 7:45 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/02/21/student-loan-debt-statistics2017/#665c0b0f5dab [https://perma.cc/E4K2-UA8H]; Mark Kantrowitz, Why the
Student Loan Crisis Is Even Worse Than People Think, MONEY (Jan. 11, 2016),
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that it serves as a disincentive for many to pursue higher education. 7
For those already mired in this debt, the burden affects their physical
and mental health, as well as their important life decisions, such as
whether to open a business, buy a house, or start a family.8
Most federal funding for higher education is authorized and
regulated by the Higher Education Act of 1965 (the HEA), which is
subject to reauthorization, usually occurring every five to seven years.9
The last reauthorization was in 2008, however, so the next one is long
overdue.10 Before the 2018 elections, Congress considered a
reauthorization of the HEA,11 but the proposed legislation showed no
signs of bipartisan cooperation.12 This failure to reach an agreement
was counterproductive because a reauthorization has the potential to
radically affect current and future borrowers, which in turn also has
the potential to affect the future American workforce and

https://www.time.com/money/4168510/why-student-loan-crisis-is-worse-thanpeople-think [https://perma.cc/R98X-HLLH].
7. See Neil Swidey, The College Debt Crisis Is Even Worse Than You Think,
BOS. GLOBE (May 18, 2016, 9:02 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/
2016/05/18/hopes-dreams-debt/fR60cKakwUlGok0jTlONTN/story.html
[https://perma.cc/M3WS-SJNX] (stating that the numbers no longer add up to pursue
a bachelor’s degree).
8. See, e.g., David Jolley, Student Debt Is Killing Entrepreneurship,
QUARTZ AT WORK (June 22, 2018), https://quartz.com/work/1311712/student-debtis-killing-entrepreneurship; Bill Fay, The Emotional Effects of Debt, DEBT.ORG. (May
1, 2017), https://www.debt. org/advice/emotional-effects [https://perma.cc/DGV6FG4F]; see also Cat Alford, 3 Major Reasons Why Student Loan Debt Is Preventing
Millennials from Having Kids, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://studentloanhero.com/featured/student-loan-debt-preventing-millennialshaving-kids/[https://perma.cc/443E-B8PT]; Borrowers Shift to Student Loan Debt
Impacting Home Ownership, FINANCE SOLUTIONS (June 13, 2017), https://finance
solutions.org/borrowers-shift-to-student-loan-debt-impacting-home-ownership
[https://perma.cc/67B6-JJTZ].
9. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965).
10. See Higher Education Act, AM. ASS’N OF COLLEGIATE REGISTRARS &
ADMISSIONS OFFICERS, https://www.aacrao.org/advocacy/issues/higher-education-act
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
11. See infra Part III (discussing Congress’ interest in re-authorizing the
HEA).
12. See Jared Polis, A Call for Bipartisanship in Higher Education, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (July 25, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2018/07/25/aimhigher-act-offers-opportunity-bipartisan-support-students-and-their-families
[https://perma.cc/CGD4-5BUY] (noting bipartisan “games” being played by
chairwoman, Virginia Foxx, and Republican members of the House Committee on
Education and the Workforce in shutting Democrats, as well as some Republican
members of the committee, out of the process).
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consequently the national economy.13 Since Congress will likely
consider a reauthorization of the HEA once again in the near future,
now is an opportune time to examine federal policies for higher
education to understand how they have evolved over time, what they
have accomplished, why student loan debt has reached such epic
proportions, and what, if anything, can or should be done about it.
While an investment in education is a crucial investment in the
future, this Article maintains that in the past, the federal government
has made poor choices in funding higher education. These choices
have been made partly from inactions, partly from mistakes stemming
from good intentions, and partly from an enmity to “free rides” for
students.14 Regardless of the rationale, the result has been that the
federal government has treated student borrowers unfairly in multiple
ways and, at present, all indications are that this unfair treatment will
continue, if not worsen.15 If so, it would be counterproductive because
it ultimately could have devastating effects, both on society and on the
economy.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution and expansion of
student loans and the consequent growth of student loan debt;16 Part II
discusses the mistakes made by the federal government during the
evolution of its funding for higher education;17 and Part III discusses
the pending legislation (from both sides of the political aisle) and
critiques the likely effect of each on the current broken system of
funding higher education.18

13. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 1.
14. See infra Part II (discussing prior mistakes in funding higher education).
15. See Yu, supra note 5; infra Subsection I.C.6 (detailing Betsy DeVos’
actions in favor of proprietary institutions); infra Section III.A (discussing PROSPER
bill and its attempt to enact Trump’s higher education agenda); see also Ryan Brown,
Trump DeVos to Eliminate Public Service Loan Forgiveness, STUDENT DEBT RELIEF,
https://www.studentdebtrelief.us/news/trump-devos-to-eliminate-public-serviceloan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/RCH7-V9JU] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
16. See infra Part I (detailing the evolution of federal student loans).
17. See infra Part II (discussing prior mistakes made in federal funding of
higher education). In addition to student loans offered by the federal government,
there are also loans offered by private lenders, states, and educational institutions.
However, the largest lender is the federal government. See Courtney Miller, How
Uncle Sam Became the Largest Student Lender, NERD WALLET (Dec. 21, 2015, 5:46
AM),
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/studies/uncle-sam-biggest-student-lender
[https://perma.cc/G3TR-PA8B].
18. See infra Part III (discussing pending legislation to re-authorize the
HEA).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS
While it has been termed a “fundamental interest,”19 education is
not a guaranteed right under the U.S. Constitution.20 Indeed, until the
1960s, it was regarded primarily as the responsibility of the state and
local governments.21 But because of its importance, the federal
government assumed a significant role in education from very early
on.22 At first that role encompassed a narrow, coherent rationale: to
promote the building of schools through land grants and to assimilate
into society emancipated slaves and, later, those who had served the

19. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1972)
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241, 1249 (Cal. 1971).
20. See Federal Education Policy and the States, 1945-2009: A Brief
Synopsis, in STATES’ IMPACT ON FED. EDUC. POL’Y PROJECT, N.Y. STATE ARCHIVES 5
(Jan. 2006, rev. Nov. 2009) [hereinafter A Brief Synopsis] (noting that education has
been regarded as one of the “unenumerated powers reserved ‘to the states . . . or to the
people’” under the Tenth Amendment). While the U.S. Constitution makes no explicit
mention of education, all state constitutions guarantee their citizens the right to
education. See id.
21. Overview: The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (last
modified May 25, 2017), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html
[https://perma.cc/N3HP-VZTG] (“It is States and communities, as well as public and
private organizations of all kinds, that establish schools and colleges, develop
curricula, and determine requirements for enrollment and graduation. The structure of
education finance in America reflects this predominant State and local role.”).
22. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 5 (explaining that in 1785 and 1787,
Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinances, reserving 1/36th of the land allocated to
each western township “for the maintenance of public schools within the said
township.”). The Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890 extended land grants to
states for institutions of higher education. See generally Pub. L. No. 37-130, 12 Stat.
503 (1862); 26 Stat. 417 (1890). After the end of the Civil War, the federal
government appropriated money to the Freedman’s Bureau to help assimilate
emancipated slaves into their new lives by, among other things, expanding educational
opportunities. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 5.
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country during wartime.23 But eventually, its role expanded far beyond
that rationale.24
A. The Initial Post-WWII Federal Role in Higher Education
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as
the GI Bill, provided a myriad of benefits for veterans returning home
from World War II.25 Among these benefits were payments of living
expenses and tuition to attend high school, college, or
vocational/technical school, as well as financial incentives to purchase
a residence.26 The GI Bill has been regarded as a great social and
economic success because it provided an education to many veterans,
thereby stimulating the economy and more than paying for itself
through increased federal income tax revenues and new home sales.27
But the original GI Bill, which expired in 1956, was ad hoc legislation
to help veterans readjust after the war. Education continued to be
regarded as the primary responsibility of the states and, indeed, until
the 1950s, the states resisted direct involvement by the federal
23. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 5. There was other education
legislation as well. See Smith-Hughes National Vocational Education Act of 1917,
Pub. L. No. 64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (promoting vocational education and training for
those interested in agriculture); National Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1920 (the Smith-Fess Act), Pub. L. No. 66-21936, 41 Stat. 735 (repealed 1973, and
reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973))
(providing vocational rehabilitation for workers disabled on the job and increased
appropriations for the handicapped in the 1920s and 1930s); Social Security Act of
1935, § 531, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (authorizing funding for a vocational
rehabilitation program). The National Youth Administration (NYA) and Works
Progress Administration (WPA) were agencies created under FDR’s New Deal in
1935 to provide job training and skills development to young people and unemployed
men and women. There were also several acts to provide school lunches and proper
nourishment to school children. See, e.g., Richard B. Russell National School Lunch
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-396, 60 Stat. 230 (1946). The Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 76-862,
54 Stat. 1125 (1940), authorized the construction of infrastructure for the war effort.
Under this Act, childcare facilities and school buildings were built, maintained, and
operated in communities across the country so that mothers could work toward the
war effort.
24. See discussion supra note 23.
25. Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284.
26. See id. at tit. II.
27. See
Servicemen’s
Readjustment
Act
(1944),
S.1767,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=76. Between 1940 and
1950, the number of postsecondary degrees awarded by U.S. colleges and universities
more than doubled. Id. The Bill’s contribution to human capital was a major factor in
the long-term economic growth that the United States enjoyed for the next generation.
Id.
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government.28 But the occurrence of two events during the Eisenhower
Administration in the late 1950s fundamentally changed the way that
education was regarded and kick-started a much broader federal role
in education at all levels.29 During the Johnson Administration, the
federal government further expanded that role.30
Eisenhower and Johnson, although from different political
parties, were both keenly attuned to education, albeit for different
reasons. Both men also were in the right place at the right time to
significantly influence education policy. Legislation enacted during
their administrations not only expanded federal involvement in
education but also ensured that the federal government would remain
involved for generations to come.
1. The Eisenhower Administration (1953–1961)
When Eisenhower ran for office, he was then president of
Columbia University, having accepted the position to “promote [the]
basic concepts of education in a democracy.”31 When he took office as
President of the United States in 1953, the country was in a period of
relative peace and economic prosperity that continued for most of his
presidency.32 This enabled Eisenhower, a moderate Republican, to
focus on domestic policy, in particular building and strengthening the

28. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 7.
29. See infra Subsection I.A.1 (discussing the Eisenhower Administration).
30. See infra Subsection I.A.2 (discussing the Johnson Administration).
31. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER, VOLUME ONE: SOLDIER, GENERAL
OF THE ARMY, PRESIDENT-ELECT, 1890-1952 471 (1983).
32. However, there were three recessions during Eisenhower’s presidency:
1953–1954, 1957–1958, and 1960–1961. The first was attributable to the inflationary
period following the Korean War, which began on June 27, 1950, and ended in July
1953, six months after Eisenhower took office. This recession was described as
“relatively mild and brief.” JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE
EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS 431 (1968). The second was a more
significant, world-wide recession attributable primarily to higher interest rates, which
in turn led to a decline in housing construction and new car sales. Also, the
Eisenhower Administration had cut the budget of the Department of Defense in 1957,
leading to a drop in new orders of equipment and a decline in the expansion of
manufacturing facilities. Because of the cut, this recession was known as “the
Eisenhower Recession.” The third was caused by the Federal Reserve’s raising of
interest rates, which slowed the economy. See DAN BARUFALDI, A Review of Past
Recessions, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/pastrecessions.asp [https://perma.cc/WP7U-MH94] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). This may
have been a contributing factor to John F. Kennedy’s 1960 presidential victory.
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country’s infrastructure.33 Shortly after taking office, he oversaw the
creation of the cabinet-level Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), established primarily to address the critical need for
additional classrooms and teachers to accommodate the burgeoning
baby boom.34 The considerable strain placed on local school districts
by an additional four million children entering school each year was
forcing these districts to turn to the federal government for help in
constructing new classrooms and providing funding for additional
teachers.35 Although Eisenhower was amenable to providing this help,
the federal government had a major obstacle to overcome before such
aid could be authorized.
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas, a seminal case in which it unanimously
held that segregated schools did not provide equal educational
opportunities; therefore, the public schools had to be desegregated.36
In accordance with Brown, the Administration could not authorize
federal funds to build segregated schools.37 The topic of school
construction then became a contentious political issue that stymied
Eisenhower from making much headway in providing aid for
education to the states.38
33. Eisenhower’s Administration saw the enactment of the National Defense
Education Act and the Atomic Energy Act as well as the creation of the National and
Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) and the Interstate Highway System. His
Administration also expanded Social Security and continued the New Deal programs.
Because of his domestic programs, Eisenhower is widely regarded as one of the
country’s ten best Presidents. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Lincoln, Washington and
Roosevelt Remain History’s Best Presidents in Survey, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lincoln-washington-and-rooseveltsremain-historys-best-presidents-in-survey/2017/02/16/42f0270a-f45f-11e6-8d72263470bf040_story.html [https://perma.cc/VHW2-XK6G] (ranking Eisenhower in
top five). When Eisenhower took office, both houses of Congress were controlled by
the Republicans. That ended in the 1955 elections, however, when the Democrats took
control of both houses and held them until 1983.
34. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 8. Eisenhower’s focus was on
primary and secondary education, although in 1954, Congress enacted § 117 of the
tax code, which excludes from gross income the value of qualified scholarships and
fellowships. I.R.C. § 117 (1954). This exclusion remains in the tax code today. See
I.R.C. §§ 117(a), (b)(1) (2018).
35. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 8.
36. See 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954).
37. See id.
38. Eisenhower proposed a $1.6 billion package of federal aid for school
construction in 1955. But there was fundamental disagreement among members of
Congress over how to allocate the money. The northern members were adamant that
the money be used “to upgrade the quality of southern schools—and, at the same time,
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In 1957, however, two events occurring within a month of each
other marked that year as a pivotal one for federal aid to education.
The first event was the desegregation crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas,
in September.39 This pitted President Eisenhower against Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus in a dramatic stand-off to enroll nine black
students in Little Rock’s formerly all-white Central High School.40
The stand-off ended when Eisenhower called in the 101st Airborne
division to protect the students and enforce the law.41 The incident was
a defining moment in the civil rights movement because it “cast the
federal government as the ultimate protector of racial equality and
civil rights.”42 It also shifted the role of “guaranteeing equal
educational opportunity to all students” from the states to the federal
government.43
The second event was the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, “the
world’s first orbiting satellite,” in October.44 This led to an
unprecedented infusion of federal funds into the public schools under
the “emergency” National Defense Education Act (NDEA), enacted
in 1958, in the interests of national defense and international economic
competition.45 Under the NDEA, particular emphasis was placed on
science, mathematics, engineering, and foreign languages.46 Title IV
of the Act established the graduate fellowship program, which
awarded fellowships to a select number of graduate students who
professed an interest in teaching at the postsecondary level.47 Title II
established the National Defense Student Loan Program,48 the first
to require desegregation.” Since the southern Democrats controlled Congress and
were vehemently opposed to desegregation, the President’s bill failed to pass. See A
Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 10.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 10; see DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK: A
MEMOIR 219–25 (1962).
43. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 11.
44. Id.
45. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat.
1580, 1581–82 (1958).
46. See generally §§ 301–305. In an effort to maintain the dichotomy
between the state and local governments on the one hand and the federal government
on the other, the Act expressly forbade federal control of education. See § 102, 72
Stat. at 1582.
47. See § 403, 72 Stat. at 1591.
48. See generally §§ 201–208. This Act
appropriated $47,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959,
$75,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, $82,500,000 for the
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federal loan program for low-income students and the precursor to the
Perkins Loan Program.49 It was also the first direct student loan
program in which the federal government appropriated funds from the
U.S. Treasury to educational institutions for low-interest loans to
needy students.50 Initially, the bill provided for scholarships rather
than loans, but some members of Congress thought it sent the wrong
message to give students a “free ride” at the expense of taxpayers.51
2. The Johnson Administration (1963–1969)
Lyndon Johnson had a particular interest in education, having
attended Southwest Texas State Teachers’ College in San Marcos,
Texas, where he had interrupted his education to earn money by
teaching poor Mexican children in a segregated school.52 He later said
this experience had a profound influence on him when he realized that
a college education was foreclosed to these children because they were
too poor to afford any further education.53 Thus, they essentially were
doomed to a life of poverty.
fiscal year ending June 30, 1961, $90,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1962, and such sums for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, and
each of the three succeeding fiscal years as may be necessary to enable
students who have received a loan for any school year ending prior to July
1, 1962, to continue or complete their education.
§ 201, 72 Stat. at 1583. Title II also provided loan forgiveness of 10% per year of fulltime service, up to 50% of the loan, for teachers in public elementary or secondary
schools. § 205(b)(3), 72 Stat. at 1585.
49. See infra notes 91, 15960, 2923 and accompanying text.
50. See Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 201, 72 Stat. at 1583. The educational
institutions then loaned the money to full-time students. Id.
51. See Timothy J. Conlan, 6 THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM:
THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH, EVOLUTION OF A PROBLEMATIC PARTNERSHIP: THE FEDS
AND HIGHER EDUCATION 18 (1981). A controversial provision in the Act was Title X,
§ 1001(f), which provided that in order to receive funds under the Act, students were
required to execute an affidavit stating that they were not members of and did not
support any group that taught or believed in the overthrow of the Government by force
or violence or by any other illegal means. Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 1001(f). It further
required students to execute an oath of allegiance to the U.S. Government. Id. Many
schools objected to this and refused to participate in the program. See Controversy of
National Defense Education Act, K12 ACADEMICS, https://www.k12academics.com/
Federal%20Education%20Legislation/National%20Defense%20Education%20Act/c
ontroversy-national-defense-education-act. This provision was deleted from the Act
in 1962. Id.
52. See PAT MURDOCK, T. CAY ROWE & SEAN BARNES, CONNECTIONS:
LYNDON B. JOHNSON IN SAN MARCOS 17 (2009).
53. See id.
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Within the first month after taking office, Johnson shepherded
through Congress the Vocational Education Act54 in fulfillment of
Kennedy’s promise to the American Vocational Association, which
had supported his bid for the presidency, and the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963,55 to accommodate the baby boomers entering
college and graduate programs.56 Both Acts authorized greater federal
expenditures for higher education.57 They were followed shortly by the
landmark Civil Rights Act and the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, which established the college work-study program for needy
students, the first program of its kind.58 Both were important pieces of
anti-discrimination legislation and the cornerstone of Johnson’s
“Great Society” agenda.59
An important part of that agenda, with its “War on Poverty,” was
a proposal for massive federal aid to education to help disadvantaged
54. See generally Vocational Education Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-210, 77
Stat. 403 (1963).
55. See generally Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88204, 77 Stat. 363 (1963).
56. 77 Stat. at 363. The preamble to this legislation states:
The Congress hereby finds that the security and welfare of the United States
require that this and future generations of American youth be assured ample
opportunity for the fullest development of their intellectual capacities, and
that this opportunity will be jeopardized unless the Nation’s colleges and
universities are encouraged and assisted in their efforts to accommodate
rapidly growing numbers of youth who aspire to a higher education. The
Congress further finds and declares that these needs are so great and these
steps so urgent that it is incumbent upon the Nation to take positive and
immediate action to meet these needs through assistance to institutions of
higher education, including graduate and undergraduate institutions, junior
and community colleges, and technical institutes, in providing certain
academic facilities.
Id. at 363–64.
57. See Higher Education Facilities Act, 77 Stat. at 363 (authorizing
“assistance to public and other nonprofit institutions of higher education in financing
the construction, rehabilitation, or improvement of needed academic and related
facilities in undergraduate and graduate institutions”); see generally Vocational
Education Act, 77 Stat. 403 (amending the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, Pub. L. No.
64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) to authorize a large increase in federal funding for
vocational education to emphasize agriculture and home economics, in particular).
58. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(1964); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964).
The Economic Opportunity Act also established the Job Corps and the Office of
Economic Opportunity, which later launched the Head Start program. See Economic
Opportunity Act, §§ 101–10, 78 Stat. 508–11; §§ 601–09, 78 Stat. 528–32.
59. See Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society”, U.S. HISTORY,
https://www.ushistory.org/us/56e.asp [https://perma.cc/3QAC-NG6S] (last visited
Oct. 28, 2019).
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students at the primary and secondary levels and to strengthen colleges
and make higher education more affordable.60 The Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) marked the most
comprehensive federal education legislation ever enacted by
Congress.61 It also marked the beginning of the federal government’s
extensive involvement in education because prior to this Act,
education and its funding had been controlled almost exclusively by
the state and local governments. The Act sought to equalize
educational opportunities through desegregation and through a
redistribution of resources to students who had been deprived or
discriminated against.62 Studies during this period showed a direct
correlation among poverty, low academic achievement, and high
dropout rates, which in turn resulted in a vicious cycle of continued
poverty and unemployment.63
In July 1965, Congress passed the Social Security Amendments
Act,64 which expanded child dependents’ benefits to include full-time
60. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress: Toward Full
Educational Opportunity, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 13, 1965),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-towardfull-educational-opportunity [https://perma.cc/2764-S8D7].
61. See generally Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). Johnson, a former teacher, employed great political
skill in getting the legislation enacted. One of four presidents to have served in the
Vice-Presidential position, as well as in both houses of Congress, Johnson was an
astute observer of the political scene and knew how the game was played. He realized
that if federal funds were given only to public schools, there would be an outcry from
Catholic schools. But if the funds also were given to private schools as well as public
schools, there would be an outcry from the National Education Association (NEA)
and from liberals, who objected to federal aid to religious schools. Johnson finally
decided that packaging his proposal as educational aid to poor children, rather than
aid directly to educational institutions, would garner the strongest political support.
He was correct because the ESEA was enacted with bipartisan support less than three
months after it was introduced, although that support was not strong because fourfifths of the Republican members of the House voted against it. See generally GARETH
DAVIES, SEE GOVERNMENT GROW: EDUCATION POLITICS FROM JOHNSON TO REAGAN
(2007).
62. See 79 Stat. at 27, 36, 47 (providing financial assistance to local education
agencies in “areas affected by federal activity,” grants for the acquisition of “school
library resources, textbooks and other instructional materials,” and to “strengthen state
departments of education”).
63. See Robert Kiener, Are New Policies Needed to Keep More Teens in
School?, CQ RESEARCHER (June 13, 2014) https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/
document.php?id=cqresrre2014061300 [https://perma.cc/X9ZA-HUNU] (discussing
efforts by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to alleviate poverty).
64. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). This was an extension of the
Social Security Amendments Act of 1956, which provided benefits to dependent
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students up to age twenty-two,65 in recognition of the fact that full-time
students often are dependent on their parents for support beyond age
18.66 By the end of that year, more than 205,000 students had received
these benefits.67
Seven months after the ESEA was signed into law, Johnson
signed complementary legislation, the Higher Education Act of 1965
(HEA).68 The HEA provided financial assistance for teacher
preparation and training programs and low-interest loans with loan
forgiveness for teachers who chose to serve in areas of national need.69
In response to concerns over the rising costs of college and the
relatively low rate of college enrollment by recent high school
graduates,70 the HEA sought to encourage college enrollment by
making post-secondary education more affordable for low- and
middle-income individuals. To accomplish this goal, it authorized the
appropriation of $804 million for scholarships, grants,71 and low
children of disabled or deceased beneficiaries or of those who were eligible for Social
Security benefits. It also provided benefits to disabled children of a person eligible for
or receiving Social Security benefits or a deceased eligible person, provided the
disability arose before the child turned age 18. 79 Stat. at 370–73.
65. 79 Stat. at 371.
66. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Research Note #11: The History of Social Security
“Student” Benefits (Jan. 2001), https://www.ssa.gov/history/studentbenefit.html
[https://perma.cc/XB85-ET5C].
67. Id.
68. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219. The Act initially was authorized for
five years, through 1970, but it has been reauthorized eight times (in 1968, 1972, 1976,
1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, 2008) to amend programs and change language and policies.
69. See generally id. (authorizing appropriation of funds for enhancement of
libraries in Title II, authorizing aid for developing institutions that had not yet met the
minimum requirements for accreditation in Title III, providing for student assistance,
such as Educational Opportunity Grants (now Pell Grants) and merit-based
scholarships in Title IV, authorizing aid for teacher quality enhancement in Title V,
and authorizing funding to improve undergraduate programs in Title VI).
70. See NAT’L CTR. ON EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
2017 tbl.302.10 (53d ed. 2019) [hereinafter NCES] (showing in 1965, almost 51% of
recent high school graduates had enrolled in either two-year or four-year institutions
of higher education by October of the year following their graduation). In raw
numbers, around 1.4 million out of 2.7 million graduating high school students in
1965 had enrolled in higher education. Id.
71. §§ 402–09, 79 Stat. at 1232–36. These were called Educational
Opportunity Grants, the precursor to Pell grants. See Student Loan History, NEW
AMERICA, https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-explainers/highered-workforce/federal-student-aid/federal-student-loans/federal-student-loan-history
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019); see also Robert L. Capt, Analysis of the Higher Education
Act Reauthorizations: Financial Aid Policy Influencing College Access and Choice,
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., ED. RESOURCES INFO. CTR.
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interest loans (the precursor of Stafford loans)72 and an extension of
the work-study program,73 all to be administered by the Commissioner
of Education.74 This marked an important transition from federal
support for educational institutions to support for individual student
aid.
Another transition was that the student loans authorized by the
HEA were not direct loans from the U.S. Treasury, as they had been
under the NDEA, but instead were loans made by private lenders.75 To
encourage participation by these lenders, the HEA anticipated that the
loans would be guaranteed by the states, with a relatively small
amount of seed money from the federal government.76 Not only did
the federal government hope to save money by encouraging the states
to assume their share of fiscal responsibility, but also budget rules at
that time required direct loans to be posted as current losses, even

72. §§ 421–45, 79 Stat. at 1236–49. Without funding from the federal
government, students would find it difficult to obtain loans because they generally
have limited credit histories, few earnings (if any), and no collateral, and they would
be unable to begin repayment until they have finished school. See JASON D. DELISLE,
PRIVATE IN NAME ONLY: LESSONS FROM THE DEFUNCT GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN
PROGRAM 3 (2017).
73. §§ 441–42, 79 Stat. at 1249–51. The HEA was reauthorized in 1968 at
the end of Johnson’s term in office. This reauthorization extended guaranteed student
loans through 1971. See generally Higher Education Amendments Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-575, 82 Stat. 1014. It also required the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to submit a report to Congress prior to March 1, 1970,
on whether there were any practices of lending institutions that discriminated against
particular classes or categories of students. See id.
74. See generally Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219. To appease the state and
local governments, the Act prohibited federal control of education. See § 804, 79 Stat.
at 1270.
75. See § 421, 79 Stat. at 1236.
76. See §§ 421–35. The states were to establish “guaranty agencies” with the
federal money plus their own money to insure against default, death, or disability of
the borrower and to pay the subsidized interest on federal direct loans to low-income
students. See §§ 421, 428, 430; see also DELISLE, supra note 72, at 3. The Act
excluded proprietary schools from receiving funds under the loan guarantee program.
See 79 Stat. at 1248. Instead, they received funding under a smaller program that
provided loans to vocational schools. This program was merged with the federal loan
guarantee program under the 1968 reauthorization, giving proprietary schools much
broader access to federally guaranteed loans. See Spiros Protopsaltis & Libby Masiuk,
Protecting Students and Taxpayers: Why the Trump Administration Should Heed
History of Bipartisan Efforts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/protecting-students-and-taxpayers
[https://perma.cc/2A6K-GSAD].
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though the loans were to be repaid later with interest.77 Guaranteed
loans, on the other hand, did not post as current losses because the
liability for the guarantee would not be realized until some years later
and thus there was no immediate outflow of funds.78 This meant that
direct loans would be recorded as losses rather than loans, while
guaranteed loans would not be recorded as liabilities at all, even
though some would become liabilities later.79 At the time, there was
concern among economists that “the government was making
financial commitments without accounting for the ultimate costs.”80
The state guaranteed loan program did not work as anticipated,
however, because some states refused to participate and others found
that demands for loans far outpaced both the available capital funding
and their insurance funds.81 In order to encourage lenders to participate
in the program, Congress provided for the guarantee of up to 80% of
losses suffered by states’ guaranty agencies.82 Thus, the federal
government assumed an even greater role in funding higher
education.83 As an added incentive to private lenders and to keep
student loan interest rates low, Congress later authorized the payment
of a “special allowance” to lenders to compensate them for loss against
increases in student loan interest rates.84

77. See Clare McCann, Fair Value Accounting, EDCENTRAL,
www.edcentral.org/encyclopedia/fair-value-accounting (last visited Oct. 28, 2019)
(explaining the concept of “cash basis accounting”).
78. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 4.
79. See id.
80. See Student Loan History, supra note 71.
81. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 4.
82. See Higher Education Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, 82
Stat. 1014 (1968); Action on Higher Education Bills Deferred to 1968, CQ ALMANAC
(1967).
83. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 4 (explaining this provision was a
reinsurance policy to reimburse the states’ insurance funds against loss). This
provision also meant that states would assume responsibility for 20% of the losses,
relegating the state “guaranty agencies to a risk-sharing role rather than one in which
they fully backed loans.” Id.
84. See generally Emergency Insured Student Loan Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-95, 83 Stat. 141 (1969). The interest rates were set by the government, and in order
to avoid doing the unpopular thing and raising the student loan rate when the market
rate increased, the government would simply compensate the lenders to the extent of
the difference between the student loan rate and the higher market rate. See DELISLE,
supra note 72, at 4.
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B. Accelerating the Government’s Funding Role
1. The Nixon Administration (1969–1974)
The relative affluence and growth of the 1950s and 1960s
devolved into a period of unrest, marked by distrust and dissatisfaction
with the government over two contentious issues: the war in Vietnam
and school busing to achieve racial equality in the schools.85 Military
spending and other requirements of the war effort, combined with
domestic spending, had produced budget deficits that fueled inflation.
There had been a prolonged period of stagflation (high inflation and
unemployment combined with a sluggish economy) followed by a
recession. This led to the economic crisis of the 1970s,86 which caused
Congress to question for the first time whether the unprecedented
amounts being spent on education were worth the cost.87
As a President, Richard Nixon has been vilified for his role in
the Watergate scandal, but he had an ambitious education agenda that
would further expand the federal role in education. Although the
second reauthorization of the HEA in 1972 was weaker than the
legislation Nixon initially proposed, it contained several significant

85. See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5
(1971). While busing was the hot issue, there were also other contentious issues
relating to education. One was de facto segregation in the North, a sore point among
Southerners. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 435–
36 (1968). Another was that courts continued to struggle with the meaning of the term
“equal education opportunities.” See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1241 (Cal.
1971) (discussing property taxes and equal education).
CENT.,
86. See
Vietnam
War
and
the
Economy,
HIST.
www.historycentral.com/sixty/Economics/Vietnam.html
[https://perma.cc/NLR8MV2K] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). The Vietnam War affected the U.S. economy in
several ways. See id. First, the war effort produced a strain on the nation’s production
capacities, since factories that had been producing consumer goods were requisitioned
to produce items for the military. See id. Funds were flowing overseas with few funds
returning to the United States. See id. This created an inequality in the balance of
payments, leading to a weakening of the dollar. See id. Second, government spending
on the war effort combined with domestic spending was causing budget deficits that
led to inflation. See id. Third, consumer confidence was low because of dissatisfaction
with the government and unrest over the war. See id. Fourth, there was an increase in
interest rates that restricted the available capital for both businesses and consumers.
See id.
87. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 24–26, 40–44 (resulting in the
advent of federal mandates to document the effectiveness of federal education
expenditures and academic achievement).
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provisions.88 First, it extended the guaranteed student loan program for
four years, through June 30, 1975, and increased the amount of the
available loan.89 Second, as a further incentive for private lenders, it
also created the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) as
a government-sponsored enterprise to serve as a “secondary market
and warehousing facility” for guaranteed student loans and to provide
liquidity for those loans.90 Third, it created the National Institute of
Education and established a new category of low-interest loans to
needy students, the Federal Direct Student Loan Program, in
partnership with the schools.91 Although the funds for this program
came directly from the U.S. Treasury, educational institutions also
made capital contributions.92 Fourth, it provided loan forgiveness for
those who chose to enter certain areas of public service,93 and fifth, it
88. See generally Education Amendments Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
86 Stat. 235 (1972). Nixon had asked for an expansion of federal aid to students
enrolled in post-secondary institutions so that eligible students would be able to
receive enough federal assistance to “make up the difference between his college costs
and what his family is able to contribute.” Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the
Education Amendments Act of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 23, 1972),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-signing-the-educationamendments-1972 [https://perma.cc/L875-CTB2] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
89. § 132. The available loan increased by $1,000 from $1,500 to $2,500. §
132(a).
90. § 133 (adding new § 439 to the HEA). A government sponsored
enterprise (GSE) is a hybrid between a government agency and a private company
“established to enhance the flow of credit to specific sectors of the American
economy.” See also Government-Sponsored Enterprise Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gse.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/Y7GQ-CL3F]. While GSE’s are not subsidized by the government,
there is an “implicit guarantee” that the government will not allow such entities to fail
or default on debt. Id. This gives GSEs significant advantages in the capital markets.
See id.
91. See § 137, 86 Stat. at 272–77; § 301, 86 Stat. at 326–34 (amending Tit.
IV of Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783). The purpose of the Institute was to
seek to improve education, including career education, in the United States
through (A) helping to solve or to alleviate the problems of, and achieve the
objectives of American education; (B) advancing the practice of education,
as an art, science, and profession; (C) the strengthening of the scientific and
technological foundations of education; and (D) building an effective
educational research and development system.
§ 405(b)(2), 86 Stat. at 329.
92. 86 Stat. at 273–81 (adding new Part E to the HEA). The educational
institutions were required to contribute one-ninth the amount of the federal
contribution. § 463(a)(2)(B), 86 Stat. at 274.
93. § 465, 86 Stat. at 277–78. This included those teaching in elementary or
secondary schools with a majority of low-income students, those teaching
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established two new need-based grants, as well as remedial programs
for disadvantaged students.94
In retrospect, the two most significant aspects of the 1972
reauthorization were the decisions to provide loans to students, rather
than support to educational institutions, and to authorize federal funds
for proprietary (i.e., for-profit) schools.95 There had been concern
expressed over the authorization of funds for proprietary schools.96 In
a prescient remark, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Committee Report on the legislation expressed a reservation about
allowing federal funding for such institutions for fear they might
recruit students through “sophisticated advertising and unfulfillable
promises” and that they might make misrepresentations about their
quality of education.97 But at that time, the number of students enrolled
in such institutions was negligible,98 so the concern was disregarded.
The higher education community urged Congress to enact
“formula-based, enrollment-driven federal aid to institutions” instead
of aid to students.99 But instead, Congress decided the most effective
way to remove barriers to education for lower-income students was
handicapped students, and those who had served in the military in dangerous areas.
Id. It also provided grants for law school clinical programs. § 191.
94. 86 Stat. at 251–58. The two new grants were under the Incentive Grant
Program and the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant Program. See
§§ 415A–415D; §§ 413A–413D. The Student Incentive grants were to be
administered by the states, which also provided partial funding. §§ 415A–415D. The
program provided for a one-time grant of up to $1,500 to be awarded on the basis of
substantial financial need to undergraduates enrolled on a full-time basis. § 415A. The
Supplemental Educational Opportunity grants were to be awarded to those enrolled in
undergraduate programs who demonstrated evidence of “academic or creative
promise and capability of maintaining good standing in this course of study” plus
exceptional need. § 413C. These were in addition to the basic Educational
Opportunity grant. See §§ 413A–413D. The amount of the Supplemental grant was
the lesser of $1,500 or one-half of the total amount of financial aid awarded by the
institution to the student. § 413B. The maximum amount of the Educational
Opportunity grant (also referred to as the basic grant) in 1972 was $1,400 for a fulltime student, less the expected family contribution. § 411, 86 Stat. at 248–49.
95. See §1057(a), 86 Stat. at 320.
96. See S. REP. NO. 92-346, at 51 (1971).
97. Id. As a consequence of the reauthorization, the number of students
enrolled in proprietary schools more than doubled between 1970 and 1975, while total
college enrollment during this period increased only slightly over 31%. See NCES,
supra note 70, at tbl.302.10.
98. See id. (explaining that despite the dramatic enrollment increase, only
around 0.4% of students were enrolled in proprietary institutions in 1975 and this
represented about 2% of all students enrolled in private institutions during this period).
99. Gladieux, supra note 5.
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through aid to students, rather than to institutions.100 This was a pivotal
point in federal financing of higher education because it established
student loans, rather than institutional support, as the centerpiece of
federal aid for higher education.101
In 1973, the year after the HEA was reauthorized, there was an
oil embargo. Although it lasted only a year, it had devastating effects
on the economy, causing unemployment to reach its highest level
since the Great Depression.102 Because of this economic downturn,
states cut funding to higher education while schools were facing
increased energy costs.103 This forced schools to raise their tuition rates
out of necessity.104

100. See id. An underlying argument was that providing aid to students, rather
than educational institutions, would be a means of ensuring higher quality education
because students would “[vote] with their feet,” moving their aid to institutions that
better met their needs, leaving the other institutions to flounder. Id. This theory was
debunked later, but by then the die was cast. See id. According to Lawrence E.
Gladieux,
[t]he notion that having students vote with their feet would somehow assure
quality in the postsecondary education marketplace was a dubious
proposition from the start. More than a quarter century later, it is clear that
the marketplace rationale begged important questions of institutional
quality and accountability, as well as consumer information, awareness, and
protection.
Id.; Matthew B. Fuller, A History of Financial Aid to Students, 44 J. STUDENT FIN.
AID
40,
54
(2014),
https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=jsfa
(“[S]cholars
have
generally
acknowledged that the 1972 reauthorization cemented the ‘basic charter of today’s
federal student aid system’ with students as the intermediaries of funds between the
federal government and institutions.”).
101. See Fuller, supra note 100, at 42–43.
102. See David B. Sicilia, A Brief History of U.S. Unemployment, WASH. POST
(Nov.
5,
2011),
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/usunemployment-rate-history
[https://perma.cc/UA5D-XZE8]
(explaining
unemployment reached a record high of over 8% during the 1970s). The maximum
marginal tax rate during the Nixon/Ford Administrations was 70%. TAX FOUND., U.S.
Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013 (Nominal and Inflation
Adjusted Brackets) (Oct. 17, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/us-federal-individualincome-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets
[https://perma.cc/CSE3-EXD4].
103. See JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN
TRANSITION, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 383 (4th ed.
2004).
104. See id. at 383–84.
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2. The Ford Administration (1974–1977)
In 1974, Richard Nixon resigned from office in the wake of
impeachment proceedings in the House and declining political
support. At that time, there was growing concern over the predatory
practices of proprietary schools and the increasing number of defaults
on student loans, the majority of which were attributable to these
schools.105 Shortly after Gerald Ford took office to serve the remainder
of Nixon’s second term, Congress extended the GI Bill benefits to
Vietnam veterans.106 This Act prohibited federal funding to any
institution that “utilizes advertising, sales, or enrollment practices of
any type which are erroneous, deceptive, or misleading either by
actual statement, omission, or intimation.”107 Shortly after the
enactment of that legislation, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare proposed new transparency regulations requiring
vocational schools to disclose to prospective students the employment
prospects in their fields of study and the projected salaries in those
fields.108 They also required these schools to provide a “fair and
equitable refund” to students who decided not to attend after
enrolling.109
In 1976, there was a third reauthorization of the HEA, which
extended the guaranteed student loan program through September 30,
1981.110 As an incentive to encourage states to establish student loan
guarantee programs, the federal government undertook to guarantee

105. See David Whitman, Vietnam Vets and a New Student Loan Program
Bring New College Scams, CENTURY FOUND. 4–7 (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/Vietnam-vets-new-student-loan-program-bring-newcollege-scams.
106. See generally Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of
1974, Pub L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578 (describing assistance available to Vietnam
veterans).
107. § 212, 88 Stat. at 1586 (amending 38 U.S.C. §1796).
108. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 11–12. These regulations also subjected
to additional scrutiny any school that enrolled more than 60% of students who were
reliant on federal loans or that had a 10% or greater default rate or a 20% or greater
withdrawal rate. Id. at 12.
109. Id. at 11.
110. See Education Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127, 90
Stat. 2081 (1976) (amending § 424 of the Higher Education Act of 1965). This
limitation applied to new loans. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2103–04 (amending Part B of
Tit. IV of the HEA). However, loans could continue to be issued until September 30,
1985, to enable students who had already obtained guaranteed loans to complete or
continue their education. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2103–04.
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100% of the loans.111 Perhaps to protect the fisc to some extent, or
perhaps to require students to pay for their “free ride,” there was a new
provision that limited the ability of students to discharge insured loans
in bankruptcy.112 Under this provision, student loans were not eligible
for discharge until after five years of repayment or upon a showing of
undue hardship.113
Later, in 1976, Congress enacted the Veterans’ Education and
Employment Assistance Act, which provided that a school would be
ineligible to receive funds under the GI Bill if more than 85% of the
students at that school received financial aid from the school, the
Veterans’ Administration, or any other federal source.114 Afterward,
there was a decline in student loan default rates.115
3. The Carter Administration (1977–1981)
When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, the country was in a
period of economic stagflation that had lingered at the end of the
Vietnam War.116 In addition, media attention was focused on a report
that SAT scores had steadily declined over the past fourteen years.117
The combination of these factors caused the public to demand greater

111. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2099.
112. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2141.
113. See id. The term “undue hardship” was undefined under the legislation,
and over the next ten to twelve years, courts struggled to define the term. § 127, 90
Stat. at 2141. The result was that discharging a student loan debt in bankruptcy
involved a lengthy, expensive legal process with a difficult burden of proving undue
hardship. See B.J. Huey, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally
Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34
TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 91–92 (2002).
114. See Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-502, § 205, 90 Stat. 2383, 2387 (1976). This provision was challenged as a
violation of Due Process but was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cleland v.
National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 221–22 (1978).
115. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 12.
116. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 40.
117. See id. at 41 (stating although a panel of experts from the College Board
theorized that the decline was attributable to a greater number of minority and female
test-takers, this theory was later debunked). At the same time, others theorized that
because of the growth of compensatory education in the 1960s as a substitute for racial
integration, the average high school dropout rate had fallen and thus a greater number
of low-achieving students remained in school. See id. This fact plus the redirection of
resources to compensatory, bilingual, and special education and away from highachieving, college-bound students was the real cause of the decline in SAT scores.
See id.
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accountability and efficiency in government spending.118 This led to
state cuts in funding for education, producing a concomitant rise in
tuition.119 Middle-income families, feeling the squeeze, began to
complain that the federal government was neglecting them.120 Also
during this time, there were proposals for tuition tax credits.121 To
address the concerns of the middle class and to quash the proposals
for tax credits, the Carter Administration and congressional
Democrats responded by enacting the Middle Income Student
Assistance Act of 1978.122 This Act eliminated the income restrictions
on guaranteed student loans, allowing any student, regardless of
income level, to obtain them.123 Thus, the federal focus shifted from
lower-income students to middle-income students, resulting in a
dramatic increase in the volume of student loans.124
Also in 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act,125
codifying into the Bankruptcy Code the provision enacted in 1976 that
provided a five-year exception to discharge for guaranteed student
118. See id. at 40–41.
119. See id. at 44.
120. See Gladieux, supra note 5.
121. See id.
122. See generally Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.) (amending the Higher Education Act of 1965).
123. See generally 92 Stat. 2402 (explaining the Act also expanded eligibility
for Educational Opportunity grants to allow an additional 1.5 million students from
middle-income families to qualify). Under this expansion, families with incomes up
to $250,000 were eligible for the grants. In determining the amount of expected family
contribution (EFC), the Act provided that no more than 10.5% of a family’s
discretionary income could be considered. § 2, 92 Stat. at 2402; Gerhard Peters &
John T. Wooley, Jimmy Carter: Educational Amendments of 1978 and the Middle
Income Student Assistance Act Remarks at the Billing Signing Ceremony., AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 1, 1978), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30087
[https://perma.cc/X6HL-BLCT].
124. See Impact of Admin.’s Proposed Fiscal Year 1983 Budget on Student
Fin. Aid & Higher Educ. Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor H.R., 97th Cong. 2, 596–97 (1982) (statement
of Alice M. Rivlin, Director). Ms. Rivlin noted,
Between 1978 and 1981, total available aid grew by 70 percent to $14.7
billion. Almost half of all aid in 1981 was in the form of loans, up onequarter from 1978. The growth of the GSL program also meant that roughly
20 percent of all aid in 1981 went to students from families with incomes
over $30,000, whereas little aid had gone to comparable students before
1978.
Id. at 597.
125. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978).
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loans.126 This exception applied only to government loans made by
nonprofit schools.127 The ostensible rationale for the exception was
that it was necessary to ensure the viability of the student loan
system.128 But there are reports that this action was based on anecdotal
evidence of students obtaining a “free” education by declaring
bankruptcy without making any payments on their loans and without
demonstrating undue hardship.129 In 1977, however, only 0.3% of
student loans had been discharged in bankruptcy,130 certainly not
enough to cause any concern over the viability of the student loan
system. Given the small number of discharges, this concern could have
been addressed better through financial counseling and litigation,
rather than through legislation.131
Despite the complaints and controversies over funding for
education that Carter faced, he was successful in establishing the
Department of Education in 1979.132 The purpose of the new
department was to focus the nation’s attention on education, make
federal education programs more responsive and accountable,
streamline the administration of federal aid to education, save tax
dollars by eliminating current “bureaucratic layers,” and ensure that
126. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. This was codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
127. See § 523, 92 Stat. at 2591.
128. See Preston Mueller, The Non-Dischargeability of Private Student
Loans: A Looming Financial Crisis?, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 229, 232 (2015).
129. See, e.g., id.; see also Rafael Pardo & Michelle R. Lacy, The Real Student
Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 180
(2009). One source states that this change was in response to a “handful of doctors
and lawyers who attempted to fraudulently file for bankruptcy after graduation.”
Jennifer Wadia, Student Loan Bankruptcy Reform, STUDENT DEBT RELIEF,
https://www.studentdebtrelief.us/news/student-loan-bankruptcy-reform
[https://
perma.cc/N7CX-3TPP] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). Instead of applying laws then in
effect to a handful of ostensible wrongdoers, Congress chose to deny bankruptcy
protection to most student loan borrowers for a minimum of five years after
graduation. See id.
130. See Steven Palmer, The History of Student Loans and Bankruptcy
Discharge (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/history-student-loansbankruptcy-discharge-steven-palmer [https://perma.cc/A3CY-NYQT].
131. See Timothy D. Naegele, The Guaranteed Student Loan Program: Do
Lenders’ Risks Exceed Their Rewards?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 599, 602 (1983) (explaining
that although Congress may have been too quick to codify the exception to discharge
for student loans, the depressed economy of the late 1970s led to a much higher than
anticipated student loan default rate).
132. See Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 9688, §§ 102–103, 93 Stat. 669 (1979). The following year, the Department was elevated
to a cabinet level department.
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local communities retained control of their schools and educational
programs.133
But during the Carter Administration, the restrictions on
proprietary schools were greatly weakened, allowing them to again
proliferate amidst allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and
deception. The Middle Income Student Assistance Act provided that
proprietary schools could admit students without a high school
diploma and those students would remain eligible for federal student
loans.134 The following year, a federal court struck down the 1974
regulation requiring proprietary/vocational schools to refrain from
engaging in unfair and abusive practices.135 The policy of the Ford
Administration, to subject to additional scrutiny schools enrolling
more than 60% of students with federal loans, those with a 10% or
greater default rate, or those with a 20% or greater withdrawal rate,136
was eliminated under new Department of Education guidelines.137
From 1979 to 1980, enrollment in proprietary schools experienced one
of the largest jumps in their history because of the proliferation in
accreditation of these schools.138

133. Jimmy Carter: Department of Education Organization Act Statement on
Signing S. 210 into Law., AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 17, 1979),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31543 [https://perma.cc/G6KJADVG].
134. See generally Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978) (allowing proprietary schools to admit students
without a high school diploma and allowing those students to remain eligible for
federal student loans). At this time, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress,
as well as the White House. Ironically, they were staunchly in favor of proprietary
schools because these schools offered educational opportunities to nontraditional and
lower-income students; Republicans were staunchly opposed to such schools. See
David Whitman, The Closing of the Republican Mind on For-Profit Colleges,
(Mar.
27,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
ATLANTIC
archive/2017/03/the-closing-of-the-republican-mind-on-for-profit-colleges/520803
[https://perma.cc/BX2R-4KNC]. Later, these parties would switch views. See id.
135. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text; see also Katherine
Gibbs Sch. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 658–59 (2d Cir. 1979) (striking regulation on
grounds of lack of specificity).
136. See discussion supra note 108; see David Whitman, The Reagan
Administration’s Campaign to Rein in Predatory For-Profit Colleges, CENTURY
FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.tcf.org/content/report/reagan-administrationscampaign-rein-predatory-profit-colleges.
137. Id.
138. See NCES, supra note 70, at 403 (showing a 56.56% increase in
enrollment).
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In 1980, the HEA was again reauthorized.139 This legislation
provided new loans to parents of undergraduate students called PLUS
loans (Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students)140 and provided a sixmonth grace period after graduation before commencement of
repayment of guaranteed student loans.141 An important, although
“little-noticed,” provision of this reauthorization tied federal loan
subsidies for lenders to Treasury bill rates, changing the previous
system in which rates were set by government officials, subject to a
cap.142 This increased the amount that lenders could receive on
guaranteed student loans and caused an explosion in lender
participation and consequently in student loan volume.143
This expansion in the availability of student loans led to a
stronger political base, which probably protected the anti-poverty
education programs from what could have been more severe cutbacks
during the Reagan era.144 But there was also an average increase of
31% in tuition from 1977 to 1981.145
C. Changing Direction in Federal Funding
1. The Reagan Administration (1981–1989)
Ronald Reagan ran for President on a platform of abolishing the
Department of Education, calling it “President Carter’s new
bureaucratic boondoggle.”146 As part of his “New Federalism” agenda
to reduce the size of the government by “reduc[ing] the federal budget

139. See generally Education Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374,
94 Stat. 1367 (1980) (reauthorizing the HEA).
140. See § 419, 94 Stat. at 1424–25.
141. See § 444(c), 94 Stat. at 1441 (amending § 464(c)(2)(A) of the HEA).
142. See § 420(a), 94 Stat. at 1425–26 (amending § 438 of the HEA); see also
ROWENA OLEGARIO, THE ENGINE OF ENTERPRISE: CREDIT IN AMERICA 198–99 (2016).
143. See OLEGARIO, supra note 142, at 199.
144. See id.
145. NCES, supra note 70, at 579–81. This was an increase of 22% at public
in-state institutions and 33% at private institutions. Id.
146. Neal McCluskey, Cutting Federal Aid for K-12 Education, Downsizing
the Federal Government (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/
education/k-12-education-subsidies; see also Valerie Strauss, Ronald Reagan’s
POST
(Feb.
6,
2011),
Impact
on
Education
Today,
WASH.
http://www.voices.washingtonpost.com/answer-sheet/school/schoolturnaroundsreform/how-ronald-reagan-affected-tod.html. Reagan’s other ideas for
reforming education included mandatory school prayer and tuition tax credits for
private schools. Id.
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deficit, . . . attack[ing] inflation, . . . cut[ting] taxes,147 and . . .
decentraliz[ing] as well as deregulat[ing] a wide range of federal social
welfare programs,”148 Reagan cut funding to education in his first year
in office by more than 15% (which amounted to around $1 billion).149
He also oversaw the Postsecondary Student Assistance Amendments
Act of 1981,150 which rolled back some of the strides in higher
education President Carter had made. This Act implemented a student
loan origination fee, repealed the six-month loan repayment grace
period, increased the annual repayment amount, repealed the
increased guaranteed loan amounts for independent students, and
increased the PLUS loan interest rate, although it expanded eligibility
under the PLUS program to include independent undergraduate
students and graduate/professional students.151
The following year, Congress enacted the Student Financial
Assistance Technical Amendments Act of 1982,152 which again
amended the Higher Education Act of 1965. This Act restricted the
amount of the Pell Grant that a student could receive in the academic
year 1983–1984; revised the need-based criteria for supplemental
educational opportunity grants, work-study grants, and direct loans;

147. Reagan wasted no time implementing his supply-side economics to
stimulate the economy. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176 (1981). He lowered the income tax rates from a maximum of
70% to 50%, where they remained for the next six years until he lowered them again
in 1987 to a maximum rate of 38.5% in a complete overhaul of the tax code. Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(h)(2), 100 Stat. 2098–99 (1986). At
the beginning of 1983, unemployment reached a high of 10.8%, the highest since the
Great Depression, but it had fallen to half that by the time Reagan left office. Sicilia,
supra note 102.
148. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 45. At that time, the Democrats
controlled the House, but the Republicans controlled the Senate.
149. Id. He argued that many of the programs had not warranted their expense
and that students should be paying a larger share of their own costs. See Gene I.
Maeroff, After 20 Years, Educational Programs Are a Solid Legacy of Great Society,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/30/us/after-20years-educational-programs-are-a-solid-legacy-of-great-society.html
[https://
perma.cc/39YZ-PJG8].
150. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§
531–40, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). This was part of Title V of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981. See §§ 531–40.
151. See §§ 534–37, 95 Stat. at 454–57.
152. See generally Student Financial Assistance Technical Amendments Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-301, 96 Stat. 1400 (1982) (amending the HEA).
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and terminated the authority of Sallie Mae to consolidate student loans
as of August 1, 1983.153
By 1984, there was growing concern over the student loan
default rate.154 So that year, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, which included private
student loans within the exception to bankruptcy discharge.155 Two
years later, there was a more student-friendly reauthorization of the
HEA.156 Under this legislation, the Supplemental Loan to Students
(SLS) program was created to extend loans to graduate, professional,
and independent students;157 authorize student loan consolidation;158
and increase the loan limits for all guaranteed student loans.159 Also
under this legislation, National Direct Student Loans were renamed
Perkins Loans.160 But amid continuing concern over the large number
of defaults, the legislation provided that any student in default would
be ineligible for any subsequent government-guaranteed student
loan.161

153. See § 2, 96 Stat. at 1400; §§ 10–11, 96 Stat. at 1403–04; § 14, 96 Stat. at
1405.
154. See Student Loan Default Rate Soars in ‘85: Officials Forecast $1-Billion
Problem, Worse Years to Come, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 1985) [hereinafter Student Loan
Default Rate Soars], https://www.articles.latimes.com/1985-08-29/news/mn237251default-rate [https://perma.cc/J6JA-3KAL].
155. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, § 456, 98 Stat. 376 (1984); see also supra notes 112–113, 125–126
and accompanying texts.
156. See generally Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99498, 100 Stat. 1268 (1986) (reauthorizing the HEA). This reauthorization bill was
sponsored by Senator Robert Stafford of Vermont.
157. See § 428A, 100 Stat. at 1384–86.
158. See § 428C, 100 Stat. at 1388–91. This applied to Federal Family
Education Loans (FFEL) under the Act.
159. See § 425, 100 Stat. at 1359. The limit was increased from $2,500 for all
years of undergraduate study and $5,000 for graduate students, to $2,625 for freshmen
and sophomores, $4,000 for juniors and seniors, and $7,500 for graduate students. §
425, 100 Stat. at 1359. In this 99th Congress, the Democrats were in the majority in
the House, but the Republicans were in the majority in the Senate. See HISTORY, ART
& ARCHIVES, Congressional Profiles, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., https://history.house.gov/
Congressional-Overview/Profiles/99th [https://perma.cc/TCN2-CXY4] (last visited
Oct. 28, 2019).
160. See § 461(a), 100 Stat. at 1439. The following year, in 1987, the
guaranteed student loan program was renamed the Stafford Loan Program in honor of
Vermont Democrat Robert Stafford, a long-time supporter of education. See Higher
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 100-369, § 8, 102 Stat. 835, 837.
161. See Pub. L. No. 99-498, § 484(a), 100 Stat. 1480.
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Secretary of Education William Bennett had been sounding the
alarm for some time over the rising student loan default rates.162 In late
1987, he proposed regulations to terminate federal funding of schools
with a default rate greater than 50% and to investigate schools with a
default rate greater than 20% by the end of 1990.163 The Democrats,
along with representatives of proprietary schools, objected that the
regulations disproportionately affected proprietary schools, which in
turn enrolled many underprivileged, lower-income students.164 But
some leading Democrats, such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
changed their views after the release of a Department of Education
(DOE) study documenting fraud, misrepresentation, and student loan
abuses at proprietary schools.165 However, the majority of Democrats
remained staunchly opposed to the restrictions on proprietary
schools,166 and with a presidential election looming, Bennett’s
proposal was never implemented.
By the end of Reagan’s term in office, not only had the issue of
student loan defaults not been adequately addressed, but the cutbacks
in education funding had taken their toll on higher education. Over
Reagan’s two terms, college tuition and fees increased by
approximately 82%.167
2. The George H.W. Bush Administration (1989–1993)
Bush began his presidency by proclaiming himself the
“education president.”168 But during his time in office, the Democrats
controlled both houses of Congress, and Bush found it difficult to
overcome the political and ideological differences. Thus, his major
education initiatives were never enacted.
162. In 1985, approximately one-third of federal funding for the guaranteed
student loan program went toward servicing defaults. It was projected that by 1987
almost half of the funding would go toward paying the defaults. See Whitman, supra
note 105.
163. Id.
164. See id. The Democrats accused the Republicans of having “their heads
buried in the sand.” Id.
165. See id. at 4.
166. See id. at 5; see discussion supra note 134.
167. See NCES, supra note 70, at 579. This affected student enrollment
because while general enrollment in degree-granting institutions increased a little over
9% during Reagan’s two terms in office, the percentage of students attending college
part-time increased only 1% and enrollment in two-year programs increased only
0.5%. Id. at 403. Students who were likely to have attended part-time or enrolled in
two-year programs were also likely to have been lower-income students.
168. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 54.
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The most momentous policy changes in federal funding for
higher education during the Bush Administration occurred during
1990 and 1992. In 1990, there was a change in the federal budget rules
accounting for student loans that addressed the concern expressed by
economists in the 1960s.169 No longer would outstanding student loans
be recorded as deferred liabilities. Instead, by 1992, all government
loan programs, whether guaranteed or direct, would be required to
account for their full long-term expenses and income with a “subsidy
cost” that would reflect the amount of money the government would
need to cover the true cost of the loans.170
This put direct loans and guaranteed loans on a more equal
footing, which shifted the focus of congressional policy discussions
directly to the cost of the loans. Studies showed that direct loans would
cost the government far less than guaranteed loans and would be easier
to administer.171
The year 1990 also proved to be an inauspicious one for
proprietary schools. Their student loan default rates reached an alltime high of 41%, and there was widespread media coverage of fraud
and abuse at these schools, as well as reports of school closures that
left hapless students stranded and taxpayers stuck with the bill.172 To
compound these problems, the largest guarantor of student loans, the
Higher Education Assistance Foundation, suddenly collapsed under
the weight of soaring defaults.173 The following year, the Senate
169. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
170. See discussion infra notes 52937–542 and accompanying text. See
generally Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
171. See Deborah Lucas & Damien Moore, Guaranteed Versus Direct
Lending: The Case of Student Loans, NAT’L. BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Feb. 2010). It
was estimated that direct loans would save the government around $2 billion a year
because the government would no longer pay subsidies to lenders and administration
fees to state guaranty agencies. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 7–9. Colleges also were
finding the guaranteed loan program cumbersome because they were having to deal
with private lenders, guaranty agencies and the Department of Education. See id.
172. See generally David Whitman, When President George H. W. Bush
“Cracked Down” on Abuses at For-Profit Colleges, CENTURY FOUND. (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/president-george-h-w-bush-cracked-abuses-profitcolleges. Although the Bush Administration proposed “teachout” regulations to allow
students to complete their studies in the wake of school closures, these regulations
were never finalized. See id. In fact, student loan defaults in general reached an alltime high of 22.4% in 1990. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FY 2011 2-Year National Student
Loan Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/
defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html [https://perma.cc/7FTG-FJQB] (last visited
Oct. 28, 2019).
173. See Whitman, supra note 172, at 6. This cost taxpayers $212 million. Id.
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Subcommittee on Investigations held bipartisan hearings on problems
relating to the guaranteed student loan program, in which multiple
witnesses testified to abuses and fraud at proprietary schools.174 The
result was a crackdown on these schools under the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990.175 This Act provided that any school with
a cohort default rate equal to or greater than 35% in 1991 and 1992
would be ineligible for federal funds.176 Thereafter, the cohort
percentage threshold would be reduced to 30%.177 The Act further
provided that any student admitted to a proprietary school without a
high school diploma would be ineligible for a student loan unless that
student passed an independently administered examination.178
In 1992, there was another reauthorization of the HEA,179
sponsored by Senator Claiborne Pell. In the discussions leading up to
the enactment, some members of Congress urged a better balance
between grants and loans by increasing the amount appropriated to
grants and reducing reliance on student loans.180 However, the
reauthorization drifted in the opposite direction. This Act created a
direct loan pilot program,181 which made it easier for students to obtain
loans. But at the same time, Congress also made it easier for lenders
to collect on those loans by eliminating the statute of limitations on
collection of federal student loans, thus putting them on a par with
174. See ABUSES IN FEDERAL STUDENT AID PROGRAMS, S. REP. NO. 102-58, at
2 (1991).
175. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990).
176. § 3004. A cohort default rate is the rate of students at a particular
institution who default in a given year on their federal student loans. See Michael
Itzkowitz, Why the Cohort Default Rate Is Insufficient, THIRD WAY (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.thirdway.org/report/why-the-cohort-default-rate-is-insufficient
[https://perma.cc/B5DV-76ZW]. It has been argued that this measure of eligibility (or
continued eligibility) for federal funds is inadequate. See id.
177. § 3004.
178. § 3005.
179. See generally Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102325, 106 Stat. 448 (1992) (reauthorizing the HEA). This Act contained some new,
innovative programs, such as grants to college students who tutored secondary school
students, particularly in predominately low-income communities; grants to “Hispanicserving institutions,” defined as those institutions with an enrollment of at least 60%
full-time Hispanic students; Presidential Access scholarships for low-income students
who demonstrated academic achievement; and a national student savings program to
encourage families to save for their children’s education. §§ 316, 406A, 106 Stat. at
473, 497. In addition, the Act extended and expanded the Pell Grant Program. § 401,
106 Stat. at 479–82.
180. See Gladieux, supra note 5.
181. See § 452, 106 Stat. at 569–76 (amending Part D of Tit. IV of the HEA).
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fraud and further reflecting a congressional enmity toward student
borrowers.182 The 1992 reauthorization also eliminated PLUS loan
limits,183 introduced new unsubsidized Stafford loans unrestricted by
need,184 and decreased the expected family contribution for need-based
aid,185 thus increasing the eligibility of lower-income students.
But there was no corresponding increase in funding to support
the expansion in eligibility.186 In the two years following the 1992
reauthorization, student loan volume increased by 50%.187 This
resulted in a marked shift in federal focus from lower-income students
to middle-income students but with fewer available aid dollars per
student.188
As part of a “Program Integrity Triad,” aimed primarily at
proprietary schools, the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA created a
new state postsecondary review program in partnership with the
states.189 Under this program, each state would designate its own
postsecondary review entity (SPRE) to conduct reviews of institutions
that met certain requirements, such as a student loan default rate of
25% or greater, or a default rate of 20% or greater at institutions where
more than two-thirds of the students received federal aid or where twothirds or more of the institution’s expenditures were derived from
federal funds.190 These reviews were to be funded by the federal
government.191 Upon review, the SPREs were to consider several
factors, including the relationship of the courses or programs to useful
employment in the state and the relationship of the school’s tuition and
fees to the remuneration that students could reasonably expect to
receive.192 The program was delayed, however, because of strong
criticism by education administrators.193 In an effort to prevent fraud
182. See Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 10226, § 3, 105 Stat. 123, 124 (1991).
183. See § 418, 106 Stat. at 531–32 (amending § 428B of the HEA).
184. See § 422, 106 Stat. at 535–36 (adding new § 428H to HEA).
185. See §§ 473–77, 106 Stat. at 586–602 (amending Part F of Title IV of the
HEA).
186. See id.
187. See Jacqueline E. King, Federal Student Loan Debt: 1993 to 2004, AM.
COUNCIL ON EDUC. ISSUE BRIEF, 1 (June 2005).
188. See id.
189. Higher Education Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, §
494C, 106 Stat. 638 (1992) (adding new subsection H, § 494C(b)).
190. § 494C, 106 Stat. at 638.
191. See §494B, 106 Stat. at 637 (adding new § 494B).
192. See §494C, 106 Stat. at 639 (adding new § 494C(d)).
193. See Gladieux, supra note 5; see also Thomas Harnisch et al., StateFederal Partnerships in Postsecondary Education: Enhancing State Authorization:
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and abuse at proprietary schools, the 1992 Act also provided an “8515” rule194 under which proprietary institutions were required to derive
at least 15% of their revenues from sources other than federal student
loans in order to become or remain eligible to receive federal funds.195
This was probably the last time there was a truly bipartisan effort to
curb abuses at proprietary institutions.
During most of Bush’s presidency, the economy was
lackluster,196 although federal spending on education increased by
25%.197 But during this period, college tuition increased overall by
nearly 20%.198 Not surprisingly, there was a widening of the
enrollment gap between lower-income and higher-income students.199
There was also increasing competition between traditional schools and
proprietary schools for federal student aid dollars.200 It was suggested
that Congress might establish separate funding for the two types of
schools, but that was vigorously opposed by proprietary school
associations, as well as by key Democratic committee members in the
The Need for Action by States as Stewards of Higher Education Performance, EDUC.
COMM’N OF THE STATES 7–8 (2016). Although the program originally had been
directed toward proprietary institutions, the bill was amended to extend this oversight
to all educational institutions. See id. This resulted in strong pushback on the
legislation, primarily from the private nonprofit sector, because it gave states broad
authority over the administration of these institutions. See id. at 8.
194. See Higher Education Amendment of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, §
481(d), 106 Stat. 611 (1992) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1088); Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 3005, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-27–
28 (1990). Similar language was found in 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(d)(1) (using language
under the Veterans’ Benefits Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-568, 106 Stat. 4320 (1992)
and under the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-550,
66 Stat. 667, §226 (1952)).
195. § 481(d), 106 Stat. at 611.
196. There was a recession from 1990 to 1991, in which unemployment
remained stagnant. See Sicilia, supra note 102.
197. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 64. “In unadjusted dollars, federal
aid to education had increased from $5.3 billion in 1965 to $23.3 billion in 1975 to
$40.0 billion in 1985 to $71.7 billion in 1995.” Id.
198. See NCES, supra note 70, at 579. The Higher Education Amendments
Act of 1992 provided for the establishment of a national commission to study the costs
of higher education. See §1441, 106 Stat. at 827–831.
199. See NCES, supra note 70, at 395. In 1989, 48.1% of low-income recent
high-school graduates enrolled in college, compared to 55.4% of middle-income
graduates and 70.7% of graduates from high-income families. Id. In the fall of 1992,
40.9% of low-income recent graduates enrolled in college, compared to 57.0% of
middle-income students and 79.0% of high-income graduates. Id. However, the fall
of 1993 marked the first time that more than 50% of low-income recent high-school
graduates enrolled in college. Id.
200. See Whitman, supra note 172, at 12.
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House and Senate.201 Afterward, enrollment in proprietary institutions
slowed, so that by the end of Bush’s term in office, it had increased
only 0.37%.202
3. The Clinton Administration (1993–2001)
By 1992, when Clinton was elected President, the effects of the
Reagan-era cuts in federal education spending were evident. Although
college enrollment had been steadily increasing since the 1950s, the
high-school dropout rate among sixteen- to twenty-four-year-old
students in 1990 was slightly over 12%,203 with a higher rate among
African Americans, Hispanics, and Native American, Alaska
Natives.204 Test scores were falling, curricula were weak, and
standards were low.205 Less than 80% of the nation’s most
economically disadvantaged schools received Title I funds.206 There
was grossly inadequate investment in technology207 and in recruitment
and training of teachers.208 Class sizes were large and buildings were
crumbling.209 The costs of higher education had spiraled, and less than
half of low-income high-school graduates continued on to college.210
201. See id.
202. NCES, supra note 70, at 403. During Reagan’s two terms in office,
enrollment in proprietary schools increased over 25%, although these schools enrolled
only 1.5% of total student enrollment. Id. Interestingly, from 1989 to 1990, proprietary
enrollment dropped 0.7%, while from 1990 to 1992, it increased 0.7%. Id.
203. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., The Condition of Education 2012, INSTITUTE OF
EDUC. SCIS. 82 (2012).
204. See id. The rate was highest among Hispanics (32%) and then Blacks
(13%). The lowest dropout rate was among Asian/Pacific Islanders. Id.
205. See The Clinton Presidency: Expanding Education Opportunity, WHITE
HOUSE, https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/WH/Accomplishments/eightyears05.html [https://perma.cc/94DH-RD9T] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (explaining that
in 1990, only 38% of those who graduated from high school had taken a core
curriculum of four years of English and three years each of math, science, and social
studies).
206. Id. Title I funds were created to aid schools with the highest poverty rates.
See id.
207. See id. Only the most affluent schools had access to computers. See id. In
1993, approximately 3% of classrooms had internet-connected computers. Id. By
1994, only 35% of public schools had such access. Id.
208. Id. (explaining that in 1992, fewer than 80% of English and Math teachers
had a college major or minor in their teaching field and in 1995 only 282 teachers
nationwide were National Board certified).
209. See id.
210. Id. In 1993, for the first time, enrollment by recent high school graduates
in the lower income bracket reached 50%. NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.302.30.
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Clinton’s presidential campaign against Bush focused on a
stronger federal role in education, and once elected he set out to
deliver on that promise. During his first term, he focused chiefly on
primary and secondary education. But in 1993, Congress enacted the
Student Loan Reform Act,211 which expanded the 1992 direct loan
pilot program and replaced the guaranteed Federal Family Education
Loans (FFEL) with direct loans made by the federal government
through the Department of Education.212 Studies showed that the FFEL
loans benefitted private lenders at the expense of students and that
direct loans were easier for schools to administer and much cheaper
for students and taxpayers.213 This Act also reduced both borrower
interest rates and the loan origination fee and added flexible repayment
plans with income-contingent payments spread over a period of
twenty-five years.214
In 1994, the Republicans won control of both houses of Congress
for the first time in forty years. Private lenders, many of whom had
contributed to Republican campaigns, began to complain loudly about
the direct loan program.215 The new congressional leadership vowed
However, the enrollment rate thereafter dropped below 50%, and for the next three
years the average enrollment rate by low-income students was around 43%. Id.
211. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub L. No. 103-66, §
4011, 107 Stat. 312, 341 (1993).
212. § 4041.
213. See Lucas & Moore, supra note 171. Under the Bush pilot program, 5%
of schools would participate in direct lending. Clinton’s plan extended that to 60% of
schools over a five-year period. Id. The government paid substantial amounts to
private lenders for interest subsidies and costs attributable to defaults. See id. It also
paid substantial amounts to state and nonprofit guaranty agencies for a variety of
services, including counseling to schools, students, and lenders. Students usually paid
a loan origination fee on private loans, plus the interest rates on those loans were much
higher than on government sponsored loans. Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Educ., FISCAL
YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST, STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, at T-4.
214. See §§ 4043, 4101–02. The Act directed that at least 60% of federal
student loans would be transformed into direct loans over a five-year period. § 4021.
However, income-contingent repayments applied only to government loans. See
Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest
Lawyers and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 33 (2007). If a student borrowed from a private lender, the
student would be required to make both income-contingent payments to the
government and non-income-contingent payments to the private lender. See id.
215. See, e.g., Joe Belew, New Direct Student Loan Program Can’t Live Up
to Its Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1994), www.nytimes.com/1994/09/25/opinion/lnew-direct-student-loan-program-can-t-live-up-to-its-claims-350346.html?mcubz=1
[https://perma.cc/U4KN-BUS2] (referencing an opinion by the President of the
Consumer Bankers’ Association); see also Matthew Spalding, Time to End Costly
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to eliminate the program but found this to be more difficult than
anticipated because hundreds of colleges were then participating, and
they had embraced the less cumbersome process of direct lending.216
So instead, the Republicans attacked the legislation by criticizing the
administration of the program.217 This led to an interdiction against the
DOE to prevent it from encouraging or requiring schools to participate
in the program.218 The result was that the DOE was effectively
muzzled while guaranteed lenders were allowed to use their
substantial resources to lure colleges, sometimes by unscrupulous
means, into the FFEL program.219 Consequently, the direct loan
program began to whither.
In 1996, Sallie Mae was granted permission to privatize220 to
allow it to become more competitive in a changing student loan market
and economic environment.221 Because Sallie Mae was no longer
constrained by its narrowly defined charter, after its reorganization the
amount of federally insured student loans more than doubled over the

Direct
Student
Loans,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Sept.
20,
1995),
www.heritage.org/node/20706/print-display [https://perma.cc/XE46-NK3V].
216. See Education Policy: Student Loan History, NEW AMERICA,
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/topics/higher-education-funding-andfionancial-aid/federal-student-aid/federal-student-loans/federal-student-loan-history
(last visited Dec. 4, 2019).
217. See Spalding, supra note 215, at 4.
218. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 8.
219. See Megan Barnett, Julian E. Barnes & Danielle Knight, Big Money on
Campus: How Taxpayers Are Getting Scammed by Student Loans, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Oct. 27, 2003), http://ire.org/resource-center/stories/20900/4. The
FFEL program was the guaranty program that originated under the HEA in 1965,
originally intended to be a partnership between the federal and state governments. See
supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. Later, it included Stafford loans, both
subsidized and unsubsidized, PLUS loans, and consolidated loans. Direct loans are
issued under the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program. See Direct Loans vs. the
FFEL Program, FINAID, www.finaid.org/loans/dl-vs-ffel.phtml [https://perma.cc/
KQ3K-KCPW] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
220. See Student Loan Marketing Association Reorganization Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Tit. VI, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–275. Although the legislation was
enacted in 1996, Sallie Mae did not become a private company until 2004 because of
the complexities of relinquishing its status as a government sponsored enterprise. See
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PRIVATIZATION OF SALLIE
MAE 10–12 (2006).
221. See Michael J. Lea, Privatizing a Government Sponsored Enterprise:
Lessons from the Sallie Mae Experience, NETWORKS FIN. INST., Apr. 2006, at 2–5.
While the decline in Sallie Mae’s market shares attributable to the direct loan program
was the principal reason for the privatization, Lea identifies other reasons as well. See
generally id. (identifying reasons for Sallie Mae’s privatization).
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next ten years.222 At the same time, the Debt Collection Improvement
Act of 1996223 provided that Social Security benefits could be offset to
repay defaulted federal education loans, both direct and guaranteed.224
In the period from 1993 to 1997, during Clinton’s first term in
office, college tuition increased over 9%225 and, not surprisingly,
enrollment during this period was almost flat.226 So during his second
term, Clinton sought to shift funding from direct support through
grants, loans, and work-study assistance to indirect funding through
the tax code.227 Portrayed as a tax cut, Republicans rallied around the
shift, and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997228 was passed with
bipartisan support.229 This Act added five new tax incentives230 and

222. Id. at 8. The amount invested in the government insured student loan
market went from $24 billion in federal fiscal year (FFY) 1994 to $52 billion in FFY
2003. Id.
223. See Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §
31001, 110 Stat. 1321-358.
224. § 31001, 110 Stat. at 1321–60.
225. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.330.10.
226. Id. The average annual increase in enrollment during Clinton’s first term
was only 0.465%. Id.
227. There were, however, other education acts passed during Clinton’s
second term. See Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-524, 98 Stat. 2435, 2437 (1984) (providing federal funding at the
secondary and post-secondary levels to promote vocational education); see also
Higher Education Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581, 1581–82 (1998)
(addressing Pell grants, the FFEL Program, federal work-study programs, the William
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program, Perkins loans, and need analysis).
228. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1998).
229. See Marc J. Gerson, Technically Speaking: The Art of Tax Technical
Corrections, TAX NOTES 927, 927, 932 (Mar. 5, 2007) (noting this Act was passed at
the eleventh hour in August 1997, shortly before Congress was to recess.)
230. § 1. The new incentives were the Hope and Lifetime Learning credits
under I.R.C. section 25A; a deduction for interest paid on student loans under new
I.R.C. section 221; penalty-free withdrawals from IRAs for purposes of education,
I.R.C. section 72(t); and savings for education trust accounts under I.R.C. section 530.
§§ 201–03, 213. The Hope and Lifetime Learning credits were estimated to cost $31.6
billion over five years and $76 billion over ten years. Patrick Fleenor, Bottom Line on
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, TAX FOUND.: SPECIAL REP., Sept. 1997, at 1, 2. The
total cost of the new education savings accounts and the expanded IRAs was estimated
to be $7.1 billion for the first five years and $30.6 billion over the next five years.
Brief Description of and Comments on the 1997 Tax Act, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUST.
(Aug. 18, 1997), https://www.ctj.org/brief-description-of-and-comments-on-the1997-tax-act [https://perma.cc/PD9A-EKA2]. Citizens for Tax Justice was very
critical of the Act, calling it “a disaster for the goal of fair, simple and adequate
taxation.” Id.
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modified others231 to encourage college attendance at an estimated cost
to the federal government of $95 billion over five years and $275
billion over ten years,232 although skeptics disputed these amounts as
being much higher.233 The Act became effective on January 1, 1998.234
Later in 1998, the HEA was again reauthorized.235 This Act
reduced Stafford loan interest rates by about 0.8%,236 provided loan
forgiveness for those who taught at the primary or secondary levels in
low-income schools, and provided unsubsidized Stafford loans for any
student.237 But it struck the provision allowing education loans to be
discharged in bankruptcy after seven years in repayment,238 essentially
making education loans nondischargeable.239 It also suspended
231. See § 1. Qualified tuition programs under I.R.C. section 529(e) were
treated as tax-free investments. § 211. The exclusion for employer-provided
educational assistance under I.R.C. section 127 was extended through 2000. § 221.
Student loan forgiveness was excluded under certain designated circumstances under
I.R.C. section 108(f). § 225.
232. Fleenor, supra note 230, at 1.
233. See CITIZENS FOR TAX JUST., supra note 230. One estimate was $400
billion over 10 years. Id.
234. See § 1.
235. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat.
1581 (1998). This Act also increased and extended Pell Grants through fiscal year
2004, extended the Academic Achievement Incentive Scholarship Program for lowincome students, and authorized appropriations for Federal Supplemental Education
Opportunity grants through 1999. §§ 401, 404, 406.
236. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The Higher Educ.
Amendments of 1998: Five Victories for the Clinton-Gore Admin. (Oct. 7, 1998),
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/news/100798.html
[https://perma.cc/
X4QN-6ZF5]. Borrowers were given four months to refinance their loans at the new
rate, although the Administration had proposed extending the refinancing period
longer. See id. It was estimated that the four-month extension would save the average
student borrower around $700 over a ten-year period. Id.
237. §§ 423(a), 424. Subsidized Stafford loans are based on need, and with
these loans the government pays the interest while the student is in school and during
periods of deferment. See Elyssa Kirkham, Everything You Need to Know About
Federal Stafford Loans, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.studentloanhero.com/featured/what-is-a-federal-stafford-loan [https://
perma.cc/CCE4-UQWT] Unsubsidized Stafford loans accrue interest as soon as the
loan is taken out. See id.
238. See § 971, 112 Stat. at 1837.
239. See Louis DeNicola, The Truth About Student Loan Bankruptcy
Discharge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (May 2, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://loans.usnews.com/the-truth-about-student-loan-bankruptcy-discharge
[https://perma.cc/M5Z9-DL88]. This applies to federal student loans, student loans
funded by a nonprofit organization, such as a school, and qualified educational loans.
See id. Qualified educational loans are those used to attend a qualified educational
institution. See id. This is a Title IV-certified school. See id. In addition, the loan must

Federal Financing of Higher Education at a Crossroads

921

eligibility for any grant, loan, or work-study assistance for those
convicted of any drug related offenses.240 Further, it loosened the
eligibility restriction on proprietary institutions by providing that they
must not derive more than 90% (rather than 85%) of their revenues
from Title IV funds.241 With the more positive climate for proprietary
institutions, enrollment in these institutions increased 90% during
Clinton’s two terms in office.242
In addition, the Act increased the length of time from 180 days
to 270 days before a delinquent borrower was declared in default, and
it eliminated any college with a default rate of 25% or greater for three
consecutive years (or 40% or more in a single year) from participating
in any federal student loan programs.243 This, plus the slash in interest
rates, produced a steady decline in the national student loan default
rates.244 However, college tuition continued to rise.245
4. The George W. Bush Administration (2001–2009)
In George W. Bush’s first term as President, the country was in
the midst of a recession that had begun at the end of the Clinton
Administration. In order to boost the economy, Bush proposed a series
be spent on a qualified educational expense such as tuition, fees, books, room and
board, and educational supplies. See id. The student must be attending on at least a
half-time basis. See id. If these requirements are not met, the loan may not be
considered a qualified educational loan and thus may be eligible for discharge in
bankruptcy. See id.
240. § 483(f). For a possession offense, this suspension would last from the
date of the conviction until one year from that date for a first offense, two years from
the date of conviction for a second offense, and indefinite suspension for a third
offense. Id. In the case of a conviction for the sale of a controlled substance, the
suspension period would run from the date of conviction until two years from that
date and would be indefinite for any subsequent conviction. Id.
241. See § 102(b), 112 Stat. at 1588; see also supra notes 194–195 and
accompanying text.
242. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10. The portion of the total student
population enrolled in proprietary institutions nearly doubled during this period,
jumping from 7.3% to 14.2%.
243. § 429.
244. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., National Student Loan Two-Year Default Rates,
FED. STUDENT AID, https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/
defaultrates.html [https://perma.cc/3K89-R4ZS] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). The
student loan default rate in 1997 was 8.8% (down from a high of 22.4% in 1990) then
fell to 5.4% in 2001, 4.5% in 2003, and 4.6% in 2005 (down from 5.1% in 2004), after
which the rate began to steadily increase. Id.
245. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.330.10 (demonstrating that college
tuition during Clinton’s second term increased by about 13% in current dollars).
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of tax cuts and incentives that were enacted as the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,246 also known as “the Bush
tax cuts.”247 Among its myriad provisions was the elimination of the
sixty-month limit on the deduction of student loan interest and an
increase in eligibility for the deduction.248 Also in 2001, in conformity
with the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, the DOE began
offsetting up to 15% of Social Security, disability, and retirement
benefits to repay defaulted federal education loans.249
In 2002, Congress reauthorized the HEA and changed all
education loan interest rates from variable to fixed for new federal
loans issued after July 1, 2006.250 Congress passed the legislation in
late 2001, and it was enacted in February 2002.251 The timing was
significant because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had
both short- and long-term negative effects on the economy. These
attacks extended the 2001 recession, led to the wars in Afghanistan

246. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
247. Pub. L. No. 107-16, tits. I, II, III, and V (reduced income tax rates,
eliminated the marriage penalty, increased the earned income tax credit, and repealed
the estate and generation skipping taxes). It also increased the maximum annual
contribution to educational savings accounts (renamed Coverdell accounts) from $500
to $2,000, allowed eligible educational institutions to maintain qualified tuition
programs, and extended the exclusion for employer-provided educational assistance
to cover graduate level courses. Id. at tit. IV. It further extended an income exclusion
to amounts received under certain scholarships. Id. Section 117(c) of the I.R.C.
provides that any amounts received under an excludable scholarship or fellowship that
“represents payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student required
as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship or qualified tuition reduction”
shall be included in income and subject to tax. I.R.C. § 117(c) (2008). The 2001 Act
provided an exception to such amounts received under a National Health Service
Corps Scholarship Program or Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship and
Financial Assistance program. Pub. L. No. 107-16,115 Stat. at 64 (amending I.R.C. §
117(c)(2)).
248. § 412, 115 Stat. at 63–64. The income limitation was increased from a
low of $40,000 for single taxpayers and $80,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly
to $50,000 for single taxpayers and $100,000 for joint filers. Id. The high end of the
limitation (at which the taxpayer would be ineligible to deduct student loan interest)
was increased from $50,000 for single filers and $100,000 for joint filers to $65,000
for single filers and $130,000 for joint filers. § 412(b), 115 Stat. at 64.
249. See supra notes 223–224 and accompanying text.
250. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 107-139, 116 Stat. 8
(amended 2002). These rates were 6.8% on Stafford loans (both subsidized and
unsubsidized), 7.9% on PLUS loans, and 8.25% on consolidated loans. Id.
251. See id.
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and Iraq, and deepened the national debt.252 The Federal Reserve cut
interest rates several times in an effort to boost the economy.253 The
end result was that the variable rates on student loans in effect before
2006 were consistently lower than the fixed rate that became effective
in 2006.254 In fact, student loan variable interest rates reached a historic
low in 2005.255
When the fixed rates became effective, Democrats blamed
Republicans for the unfairness of the interest rate differential, and they
launched a campaign promising to cut the rates by half.256 But they
failed to deliver on this promise.257 Instead, they cut only the
subsidized Stafford rate to six-percent for four years, after which the
rate would revert to the fixed rate of 6.8%.258
At the end of 2005, Congress cut $12.6 billion from student
financial aid under the Deficit Reduction Act,259 which was enacted to
control mandatory federal spending.260 While this Act increased the
limits of FFEL loans (although it did not increase the cumulative
limit),261 made PLUS loans available to graduate and professional
252. See Kimberly Amadeo, How the 9/11 Attacks Affect the Economy Today,
THE BALANCE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/how-the-9-11-attacksstill-affect-the-economy-today-3305536 [https://perma.cc/KM25-BFSW]; see also
Ed Grabianowski, What Was the Economic Impact of September 11?, HOW STUFF
WORKS, www.money.howstuffworks.com/september-11-economic-impact.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L777-A2NE].
253. See Casey Bond, How the September 11 Attacks Destroyed U.S. Interest
Rates, GO BANKING RATES (Sept. 11, 2013), https://gobankingrates.com/personalfinance/september-11-attacks-destroyed-u-s-interest-rates [https://perma.cc/5VU7ALWS].
254. See Stephen Vanderpool, Timeline: The History of Federal Student Loan
Interest Rates, NERDWALLET (May 22, 2012), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/
loans/student-loans/federal-student-loan-interest-rate-timeline-events
[https://
perma.cc/E955-3RYN].
255. The rate was 2.88% for an in-school lock-in on consolidated loans with a
cap of 8.25%. An early repayment status loophole allowed current students to
consolidate
their
loans.
See
Interest
Rate
Loophole,
FINAID,
www.finaid.org/loans./loophole.phtml [https://perma.cc/X9NX-D6T7] (last visited
Oct. 28, 2019)
256. See Vanderpool, supra note 254.
257. See id.
258. Id. If the variable rate had been in effect, that rate would have been 2.5%.
Id.
259. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4
(2006).
260. See 2005 Reauthorization: Deficit Reduction Act, FINAID,
www.finaidorg/educators/reauthorization20051219s1932.txt
[https://perma.cc/
79AY-YWR7] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
261. § 8005.
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students,262 and permitted consolidation of FFEL and direct loans to
take advantage of income-contingent repayment plans,263 it also raised
the fixed interest rate of PLUS loans and repealed consolidation of
loans while students remained in school.264
Also in 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,265 which provided an
exception from discharge for “qualified education loans.”266 This
included most federal and private student loans.267 The added security
of complete bankruptcy protection for private lenders, along with an
unlimited statute of limitations, was not passed along to borrowers,
however, by a reduction in the cost of the loans.268
By 2007, the Democrats had regained control of both houses of
Congress. Later that year, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act
of 2007269 was enacted. This Act halved the interest rate over a fouryear period on FFEL loans and subsidized Stafford loans,270 provided
loan forgiveness for public service employees,271 authorized income-

262. Id.
263. § 8009, 120 Stat. at 163–64.
264. §§ 8006, 8009, 120 Stat. at 159–60, 163–64. It also lowered loan
origination fees from 4% to 1%, but only for Stafford loans, and eliminated the ability
of schools to originate PLUS and consolidation loans. Stafford loans also could not
be originated at the school level, so these loans had to be made by other lenders. §
8011, 120 Stat. at 165.
265. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
266. § 220, 119 Stat. at 59 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). The term
“qualified education loan” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 to include any debt incurred “solely to pay qualified higher education
expenses” of the borrower, the borrower’s spouse, or any dependent of the borrower
at the time the debt is incurred. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1). Qualified education loans also
include debt used to refinance qualified education loans. See id. Qualified higher
education expenses include the cost of attendance at a college or university that is
eligible for Title IV federal student aid, minus scholarships, employer-paid tuition
assistance, and other education tax benefits. See id. The regulations at 26 C.F.R.
1.221-1 indicate that qualified education loans do not include mixed-use loans, such
as credit card debt. 26 C.F.R. § 1.221-1 (2018).
267. § 220, 119 Stat. at 59.
268. See Xiaoling Ang & Dalié Jiménez, Private Student Loans and BAPCPA:
Did Four-Year Undergraduates Benefit from the Increased Collectability of Student
Loans, EDUC. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 29, 2013).
269. College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat.
784 (2007).
270. § 201, 121 Stat. at 790–91. This was a ratable reduction from 6.8% in
2006–2008 to 3.4% in 2011–2012. Id.
271. § 401, 121 Stat. at 800–01.

Federal Financing of Higher Education at a Crossroads

925

based repayment,272 and increased support for working students by
increasing the income protection allowance for both dependent and
independent students.273 A simplified means test, under which the
expected family contribution (EFC) threshold was increased from
$20,000 to $30,000 in 2009–2010,274 added some much needed
simplification to the federal student loan application form.275
The bill was funded from money saved by cutting payments to
private lenders and guarantee agencies under the FFEL program.276 In
2006, direct loans represented a relatively small portion of federally
guaranteed loans,277 but that changed with the global financial crisis
that began in 2008. This crisis produced a credit freeze during which
many private educational lenders had difficulty covering their student
loan obligations.278 Since these loans were guaranteed by the federal
government, Congress was forced to act to avert a crisis in the FFEL
program.279 Under the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans
Act of 2008,280 the DOE was temporarily authorized to purchase
unsubsidized Stafford and PLUS loans disbursed from October 1,
1993, to September 30, 2009.281 It ultimately financed approximately
88% of FFEL loans made in 2008–2009.282 This resulted in a hybrid
272. § 203, 121 Stat. at 792.
273. 121 Stat. at 801–04. The income protection allowance is the amount a
student may earn and remain eligible for financial aid. See id. The allowance was
almost doubled for dependent students from 2009–2010 to 2012–2013. § 601, 121
Stat. at 801. For independent students without dependents other than a spouse, where
both were enrolled, the increase was less dramatic—$7,000 from 2009–2010 to
$9,330 from 2012–2013. Id. For married students where only one of the spouses was
enrolled, the increase was $11,220 from 2009–2010 to $14,960 from 2012–2013. §
601, 121 Stat. at 802. There was a sharper increase for married students with one or
more dependents, with the increase contingent on the number of dependents. § 601,
121 Stat. at 802–03.
274. § 602,121 Stat. at 804–05.
275. See id. Also, lender subsidy rates on PLUS loans were made more
competitive through a pilot auction, effective July 1, 2009. § 701, 121 Stat. at 808.
276. §§ 301–05, 121 Stat. at 796–800; see also supra notes 211–214 and
accompanying text.
277. See SFGATE, Feds Take Over Student Loan Program from Banks (Mar.
30, 2010, 4:00 AM), www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Feds-take-overstudent-loan-program-from-banks-3193888.php [https://perma.cc/LYN2-3CWN]. In
specific, they represented about 20% of federally guaranteed loans. Id.
278. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 9.
279. See id.
280. Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-227, 122 Stat. 740.
281. § 459A, 122 Stat. at 746–48.
282. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COSTS AND POL’Y OPTIONS FOR FED. STUDENT LOAN
PROGRAMS, VIII (2010).
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program in which the federal government supplied capital to private
lenders.283 The Act also increased the limits (both annual and
aggregate) on unsubsidized Stafford loans, allowed parents to defer
repayment on PLUS loans while students were in school, and provided
a repayment grace period of up to six months after students left
school.284
In 2007, Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York launched an
investigation into unethical practices of some of the largest student
loan lenders.285 He discovered that these lenders were engaging in
deceptive practices, such as selling student loans to third parties
without the borrowers’ knowledge, so that the benefits the borrowers
had been promised by the original lender were no longer honored.286
Also, some lenders established call centers in which students or
parents thought they were calling a school’s financial aid office but
were actually directed straight to the lender.287 The largest of these
lenders, Sallie Mae (now SLM Corporation), settled by agreeing to a
code of ethics proposed by Cuomo and by paying a fine of $2 million
to a fund to help educate students and parents about the student loan
industry.288
In 2008, the HEA was again reauthorized to make college costs
more transparent by requiring participating colleges to prominently
disclose their costs and by requiring the DOE to display on its website
a list of the 5% most expensive and the 10% least expensive
colleges.289 It also provided loan forgiveness for civil legal assistance

283. See Education Policy: Student Loan History, supra note 216. Ironically,
the federal government was assuming the role that the then-privatized Sallie Mae had
filled when it was a government sponsored enterprise.
284. See §§ 2–4, 122 Stat. at 740, 740–43.
285. See Amanda Ernst, Sallie Mae Settles Student Loan Kickback Charges,
LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2007), https://www.law360.com/articles/22415/sallie-mae-settlesstudent-loan-kickback-charges [https://perma.cc/UKL5-GUGF].
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. Id. Citibank, another student loan lender under investigation, also agreed
to Cuomo’s code of ethics. Id. Cuomo was scathing on the poor job that the DOE and
federal regulators had done in overseeing these lenders. See Marcy Gordon, NY AG
Faults Oversight of College Loans, WASH. POST (June 6, 2007, 9:04 PM),
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/06/AR2007060601818
_pf.html [https://perma.cc/Q3BA-XZYY]. These regulators are the Federal Trade
Commission, the Treasury Department’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id.
289. Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078,
3099 (2008).
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attorneys,290 teachers employed by educational service agencies,291 and
in cases of disability or death of the borrower.292 It extended the
Perkins Loan Program as a campus-based aid program,293
implemented a program to promote early awareness of eligibility for
federal aid,294 and increased the reporting requirements of
postsecondary institutions by requiring them to report the repayment
status of student loans to consumer credit agencies.295
Because of the sudden closure of some proprietary schools, the
Act further required institutions to prepare “teach out” plans to provide
for the “equitable treatment of students” in the event that the
institution should cease to exist before all students had completed their
degrees.296 It also provided that any proprietary institution that failed
to meet the 90/10 rule297 for two consecutive institutional fiscal years
would be ineligible to participate in federal aid programs for at least
two more consecutive fiscal years, until it demonstrated compliance
with the eligibility and certification requirements.298 However, during
the two fiscal years following the year of disqualification, the
disqualification could be made provisional.299
During Bush’s eight years in office, there was a 57% general
increase in college tuition,300 although there was a significant increase
in overall college enrollment by recent high school graduates.301 This
enrollment increase, particularly for lower- and middle-income
students, was attributable to two factors: (1) the financial crisis of
2008, in which many recent high school graduates had difficulty
finding work and opted to use federal aid to enroll in postsecondary

290. § 431, 122 Stat. at 3242. These are attorneys employed by nonprofit
organizations that provide free legal assistance to the underprivileged. Id.
291. § 429, 122 Stat. at 3236.
292. § 437, 122 Stat. at 3257–58.
293. § 466, 122 Stat. at 3269.
294. § 490, 122 Stat. at 3305–07.
295. § 432, 122 Stat. at 3245–46.
296. § 493, 122 Stat. at 3316.
297. § 493, 122 Stat. at 3308 (amending § 487(a)(24) of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 and providing that proprietary schools may receive no more than 90% of
their funding from Title IV federal student aid); see also supra note 241 and
accompanying text.
298. § 493, 122 Stat. at 3312.
299. Id.
300. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.330.10. This was in current dollars
(2001–2009). Id.
301. Id. at tbl.302.30 This was an 8.3% increase from 2001, with an increase
of 10% for both low- and middle-income students. Id.
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institutions,302 and (2) an increase in eligibility and size of Pell
grants.303 These factors caused enrollment in proprietary institutions to
increase 178% during Bush’s two terms in office.304
5. The Obama Administration (2009–2017)
During the first two years of Barack Obama’s presidency, the
Democrats controlled both houses of Congress. The steep recession of
2008 continued, and this focused the new administration’s attention
initially on economic recovery as well as health care reform.305 But in
2010, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, passed along
party lines, eliminated the FFEL program and provided that all new
federal education loans would be made through the Direct Loan
program.306 Under this program, there would be a change from private
lending back to 100% federal lending. Since this eliminated private
banks as “middlemen,” the federal government estimated that it would
save about $68 billion over eleven years.307
This Act also cut the monthly income-based student loan
repayment by one-third308 and accelerated loan forgiveness from
twenty-five years to twenty years for borrowers of new federal loans

302. See, e.g., Bridget Terry Long, The Financial Crisis and College
Enrollment: How Have Students and Their Families Responded?, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RES., at 229–31 (2015); see also Clifton B. Parker, The Great Recession
Spurred Student Interest in Higher Education, Stanford Expert Says, STANFORD NEWS
(Mar. 6, 2015), https://news.stanford.edu/2015/03/06/higher-ed-hoxby-030615
[https://perma.cc/YP9T-M2HG].
303. See Pell Grant Funding and History, NEW AMERICA,
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-explainers/higher-edworkforce/federal-student-aid/federal-pell-grants/pell-grant-funding
[https://
perma.cc/UVR9-JPB9] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
304. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10. The percentage of students
enrolled in proprietary institutions more than doubled from 3.3% in 2001, during
Bush’s first year in office, to 7.7% during his last year. See id.
305. See generally Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (noting the passage of this bill focused on health
care).
306. § 2201, 124 Stat. at 1074–75.
307. See Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of
Student Loan Program, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), www.nytimes.com/
2010/03/31/us/politics/31obama.html?mcubz=1
[https://perma.cc/G2B2-UBJL].
Much of this savings was redirected to the Pell program, making the increased
maximum amount of the grant permanent. § 2101, 124 Stat. at 1071.
308. § 2213, 124 Stat. at 1081. This repayment went from 15% of
discretionary income to 10% of discretionary income. Id.
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made on or after July 1, 2014.309 However, none of these programs
addressed private student loans, which constituted approximately
$168 billion or 20% of total student loan debt.310
But the 2008 recession, combined with the increase in federal
spending, precipitated a decrease in state spending for education,
causing tuition and fees to continue to rise.311 In 2010, for the first time
total outstanding student loan debt exceeded credit card debt.312
In fall 2010, the Republicans won the majority of seats in the
House, while the Democrats continued to control the Senate. This
marked the beginning of a period of political polarization and gridlock
that continued throughout the remainder of the Obama
Administration.
The following year, the Budget Control Act of 2011313 was
passed after a bitter partisan battle. This Act ended the debt-ceiling
crisis that was threatening to result in a sovereign default.314 In addition
to the balanced budget provisions, this Act increased funding for Pell
grants,315 but it also provided that graduate and professional students
would no longer be eligible for subsidized Stafford loans.316 Further, it
eliminated repayment incentives effective July 1, 2012,317 and
309. Id.
310. See Mark Kantrowitz, Total College Debt Now Exceeds Total Credit
Card Debt, FASTWEB (Aug. 11, 2010), https://www.fastweb.com/financialaid/articles/total-college-debt-now-exceeds-total-credit-card-debt [https://perma.cc/
N8FP-PQ33].
311. See, e.g., Michael Leachman et al., Most States Have Cut School
Funding, and Some Continue Cutting, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 25,
2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budgert-and-tax/most-states-have-cutschool-funding-and-some-continue-cutting [https://perma.cc/UJR5-8DP5]; see also
Lauren Camera, States Are Slacking on Higher Ed Spending, U.S. News & World
Rep. (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2016/01/07/states-spending-less-today-on-higher-education-than-before-recession
[https://perma.cc/A9PM-FN46].
312. See Jennifer Wadia, Rising Tuition Costs and the History of Student
DEBT
RELIEF
(May
14,
2019),
Loans,
STUDENT
https://www.studentdebtrelief.us/news/rising-tuition-costs-and-the-history-ofstudent-loans [https://perma.cc/ZET2-HPT8]. Total student debt in 2010 was $830
billion, while total credit card debt was $825 billion. See id.; see also Kantrowitz,
supra note 310.
313. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 239 (2011).
314. See Suzy Khimm, The Sequester, Explained, WASH. POST (Sept. 14,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/09/14/the-sequesterexplained/?utm_term=.58678d85406d [https://perma.cc/YAT2-D5QA].
315. § 501, 125 Stat. at 266.
316. § 502.
317. § 503, 125 Stat. at 266–67.
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implemented sequestration, a system of automatic cuts to the federal
budget of $1.2 trillion over ten years, plus additional caps on spending
if Congress should fail to agree on a budget.318 This meant that if
Congress failed to pass a budget, $109.3 billion would be cut from the
federal budget each year until 2021.319
In 2011, outstanding federal student loan debt for the first time
exceeded auto loan debt.320 The following year, total outstanding
student loan debt (both federal and private) exceeded one trillion
dollars.321
In fall 2012, the President and Congress failed to agree on a
budget, triggering sequestration, which ultimately led to an increase in
fees on Stafford and PLUS loans.322
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 eliminated
subsidized interest on Stafford loans during the six-month grace
period for new loans made from July 1, 2012, to June 30, 2014.323 In
mid-2012, however, interest rates on subsidized student loans
threatened to double. To prevent that, Congress enacted the Moving
Ahead For Progress in the 21st Century Act, which extended for an
additional year the 3.4% interest rate on subsidized Stafford loans to
undergraduate students.324
Proprietary schools did not fare well under the Obama
Administration. The General Accountability Office (GAO) had issued
a report in 2009 concluding that students at proprietary schools were

318. §251, 125 Stat. at 241–45.
319. See Grant A. Driessen & Marc Labonte, The Budget Control Act of 2011
as Amended: Budgetary Effects, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 4 (2015). There would be an
equal cut from defense and non-defense spending. Id. This would amount to a total
reduction of $2 trillion over the nine-year period. Id. at 1.
320. See Kantrowitz, supra note 6.
321. See Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, DeVos Halts Obama-Era
Plan to Revamp Student Loan Management, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/business/dealbook/education-departmentfederal-student-loan-program.html [https://perma.cc/NY3X-9B58]; A Record OneIn-Five Households Now Owe Student Loan Debt, PEW RES. CT. (Sept. 26, 2012),
https://www.pewsocialtrrends.org/2012/09/26/a-record-one-in-five-households-nowowe-student-loan-debt.
322. See History of Student Loans, EDVISORS, https://www.edvisors.com/
college-loans/federal/history [https://perma.cc/SN6L-98UG] (last visited Oct. 28,
2019).
323. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, tit.
III, 125 Stat. 786, 1101 (2012).
324. See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-141, § 100301 126 Stat. 405, 979 (2012).
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more likely to default on their loans.325 The following year, it issued
another report accusing these schools of fraud and misrepresentation
in recruitment and admissions.326 In addition, there were several other
reports that chronicled the abysmal performance of proprietary
schools.327 In 2012, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) released a scathing
report on behalf of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions that attributed the sector’s high drop-out rates to
underspending on instruction and overspending on marketing and
profit-sharing.328
In the wake of the negative reports, the DOE finalized a “gainful
employment” regulation in 2011 to protect students and taxpayers
alike.329 This regulation was based on language in the HEA providing
that to be eligible to receive federal funds under Title IV, an
educational institution must “prepare students for gainful employment
in a recognized occupation.”330 This regulation was intended to
monitor schools to ensure that their borrowers met a minimum debt to
earnings ratio.331

325. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY
SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP
ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID 28 (2009).
326. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES, UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 7 (2010).
327. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, BENEFITTING
WHOM? FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION COMPANIES AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARY
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS 4, 8 (2010) (questioning whether for-profit schools were
targeting the military and delivering substandard product); see also David J. Deming,
Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The For-Profit Postsecondary School Sector:
Nimble Critters or Agile Predators? 4, 22 (CAPSEE, Working Paper 2012) (finding
that while there are some positives associated with for-profit schools, such as the fact
that they educate more minority, disadvantaged, and older students, their students
have higher unemployment rates, lower earnings, higher debt, and higher rates of
default).
328. See S. REP. NO. 112-37, at 92.
329. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES NEW
STEPS TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM INEFFECTIVE CAREER COLLEGE PROGRAMS (2011),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-announces-newsteps-protect-students-ineffective-career-college-programs [https://perma.cc/267V6D8P].
330. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 461, 79 Stat.
1219, 1251 (1965) (amending § 103(b) of the National Defense of Education Act of
1958).
331. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 329 (reporting that under the new
DOE regulation, a school would remain eligible to receive federal funds if at least
35% of its borrowers were repaying their loans and the estimated loan payments did
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The peak year for enrollment in proprietary schools was the
academic year 2010.332 In the wake of the negative publicity, however,
there was a steady decline in enrollment in these institutions from
2011 throughout the remainder of the Obama Administration and into
the Trump Administration.333
President Obama’s 2013 budget proposed a 4.6% increase over
the 2012 level in spending for higher education with an increase of
2.5% in the budget of the DOE.334 The fierce battle over this budget
resulted in a government shutdown that lasted sixteen days, resulting
in the budget not being approved. Instead, Congress passed a series of
continuing resolutions to fund the government through September 30,
2013.335
The Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013 changed the
interest rates for new Stafford and PLUS loans for undergraduates
originating on or after July 1, 2013.336 The new rate would be fixed but
would be determined on the preceding June 1st and would be equal to
the lesser of (1) the rate of the high-yield federal note auctioned at the
not exceed 30% of the borrowers’ discretionary income or 12% of their total
earnings).
332. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10 (indicating that during that year,
there were 2,022,785 students enrolled in proprietary schools, representing 9.6% of
total student enrollment).
333. See id. (indicating from 2010 through 2016, when data was last available,
there was a decline of almost 42% in enrollment and in 2016 enrollment in proprietary
schools was only 5.9% of total enrollment). It should be noted, however, that overall
enrollment in postsecondary educational institutions declined during this period. See
id. In 2017, there was an approximate 7% decline in enrollment from 2016. See Maria
Danilova & Richard Lardner, For-Profit Colleges Struggle Despite Assist from
NEWS
(Apr.
7,
2018),
https://apnews.com/
DeVos,
AP
5e8fa04c469b4a5daa6640ee79584c4d [https://perma.cc/53EF-HWZA].
334. See Cameron Brenchley, 2013 Education Budget: What It Means for You,
HOUSE
BRIEFING
ROOM
(Feb.
13,
2012,
7:02
PM),
WHITE
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/02/13/2013-education-budgetwhat-it-means-you [https://perma.cc/R6ML-EQVC] (stating that this was an increase
to $69.8 billion in discretionary appropriations). In this budget, President Obama
proposed doubling the number of work-study jobs and increasing by $7.5 billion the
available funding for Perkins Loans. See id.; see also Willliam C. Smith, The Second
Term: Higher Education and the Obama Administration, FORUM OF AMERICAN J. OF
ED. (Jan. 21, 2013), www.ajeforum.com/the-second-term-higher-education-and-theobama-administration-by-william-c-smith.
335. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175,
126 Stat. 1313, 1315 (2013) (authorizing funding through March 27, 2013). See
generally Consolidated and Further Continuing Resolutions Act of 2013, Pub. L. No.
113-6, 127 Stat. 198 (2013) (authorizing funding through end of fiscal year 2013).
336. See Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub L. No. 113-28,
127 Stat. 505, 506 (2013).
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final auction held prior to that June 1, plus 2.05% or (2) 8.25%.337 For
graduate and professional students, the interest rate on unsubsidized
Stafford loans was higher.338
In 2014, Obama signed a memorandum directing the DOE to
propose regulations allowing students to cap their loan repayments at
10% of their income.339 He also proposed that the federal government
partner with the states in making the first two years of community
college free for all students, whether they intended to complete their
bachelor degrees or go on to the workforce.340 The Perkins Loan
Program, established in 1958 as a need-based loan program,341 was
allowed to lapse in September 2015. However, it was extended in
December of that year for another two years,342 although this was too
late to affect the decisions of those entering college that fall.
In 2014, the Department of Education found for-profit
Corinthian Colleges guilty of fraud in deceptive marketing and lying
to the government about its graduation and job placement rates.343 In
the wake of this finding, the DOE prohibited Corinthian from
receiving any further federal funding.344 In 2015, the school filed
bankruptcy and ceased its operations.345
337. See id.
338. See 127 Stat. at 507 (stating that, for these students, the rate of interest on
unsubsidized Stafford loans was the lesser of the rate of the high-yield Treasury note
plus 3.6% or 9.5%). Consolidation loans would have an interest rate equal to the
weighted average of the loans, rounded to the nearest one-eighth of one percent. Id.
339. See Making College Affordable, WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/higher-education/making-collegeaffordable [https://perma.cc/V6ZS-JWZF] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
340. See Higher Education, WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/issues/education/highereducation [https://perma.cc/HV6N-URUM]. Obama reiterated this in his State of the
Union Address on January 21, 2015. See Obama’s State of the Union 2015 Transcript
(Full Text and Video), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/01/21/us/politics/obamas-state-of-the-union-2015-address.html?mcubz=1
[https://perma.cc/NSX6-KZQK].
341. See supra notes 49–50, 160–161, 293 and accompanying text.
342. See Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-105, 129 Stat. 2219, 2221 (stating that this legislation was not approved until
December 18, 2015).
343. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Feds Found Widespread Fraud at
Corinthian Colleges. Why Are Students Still Paying the Price?, WASH. POST (Sept.
29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/29/fedsfound-widespread-fraud-at-corinthian-colleges-why-are-students-still-paying-theprice [https://perma.cc/5ZN8-RYJB].
344. See id.
345. See Alia Wong, The Meltdown of a For-Profit College Behemoth, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
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After the Corinthian closure, the Obama Administration
announced a “borrower defense” regulation that would provide
automatic relief from indebtedness in the event of a school closure
after November 1, 2013, if the borrower had not enrolled in another
Title IV-eligible institution within three years.346 Unfortunately, this
regulation was not effective until July 1, 2017, after Obama left
office.347
In 2016, the DOE predicted an alarming increase in student loan
defaults, despite a rosy economic forecast, an increase in the
maximum Pell grant, lower interest rates, and income-based loan
repayment.348 This prediction proved true. According to the DOE’s
findings released in late 2017, there was a 12% increase in student
loan defaults from a year earlier.349 One commentator placed much of
the blame on contractors hired by the government to service student

2015/04/the-meltdown-of-a-for-profit-college-behemoth/391925 [https://perma.cc/
S4R4-3YZR].
346. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., U.S. Department of Education Announces Final
Regulations to Protect Students and Taxpayers from Predatory Institutions (Oct. 28,
2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announcesfinal-regulations-protect-students-and-taxpayers-predatory-institutions
[https://
perma.cc/VR82-PHRU]. There were other protections in this regulation, such as
requiring schools with poor loan repayment records to provide warning to students,
banning arbitration agreements under which students waived their right to go to court
or bring class action suits in a borrower defense claim, and providing notice to
borrowers of their rights in the event of a school closure. See id.
347. See id.
348. See Jason Delisle, Obama Budget Sees Rising Student Loan Defaults,
(Feb.
3,
2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasondelisle/2015/
FORBES
02/03/obama-student-loan-defaults/#4f9a98b446d [https://perma.cc/LU6U-UV3K]
(projecting that there would be an increase in default with every type of student loan).
The most dramatic projected increase was a 25.3% default rate in undergraduate
Stafford loans (an increase of 2.5% from 2015). See id.
349. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, The Number of People Defaulting on
Federal Student Loans Is Climbing, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/28/the-number-ofpeople-defaulting-on-federal-student-loans-is-climbing
[https://perma.cc/EAD37ZE8]. These figures were not based on the cohort default rate but on a more
comprehensive view of defaults that showed as of June 2017, there were millions of
student loan debtors who had made no payments on $144 billion in federal student
loans in the past nine months. See id.
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loans.350 These contractors have been accused of driving borrowers
into default by creating obstacles to repayment.351
6. The Trump Administration (2017– )
Trump’s actions on education have been controversial. In his
first budget request, FY 2018, he proposed to cut the budget of the
DOE by $10.6 billion, with a redirection of funds away from higher
education to his primary and secondary school choice agenda.352
Congress ultimately rejected this proposal.353 His nominee for
350. See Teddy Nykiel, Navient Lawsuits: What Student Loan Borrowers
Need to Know, NERDWALLET (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/
navient-lawsuits-what-student-loan-borrowers-need-to-know-cm855944
[https://
perma.cc/NRQ5-7F2X].
351. See id. Navient Corp., a spin-off of Sallie Mae and once the largest of the
student loan servicers, is facing lawsuits filed by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and the attorneys general of five states—Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York,
Washington, and California—alleging fraud, predatory practices, and violations of the
consumer protection laws in its dealings with borrowers. See Michelle Singletary,
How the Lawsuits Against Student Loan Servicer Navient Could Affect You, WASH.
POST
(July
5,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/getthere/wp/2018/07/05/how-the-lawsuits-against-student-loan-servicer-navient-couldaffect-you [https://perma.cc/TY8R-AW5C]; see also Shahien Nasiripour, Why This
State’s Navient Lawsuit Could Affect Your Student Loans, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-05/why-pennsylvania-s-navientsuit-may-impact-your-student-loans [https://perma.cc/N8AH-RGUC]; Nykiel, supra
note 350. Although Navient tried to get the suits dismissed, a federal judge in
Pennsylvania ruled that the suit could proceed. See Judge Allows Lawsuit Against
Student Loan Servicer Navient, DEL. ONLINE (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2018/12/18/lawsuit-alleging-abusewilmington-based-navient-can-go-ahead-judge-says/2348657002 [https://perma.cc/
Y9VQ-WP9T].
352. See Valerie Strauss, Five Startling Things Betsy DeVos Just Told
Congress, WASH. POST (May 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
answer-sheet/wp/2017/05/24/five-startling-things-betsy-devos-just-toldcongress/?utm_term=.846 d5cd7d22e [https://perma.cc/HU4X-RQPW]; Danielle
Douglas-Gabriel, Betsy DeVos Undoes Obama’s Student Loan Protections, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 11, 2017, 9:47 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-betsy-devosstudent-loan-protections-20170411-story.html [https://perma.cc/3QBA-NPPZ]. The
budget proposal would have redirected $1.4 billion to school choice. Emma Brown,
DeVos Promises “the Most Ambitious Expansion of Education Choice in Our
Nation’s History” But Offers No Details, WASH. POST (May 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/betsy-devos-promises-the-mostambitious-expansion-of-education-choice-in-our-nations-history--but-offers-nodetails/2017/05/22/ae90f55e-3f03-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/F9NP-TUP3].
353. See Andrew Ujifusa, Trump Fails in Bid to Slash Education Budget, ED.
WEEK (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/ articles/2018/04/11/trump-fails-
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Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, was the former chairwoman of
the Michigan Republican Party with no prior experience in education
policy.354 On February 7, 2017, she was confirmed with the closest
vote of any Cabinet nominee in history after the Vice-President cast
the deciding vote.355 The controversy surrounding her confirmation
has continued as she has worked to repeal many of the policies and
safeguards for student loan borrowers implemented by President
Obama.356
One of these safeguards was the borrower defense to repayment
regulation, which was due to become effective on July 1, 2017.357
However, DeVos delayed the implementation, ostensibly to allow the
DOE to “review[] the rule.”358 She ultimately proposed rules that would
have been effective in July 2019 that would have made it much more
in-bid-to-slash-education.html [https://perma.cc/Y543-X7SB] (stating that the FY18
education budget was actually increased $2.6 billion over the fiscal year 2017 level).
354. See Greg Toppo, What You Need to Know About Betsy DeVos, USA
TODAY (Feb. 7, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/
02/07/facts-about-education-secretary-betsy-devos/97605238
[https://perma.cc/
LZL4-4HY5].
355. Emmarie Huetteman & Yamiche Alcindor, Betsy DeVos Confirmed as
Education Secretary; Pence Breaks Tie, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-secretaryconfirmed.html [https://perma.cc/2SCB-RWPB] (reporting that this vote (51-50) was
along party lines with two Republicans voting against, and that these two noted that
“Ms. DeVos was unqualified because of a lack of familiarity with public schools and
with laws meant to protect students”).
356. See, e.g., Dustin Hornbeck, Betsy Devos’ 6-Month Report Card: More
Undoing Than Doing, CONVERSATION (Aug. 10, 2017, 8:59 PM),
http://theconversation.com/betsy-devos-6-month-report-card-more-undoing-thandoing-81793 [https://perma.cc/4WMM-YJQC]; see also Lauren Camera, 18 States
Sue Betsy DeVos for Killing Student Loan Protections, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(July
6,
2017,
11:52
AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/educationnews/articles/2017-07-06/18-states-sue-education-secrertary-betsy-devos-for-nixingstudent-loan-protections [https://perma.cc/WWR6-D5NQ].
357. See supra notes 346–347 and accompanying text.
358. Katie Lobosco, Betsy DeVos Limits Debt Relief for Defrauded Students,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 21, 2017, 2:57 PM), www.money.cnn.com/2017/12/21/
pf/college/devos-borrower-defense-debt-relief/index.html [https://perma.cc/3C92JV32]. DeVos eventually argued that relief should be granted based on “damages
incurred,” which would involve a consideration of the earnings of the borrower. Id.
Critics counterargued that this was unfair because many borrowers never completed
their degrees in the wake of the closure of a proprietary institution. See id.; see also
Andrew Josuweit, 4 Ways Betsy DeVos Plans to Make It Harder for Ripped-Off
(Jan.
5,
2018),
Students
to
Get
Loan
Forgiveness,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewjosuweit/2018/01/05/4-ways-betsy-devosplans-to-make-it-harder-for-ripped-off-students-get-loan-forgiveness/2/#
[https://
perma.cc/BP3E-GKGY].
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difficult for defrauded students to obtain relief,359 and for those who
might have managed to overcome the myriad roadblocks, the relief
would have been based on the borrowers’ earnings, determined
through the use of Social Security data.360
359. See Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos Rule Would Cut Billions in Student
HIGHER
E D.
(July
26,
2018),
Loan
Relief,
INSIDE
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/07/26/devos-proposes-tougherstandard-borrowers-who-seek-student-loan-relief
[https://perma.cc/4XZ7-WZU9]
(allowing relief only for those borrowers in default). Default, however, carries severe
consequences for borrowers, including wage garnishment, tax refund and social
security benefit garnishment, and negative effects on credit that could affect
employment and approval for housing and car loans. See id. They also would have
eliminated the Obama-era ban on forced arbitration, although they would have
required institutions to plainly notify student borrowers that they enforced such a
provision. See id. For those borrowers who might have managed to get to court,
DeVos’ rules forbade class action suits, resulting in borrowers having to bring suit
individually. See id. This would have greatly increased the cost to borrowers in having
their claims addressed. See id. These rules also would have required borrowers to bear
the burden of proving that their institutions knowingly defrauded them by making
false statements in advertising or recruitment or in making promises with a reckless
disregard for the truth. See id. They finally would have ended the Obama-era
automatic loan discharge for borrowers who had not enrolled elsewhere within three
years of a school closure. See id. These borrowers instead would have had to seek
proactive relief. See id.
360. See Michael Stratford, Trump and DeVos Fuel a For-Profit College
Comeback, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2017, 4:58 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2017/08/31/devos-trump-forprofit-college-education-242193
[https://perma.cc/
MN3E-H2T9]. Under the Borrower Defense to Repayment regulation, students
defrauded by for-profit schools could apply to have their loans forgiven. See id.
During the Obama Administration, $550 million in student loan debt was extinguished
under this regulation. See id. As of the first of November 2017, none of the 87,000
claims submitted since DeVos took office had been addressed, including 10,000
claims that previously had been recommended for approval. See Shannon Insler, Betsy
DeVos Considering New Limits on Loan Forgiveness for Defrauded Students,
STUDENT LOAN HERO (Oct. 30, 2017), https://studentloanhero.com/news/betsy-devosdelays-closed-for-profit-colleges-student-loan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/83CQBWPZ]. In December 2017, DeVos unveiled her plan to provide ‘tiered relief’ to
defrauded students. See id. This plan would provide only partial forgiveness based on
debt to earnings data that compared average earnings and debt of students in similar
programs and schools. See id. This plan has been criticized severely by Democrats
and consumer advocates. See id. As of April 2018, the DOE had approved 8,809
claims (with 99,000 more claims pending) with awarded relief of $13.4 million. Id.
However, these borrowers would have been entitled to $70.3 million if they had
received full discharge of their loans. See Michael Stratford, A Look at Student Fraud
Claims Under New DeVos Policy, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2008, 10:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-education/2018/04/16/a-look-atstudent-fraud-claims-under-new-devos-policy-170324
[https://perma.cc/V4QTVDWZ]. Meanwhile, under DeVos’ rules, those who had been defrauded by closed
for-profit schools would have had to continue to pay their debt, ostensibly until July
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This prompted a number of lawsuits in 2017 by the attorneys
general of eighteen states, plus the District of Columbia.361 In May
2018, a California federal district court held that the DOE’s use of
Social Security data to determine borrowers’ earnings violated privacy
laws, and it issued a preliminary injunction both against the use of this
data and against collection on the loans.362 The following September,
a U.S. District Court judge held in favor of the states, concluding that
DeVos’ delay of the borrower defense rule was “arbitrary and
capricious” and that the Department’s legal rationale “lacked any
meaningful analysis.”363
In a separate suit filed by the Harvard Legal Services Center
Project on Predatory Student Lending, the court concluded that the
DOE’s delay in implementing the borrower defense regulation was

1, 2019, according to the DOE’s Federal Register expiration date for the consideration
of new regulations. See id.
361. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Democratic AGs Sue DeVos on Borrower
Defense, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://insidehighered.com/
quicktakes/2017/12/15/democratic-ags-sue-devos-borrower-defense
[https://
perma.cc/GP9Y-7WXU]. These states were California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and
Washington. Id.; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Betsy DeVos Takes Action on
Backlog of Student Debt Relief Claims, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:25 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/12/20/betsy-devostakes-action-on-backlog-of-student-debt-relief-claims
[https://perma.cc/Z8JZJF5W]. The suit also consolidated other suits by two aggrieved borrowers filed by the
consumer advocacy group, Public Citizen. See Andrew M. Harris & Daniel Flatley,
Betsy DeVos Loses Student Loan Lawsuit Brought By 19 States, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
12, 2018, 5:42 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-12/devosloses-states-suit-over-borrower-defense-rule-delay [https://perma.cc/RP3F-R38D].
362. See Scott Jaschik, Court: Education Department Must Resume Debt
Relief, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (May 29, 2018), https://insidehighered.com/quicktakes/
2018/05/29/court-education-department-must-resume-debt-relief [https://perma.cc/
RJ22-UE2Y].
363. See Katie Lobosco, Betsy DeVos Loses Lawsuit After Delaying Student
Loan
Protection
Rule,
CNN
(Sept.
13,
2018,
12:51
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/13/politics/betsy-devos-loses-lawsuit/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2MFU-NTPP]. The judge, however, did not require the rule to be
reinstated. See id. Instead, there will be a hearing to discuss remedies. See id.
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illegal.364 It gave the DOE thirty days to resolve problems inherent in
the repeal of the regulation.365
DeVos’s actions belie any concern for student borrowers.
Rather, her real concern is for lenders and institutions, particularly
proprietary institutions, which does not bode well for borrowers.366 In
June 2017, she announced that the DOE would reconsider the Obama
Administration’s gainful employment rule with the aim of creating or
“resetting” a new rule.367 This again prompted lawsuits by the attorneys
general of eighteen states plus the District of Columbia to compel
implementation of the old rule on the ground that it had already
undergone “extensive input and analysis, negotiated rulemaking, and
public comment.”368 In October 2018, the court gave the DOE thirty
days to resolve problems with repeal.369
Meanwhile, the DOE announced in October 2018 that it would
not be able to meet the November deadline to resolve the problems
364. See Sara Garcia, The Lawsuits Challenging DeVos’ Anti-Student Higher
Education Agenda, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2018, 9:03 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2018/
10/02/458814/lawsuits-challenging-devos-anti-student-higher-education-agenda
[https://perma.cc/859X-JUQK].
365. See id.
366. See, e.g., Michael Stratford, DeVos Escalates Fights with States Over
Student Loan Companies, POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2018, 4:29 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/07/devos-student-loan-companies-774599
[https://perma.cc/Q3FT-H9MU].
367. See Paul Fain, AGs Sue DeVos Over Gainful Employment Rule, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/10/18/agssue-devos-over-gainful-employment-rule [https://perma.cc/3UK7-B8JD].
368. See Dozens of Organizations Come Out in Support of Gainful
Employment, Borrower Defense Rules, CONSUMER REPS. (May 4, 2018),
https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/dozens-of-organizations-come-outin-support-of-gainful-employment-borrower-defense-rules [https://perma.cc/H7CAL67L].
369. See Garcia, supra note 364; see also Andrew Kreighbaum, Agencies at
Loggerheads Over Gainful-Employment Data, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/12/06/education-department-says-datadispute-behind-failure-enforce-gainful-employment [https://perma.cc/D4U8-QAS3].
Also pending is a suit filed in August 2018 by the National Student Legal Defense
Network representing the National Education Association and the California Teachers
Association against DeVos and the DOE to halt the illegal delay of rules designed to
protect students enrolled in online education programs. See id. The rules at issue
require online educational institutions to notify students if the programs in which they
are enrolled or plan to be enrolled fail to meet state licensing standards or are in danger
of “fac[ing] adverse actions from the state or accreditor.” Educators, Students File
Lawsuit Against Education Department, DeVos, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N. (Aug. 23,
2018), www.nea.org/home/73914.htm [https://perma.cc/D82Y-SJRT].
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with the repeal of the borrower defense and gainful employment
regulations.370 This means that the earliest implementation date will be
July 2020, a year after the DOE had estimated.371 Advocates called this
a win for student borrowers.372
In 2016, the Obama Administration considered replacing the
complex labyrinth that is the system of obtaining information about
student loans with the creation of a single web portal administered by
the DOE through which students could obtain this information.373 In
April 2017, DeVos proposed to take that simplification plan a step
further and award the student loan vendor contract to a single company
instead of the then nine loan servicers.374 She also proposed to
disregard the Obama Administration’s policy of considering a loan
company’s track record of servicing loans in awarding loan vendor
contracts.375 This would have placed student borrowers at the mercy of
a single predatory loan servicer, without any feasible choices.376
370. See Garcia, supra note 364; see also Andrew Kreighbaum, Missed
Deadline Stalls DeVos Agenda, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/04/education-department-missesdeadline-its-overhaul-student-loan-rules [https://perma.cc/XG65-ATK9].
371. See Kreighbaum, supra note 370.
372. See id.
373. See Stacy Cowley, DeVos Abandons Plan to Allow One Company to
2,
2017),
Service
Federal
Student
Loans,
N.Y.
TIMES (Aug.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/business/dealbook/devos-student-loanpayment-system.html [https://perma.cc/8MAR-2QSC].
374. See id. Her rationale was that this would be more efficient because the
present system is “cumbersome and confusing—with shifting deadlines [and]
changing requirements.” Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Administration Cancels
Controversial Contract Bid for a New Student Loan Servicer, WASH. POST (Aug. 1,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/08/01/senatorscombat-devoss-reset-on-student-loan-servicing-contracts [https://perma.cc/P2WRCQGM]. The DOE had estimated that switching to a single loan servicer would save
more than $130 million in the first five years. See id.; see also Roger Yu & Kevin
McCoy, Trump to Grant Student Loan Servicing Work to Just One Company, USA
TODAY (May 22, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
2017/05/22/trump-grant-student-loan-servicing-work-just-one-company/102004374
[https://perma.cc/6T5X-UT3M].
375. See Cowley & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 321.
376. See Gretchen Morgenson, At Student Loan Giant Navient, Troubled Past
Was Prologue, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/
business/navient-sallie-mae-student-loans.html
[https://perma.cc/5DRD-YQM2].
The largest federal loan servicer, Navient, formerly Sallie Mae, is currently facing a
lawsuit filed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau accusing it of shoddy
service and deception. See id. The company denies these allegations, but in 2014, the
company was investigated by the Department of Justice and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation for wrongdoing in overcharging military families for almost
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DeVos withdrew these proposals only after they received vociferous
objections from consumer advocates and members of Congress
concerned about both the quality of service and creating a “too big to
fail” student loan servicing monopoly.377 In its FY 2018 appropriations
bill, Congress forbade the DOE from awarding the contract to service
student loans to a single servicer.378 It also required the DOE to
consider the performance record of any company receiving a DOE
loan servicing contract.379
DeVos has made no secret of her desire to decrease the federal
government’s role in education.380 She has shrunk the number of
positions in the DOE to the point that there is concern about the ability
of the Department to perform its key functions, such as “aiding debtburdened students defrauded by for-profit colleges” and addressing
the thousands of applications for student debt relief.381 When she
ten years. See id. Navient settled the suit, paying $60 million. See id.; see also Nykiel,
supra note 350.
377. See Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 374.
378. See Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 115th Cong., Rules Comm. Print 115-66, 992-994 (Mar. 21, 2018);
Andrew Kreighbaum, New Boost for Student Aid and Research, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/03/22/omnibusspending-package-boosts-student-aid-while-restricting-devos-priorities.
379. See Consolidations Appropriation Act, supra note 378, at 992–994.
380. See, e.g., Moriah Balingit & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Inside Betsy
DeVos’s Efforts to Shrink the Education Department, WASH. POST. (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/inside-betsy-devoss-efforts-toshrink-the-education-department/2017/11/08/fc03884c-ba64-11e7-be94fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html [https://perma.cc/5M8U-QRAT]; see also Danielle
Douglas-Gabriel, DeVos Offers Buyouts to Shrink Education Department Workforce,
WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2017/10/27/devos-offers-buyouts-to-shrink-education-departmentworkforce [https://perma.cc/MC79-SQGZ].
381. See Balingit & Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 380. Previously, there were
87,000 such applications that were being reviewed by just fourteen staff members. Id.
Recently, however, DeVos has announced that the DOE will implement part of the
borrower defense rule and will automatically cancel $150 million in student loan debt
of around 15,000 borrowers who attended colleges that closed between November
2013 and December 2018. Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos to Cancel $150 Million in
HIGHER
E D.
(Dec.
14,
2018),
Student
Loan
Debt,
INSIDE
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2018/12/14/devos-cancel-150-millionstudent-loan-debt [https://perma.cc/A57R-B62E]. However, in November 2019, the
DOE announced that it would cancel almost $11 million in federal loans provided to
students defrauded by four defunct for-profit Art Institutes which falsely claimed to
be accredited. Evidence establishes that the DOE knew the institutions were not
accredited but continued issuing the loans. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, DeVos
Cancels Nearly $11 Million in Student Loans that the Education Dept. Sent to
Unaccredited For-Profit Colleges, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2019, 3:14 pm),
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sought to dismantle the DOE’s Central Budget Office and the Office
for Civil Rights, she again was rebuked by Congress with specific
language in the 2018 appropriations bill that forbade her from making
fundamental changes to the Department.382
Her support of student loan servicers has been unapologetic,
despite numerous complaints about these entities. In 2017, she ended
the DOE’s relationship with the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), the government regulator of student loan servicers
and for-profit institutions.383 The DOE abruptly announced that it
would no longer honor two memoranda of understanding between it
and the CFPB to share information on abusive practices of student
loan servicers, along with supervisory oversight of student loan
lenders and for-profit schools.384
DeVos has gone even further in attempting to curtail oversight
and regulation of student loan servicers by the states as well. In early
2018, she issued a memorandum arguing that federal law preempts
state efforts to regulate student loan servicers.385 Although the states
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/11/08/devos-cancels-nearlymillion-student-loans-that-education-dept-sent-unaccredited-for-profit-colleges.
382. See Valerie Strauss, Congress Rebukes DeVos Over Her Plans to
Reorganize the Education Department, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2018, 2:19 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/03/22/congressrebukes-devos-over-her-plans-to-reorganize-the-education-department
[https://
perma.cc/Z74H-A6FU]. However, DeVos also has staffed the DOE with for-profit
industry insiders. See David Halperin, DeVos Embrace of Predatory For-Profit
Colleges Is Breathtaking, HUFFPOST (Sept. 6, 2017, 6:03 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/devos-embrace-of-predatory-for-profitcolleges-is-breathtaking_us_59b0705ee4b0d0c16bb529d0 [https://perma.cc/236NS8UU].
383. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Education Dept. Ends Partnership with CFPB,
INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2017/09/05/education-dept-rebukes-cfpb-overreach-kills-information-sharingagreement [https://perma.cc/4PBN-S4MJ].
384. See id. In the 2018 Appropriations Act, however, Congress required the
DOE to provide reports on a quarterly basis on borrower defense to repayment claims.
See Andrew Kreighbaum, New Boost for Student Aid and Research, INSIDE HIGHER
ED. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/03/22/omnibusspending-package-boosts-student-aid-while-restricting-devos-priorities
[https://perma.cc/X9UY-266T].
385. See, e.g., Cory Turner, Education Department Wants to Protect Student
Loan
Debt
Collectors,
NPR
(Feb.
27,
2018,
10:40
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/02/27/588943959/education-departmentwants-to-protect-student-loan-debt-collectors [https://perma.cc/CXZ8-89L3]. States
have implemented measures to regulate this industry, such as passing a “student loan
bill of rights,” creating a student loan ombudsman position to assist borrowers with
complaints, and requiring licenses to operate within the state. Id.; see Kaitlin Mulhere,
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have vowed to continue their efforts to regulate the servicers,386 there
is no indication that DeVos plans to withdraw the memo or reduce her
efforts to aid the student loan servicing industry. While the memo is
not law, nevertheless the fear is that the industry will seize upon it to
bolster their argument that they are bound only by federal law and are
not subject to state laws aimed at protecting borrowers.387 DeVos
stated in this memo that there are federal safeguards in place to “ensure
that borrowers receive exemplary customer service and are protected
from substandard practices.”388 The reality, however, does not support
this statement.
Trump has supported DeVos’s actions. In both his FY 2018 and
FY 2019 budget proposals, Trump called for cuts to higher
education.389 In 2018, he proposed cutting $143 billion from federal
student loans by allowing the Perkins loan program to expire, phasing
out subsidized Stafford loans, ending public service loan forgiveness
(PSLF), reducing funding for the federal work-study program by half,
cutting the surplus in the Pell grant program, eliminating SEOG
grants, and revamping the income-based repayment program.390
However, he was rebuked when Congress increased the 2018 budget
of the DOE by $3.9 billion to provide additional funding to the SEOG

Betsy DeVos Is Telling States to Stop Cracking Down on Student Loan Companies,
MONEY (Mar. 9, 2018), http://time.com/money/5193456/devos-student-loanservicers-state-regulations [https://perma.cc/3ZNU-642Q].
386. See Jillian Berman, States to DeVos: We’ll Keep Cracking Down on
Student-Loan Companies, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 3, 2018, 1:34 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/states-to-devos-well-keep-cracking-down-onstudent-loan-companies-2018-03-02 [https://perma.cc/AQB2-2BW9].
387. See Mulhere, supra note 385. There is a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) lawsuit currently pending to compel the DOE to release documents to
determine whether loan servicers illegally participated in the DOE’s attempt to restrict
states’ role in regulating loan servicers. See Garcia, supra note 364 (discussing other
lawsuits pending against DeVos and the DOE); see also National Consumer Law
Center Files FOIA Lawsuit Against U.S. Department of Education, NAT’L. CONSUMER
LAW CTR. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/national-consumerlaw-center-files-foia-lawsuit-against-u-s-department-of-education.html
[https://
perma.cc/948M-UW64].
388. See Mulhere, supra note 385.
389. See FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION, 26–28.
390. Id. at 25–29; Andrew Kreighbaum, Trump Budget Would Slash Student
HIGHER
E D.
(May
24,
2017),
Aid
and
Research,
INSIDE
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/24/white-house-budget-includestens-billions-cuts-student-aid-and-research [https://perma.cc/NC9S-YCMX].
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program, the PSLF program,391 the work-study program, and the Pell
grant program.392
In Trump’s FY 2018 budget proposal, there was a cryptic
statement that the Administration “looks forward to working with
Congress” to address the issue of “Higher Education Accountability”
by not allowing students to “take on debt they cannot afford to
repay.”393 Given the Trump Administration’s partiality to predatory
institutions and the fact that it has worked to dismantle the Obama era
“gainful employment” rule,394 this probably means that instead of
holding underperforming schools accountable, and instead of working
to hold rising tuition costs in check, students will be held accountable
with a limitation on the amount of federal loan money they can obtain,
while tuition continues to rise. This will force students to turn to more
expensive private loans.
In his FY 2019 budget proposal, Trump again requested cuts to
education, including the elimination of the PSLF program and
subsidized student loans.395 He also requested a reform of the student
loan repayment system, so that students in an income-driven
repayment plan would have to make larger monthly payments of
391. See What the 2018 Spending Bill Means for Education and the
Humanities, MLA ACTION NETWORK (Apr. 6, 2018), https://action.mla.org/policywhat-the-2018-spending-bill-means-for-education-and-the-humanities
[https://
perma.cc/F4AC-XYSV] (explaining the additional funding to the PSLF program was
intended to fix the problem of loan servicers’ failure to inform borrowers that either
their loans or their repayment plans or both did not qualify for forgiveness). Thus, the
years of payments that borrowers had made thinking they would soon qualify for
forgiveness would not count, and they would have to start over making payments for
another ten years to qualify for forgiveness. See id. This prompted a number of
lawsuits, which the 2018 appropriation was intended to address. See id. However, this
funding is on a one-time, first-come-first-served basis and will not be renewed. See
id. There are concerns that the current appropriation will be insufficient to adequately
service the number of claimants who were misled by their loan servicers. See id.
392. See FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION, supra note 389, at 24.
393. Id. at 25.
394. See supra notes 329–331, 367–368 and accompanying text. This rule
prohibits schools from receiving federal funding if a certain percentage of their
graduates are unable to secure jobs or “have high levels of debt compared [to] their
incomes.” Ben Miller, 6 Things Betsy DeVos Has Done on Higher Ed, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (June 29, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
education-postsecondary/news/2017/06/29/435273/6-things-betsy-devos-donehigher-ed [https://perma.cc/L5D6-GW5J].
395. See Preston Cooper, President Trump’s Proposed Higher Education
Budget (Round 2), FORBES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
prestoncooper2/2018/02/13/president-trumps-proposed-higher-education-budgetround-2/#2ad58af759b9 [https://perma.cc/Z3QM-5K3D].
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12.5% of their income instead of the current 10%.396 The trade-off
would be loan forgiveness for any remaining balance at the end of
fifteen years, instead of the current twenty years.397 This would apply
only to undergraduate borrowers; graduate borrowers would not
receive forgiveness until the end of thirty years.398 Trump’s proposal
claims that these changes would save $203 billion over the next ten
years,399 although this amount has been disputed.400
While there is an obvious advantage in lowering interest costs to
students because they would pay off their loans earlier, nevertheless
this proposal would hit borrowers hardest (forcing them to make larger
payments) at the beginning of their careers when they are most
vulnerable financially.
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: MISTAKES, INACTIONS, AND ANIMOSITY
One of the major problems facing the American economy today
is the sheer size of student loan debt, surpassed only by home
mortgage debt.401 Unlike home mortgage debt, though, student loan
debt is unsecured. For that reason, as this huge bubble continues to
enlarge, if it should burst it will be more disastrous than the 2008
financial crisis.402
396. Id.
397. Miller, supra note 394.
398. Id.
399. Cooper, supra note 395.
400. See id. (stating the CBO estimates that the figure is “closer to $100
billion”).
401. See Weingarten, supra note 6 (noting that student loan debt reached $1.5
trillion last summer which exceeds auto loan debt, credit card debt, and home equity
revolving debt); see also A Record One-In-Five Households Now Owe Student Loan
Debt, supra note 321; Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit 2018: Q2,
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Aug. 2018). Women owe the vast majority of this amount,
$890 billion, nearly twice as much as men, and black women owe more than white
women. Jonathan Berr, Who Shoulders Most of Nation’s $1.4 Trillion in Student
Debt? Women, CBS NEWS (July 9, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
women-shoulder-most-of-the-nations-1-4-trillion-in-student-debt [https://perma.cc/
V2Y9-899H].
402. See Susan Soederberg, The Student Loan Crisis and the Debtfare State,
DOLLARS & SENSE (May/June 2015), www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/
2015/0515soederberg.html [https://perma.cc/46EA-GRTM]. Student loan debt bears
some similarities to the sub-prime mortgage debt that caused the 2008 financial crisis.
See id. For instance, student loan debt, like sub-prime mortgage debt, is bundled and
sold into the secondary market. See id. This bundle is called SLABS, an acronym for
Student Loan Asset Backed Securities, and it is purchased by hedge funds, large
pension plans, and other institutional investors. See id. It is the means through which

946

Michigan State Law Review

2019

Student loan debt is part of a vicious circle because college
students today face spiraling costs of tuition and fees. For many
students, higher education is unobtainable without incurring
burdensome debt to pay for it. For others, the fear of this crippling
burden and its consequences dissuades them from pursing higher
education at all.
The equity in student loan debt lies in the value of the education
obtained and the ability of the borrower to find a job that enables him
or her not only to feasibly pay off the debt but also to become a
contributing member of society. In some cases, however, the degrees
these students obtain may be worthless or partially worthless, or their
schools may close suddenly, leaving them with massive debt and no
degree.403 Once the debt is incurred, students may be at the mercy of
predatory lenders who may make it more difficult for these students
to repay their loans.404 For those who are struggling to repay, there are
dire consequences of default, in addition to the fact that this debt is
almost impossible to discharge in bankruptcy.405
The problems of spiraling tuition, crisis-level student loan debt,
predatory for-profit institutions, unfair laws relating to student
borrowers, and predatory lenders and loan servicers can all be laid at
the collective feet of Congress. Some of these problems have been the
result of well-intended but mistaken congressional actions, some have
been the result of congressional inactions, and some have been the
result of outright enmity or disregard for student borrowers.
Whatever the origin, these problems can and should be fixed.
Since the HEA is past due for reauthorization, which is likely to occur

funds are raised for student loans. See id. The risk of this investment depends upon
borrowers’ ability to repay the loans. See id. There is much concern that “the value of
the debt [will] outstrip the value of the asset itself.” Eric Reed, Should You Invest in
Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities?, THE STREET (May 20, 2017),
https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/should-you-invest-in-student-loan-assetbacked-securities-14142296; see also Ellen Messer-Davidow, Investing in College
Education: Debtors, Bettors, Lenders, Brokers, MDPI (2017). However, not everyone
shares this alarm. See, e.g., Akin Oyedele, Goldman Sachs: There’s an Attractive Way
to Profit From the $1.3 Trillion Student Loan Bubble, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2017,
7:05 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/student-loan-bubble-investment-isprivate-abs-goldman-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/7FDK-N4G3].
403. See, e.g., supra notes 343–345 and accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., supra notes 287–288, 349–351, 383–387 and accompanying
text.
405. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (outlining the consequences
of default); see also supra notes 154–155, 238–239, 265–266 and accompanying text
(explaining student loan debt is difficult to discharge in bankruptcy).
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in the near future, now is the time to carefully consider the federal role
in higher education and to learn from the mistakes of the past.
A. Student Loan Policy and The Garden Path
The “golden years” of federal funding policy for higher
education during the 1950s and 1960s were due to four factors: first,
the Presidents themselves were keenly attuned to promoting education
and access to education; second, the economy was strong during this
period; third, the political climate throughout this period was
consistently inclined toward the promotion of education; and fourth,
there was bipartisanship with a spirit of compromise in the national
interest. Nevertheless, there were some missed opportunities, such as
the congressional leaning toward loans, as opposed to scholarships, in
the National Defense Education Act of 1958.406 No doubt this made
federal funding for higher education more palatable because loans
were cheaper for the government than grants and scholarships. But the
“no free rides for students” attitude that partially led to that decision
was ironic considering the tremendous efforts of Congress in the
1960s to increase access to education for low-income students plus the
fact that the Democrats solidly controlled both houses of Congress at
the time.407
The public’s attitude toward education began to change during
the 1970s, however, with the decline in the economy and the
increasing distrust of the government over the Vietnam War. The
demand for greater accountability in education spending and concern
over growing student loan defaults, the majority of which were
attributable to borrowers from proprietary institutions, were probably
factors in the first congressional encroachment on student borrowers’
rights in the bankruptcy process in the third reauthorization of the

406. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
407. See
85th
United
States
Congress,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/85th_United_States_Congress
[https://perma.cc/
6KXQ-JKP4] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (explaining that in the 85th Congress (1957–
1959), Democrats controlled 65% of the voting shares in the Senate and 53.3% of the
voting shares in the House). The members of Congress who thought that students
should not be given a “free ride” may have felt emboldened by the fact that
Eisenhower had a very strong work ethic, developed after having grown up in a poor
but very religious family in a very small town in Kansas. See Obituary, Dwight David
Eisenhower: A Leader in War and Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1969),
http://movies2.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1014.html
[https://
perma.cc/3CNF-CT6T].
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HEA in 1976.408 But instead of addressing the problem of defaults in a
rational manner by imposing additional restrictions on proprietary
institutions, which were responsible for the largest number of defaults,
Congress instead chose to “punish” student borrowers by limiting their
ability to discharge federally insured student loans in bankruptcy.409 At
the same time, it provided an unlimited statute of limitations on
collection of these loans.410
The “no free rides” mentality persisted and caused Congress to
decide at several points to forego the route of scholarships and grants
for students and support to educational institutions, in favor of student
loans.411 The die was cast by the HEA’s initial shift of support from
educational institutions to students and from government lenders to
government-guaranteed private lenders. This was the root of today’s
student loan debt crisis. At the time the HEA was enacted, however,
these shifts probably made the legislation more palatable politically
and thus increased its chance of enactment,412 even though at the time,
there was concern over the rising costs of higher education.413
While there are numerous factors that have contributed to the
high cost of post-secondary education, the biggest factor has been the
decrease in state support, particularly during periods of economic
downturns, which has forced colleges to raise tuition.414 But in the
initial enactment of the HEA, as well as in subsequent
reauthorizations, Congress relinquished any significant role in
moderating the spiraling costs of higher education by focusing on aid
to students, rather than aid to educational institutions.415
408. See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 99–101, 179–181 and accompanying text.
412. See
89th
United
States
Congress,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/89th_United_States_Congress [https://perma.cc/XLL2G4YR] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (noting that Democratic control over Congress
during the 89th Congress (1965–1967) was at an all-time high of 67% of the voting
shares in the Senate and 68% of the voting shares in the House). However, it was also
a period in which there was a spirit of bipartisanship. See id.
413. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
414. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Selingo, Who Is to Blame for Rising Tuition Prices at
Public Colleges?, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2017, 9:55 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/10/20/who-is-to-blame-forrising-tuition-prices-at-public-colleges/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e396e06fe219
[https://perma.cc/AVE8-4H6S]; see also UTAH SYS. HIGHER ED., New Report
Analyzes Factors for Rising Tuition (May 5, 2015), https://ushe.edu/new-reportanalyzes-factors-for-rising-tuition [https://perma.cc/B8CU-DX7Z].
415. See supra notes 50, 70–74, 99–101, 179–185 and accompanying text.
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This problem was compounded in 1978 with the enactment of
the Middle Income Student Assistance Act because this Act greatly
expanded the federal student loan program by making federal loans
available to any student, regardless of need.416 So instead of a
Democratic-controlled Congress and a Democratic President taking
advantage of the moment to rethink federal education policy, they
simply reacted to the immediate problem, which was the outcry from
the middle class for relief from spiraling tuition costs. The immediate
“price” for this “free ride” was the codification of the limitation from
bankruptcy discharge for federally guaranteed loans from nonprofit
institutions, even though there was no evidence to justify such a
limitation.417 The longer-term cost was an across-the-board tuition
increase and the largest enrollment increase in proprietary institutions
up to that point because of the elimination of restrictions on these
institutions.418 At the same time, however, there was inadequate
regulation of these institutions.
Reagan’s emphasis on smaller government resulted in education
policy becoming less reactive and more focused on neoliberalism,
with resulting cuts in government spending across the board,419 leading
to steep increases in college tuition in the 1980s.420 Despite these
tuition increases, however, in the 1992 HEA reauthorization, a
Democratic-controlled Congress chose to disregard the suggestion of
providing more grants, thereby reducing reliance on loans.421 This
decision resulted in an increase of 50% in student loan volume.422 But
this Congress did implement a pilot program of direct loans instead of
using banks and other lenders as middlemen after studies showed that
direct loans were cheaper for students, easier for schools to administer,

416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text.
Sees supra notes 125–131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text.
See Messer-Davidow, supra note 402, at 7–8.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text.
King, supra note 187.
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and more economical for the federal government.423 Thus, this change
was a win for everyone—except private lenders.424
The Republicans’ 1994 victory in gaining control of both houses
of Congress was an important turning point in the student loan
program because the congressional spirit of bipartisanship began to
seriously wane and, with it, the focus on the promotion of education.
Instead, the country entered a period of politicization of education,
which has continued. This has had detrimental effects on both student
borrowers and taxpayers.425 For instance, immediately after gaining
control of Congress, the newly elected Republicans bowed to pressure
from private lenders and gave them an open field to use whatever
means were available to persuade financial aid officers to enlist in the
FFEL guaranteed loan program,426 despite the fact that this program
benefitted no one—not the schools, not the students, and not the
American taxpayers—except the private lenders.427
But a consequence of the direct loan program was the
privatization of Sallie Mae in 1996.428 It was entirely foreseeable that
the volume of student loans would greatly increase by allowing Sallie
Mae to become a private company, no longer restricted by its narrow
government charter but boosted by its reputation as a former GSE with
the imprimatur of a federal guarantee.429 Thus, Sallie Mae had a
significant advantage in the private sector.
Despite the increase in number of outstanding student loans,
however, in 1998 Congress again expanded the student loan program
by making unsubsidized loans under the Stafford loan program
available to all students.430 But in keeping with the enmity toward
student borrowers that it had displayed in the past, the “price” of this
423. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; see also Federal Versus
Private Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federalvs-private [https://perma.cc/QEA7-45BH] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (providing that
government loans provide lower interest rates and fees than private loans, and they
offer benefits like forgiveness and forbearance that private loans do not). Educational
institutions find it much simpler to deal with a single government lender, rather than
numerous private lenders. See id.
424. See supra notes 211–213 and accompanying text. In 1993, the direct loan
pilot program was expanded in the Student Loan Reform Act. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub L. No. 103-66, § 4011, 107 Stat. 312, 341 (1993).
425. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text.
427. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 220 and accompanying text.
429. See supra note 220–222 and accompanying text (explaining the number
of student loans doubled within ten years after Sallie Mae’s privatization).
430. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text.
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expansion exacted by Congress was that education loans, both federal
and private, were made essentially non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.431
Yet this significant advantage to lenders was not passed on to
borrowers in the way of lower interest rates or fees.
In 2002, Congress raised the interest rate on federal student loans
when it changed the rate from variable to fixed, and the fixed rate,
which became effective in 2006, was much higher than the variable
rate.432 It then took Congress six years to alleviate this unfairness, and
even then it acted only in response to an outcry when the fixed interest
rate threatened to double.433
In 2005, when the Republicans gained control of both Congress
and the White House, there was a significant cut in student financial
aid.434 While PLUS loans were extended to graduate and professional
students, the “price” for this largesse was that these students would
have to pay a higher interest rate,435 and the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 essentially ensured
that all student loans would be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.436
Shortly after the Democrats regained control of Congress in the
following year, there was a marked change in education policy. The
wasteful payments to private lenders under the FFEL program were
cut, and the savings were directed into student-friendly changes to
financial aid.437 The financial crisis of 2008 had highlighted the
inadequacies of the FFEL program when the federal government was
forced to lend large amounts of money to private lenders who
exercised the federal guarantee on their loans.438 In 2010, with the
Democrats still in control of both Congress and the White House, the
FFEL program was terminated, and there were further student-friendly
provisions enacted, such as a decrease in borrowers’ required monthly
payments.439
But in the fall 2010 elections, the Democrats lost control of the
House and their control of the Senate was weakened. When the
Republicans took over the House, they rolled back much of the
431. See supra notes 238–239 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 250–255 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 323–324 and accompanying text.
434. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. The amount of the cut was
$12.6 billion. Id.
435. See supra notes 262–264 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 264–267 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 269–276 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 277–283 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 306–309 and accompanying text.
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previous student-friendly legislation, thus increasing the cost of
student loans.440 In 2013, the Republicans gained control of the Senate,
giving them control of both houses of Congress. In 2017, with the
Republicans still in control of Congress, there was a 12% increase in
student loan defaults over 2016.441
The consequences of defaulting on student loans are dire. The
Debt Collection Improvement Act, enacted in 1996 and implemented
in 2001, permits lenders to reach Social Security, retirement, and
disability benefits to offset defaults.442 In addition, many states impose
additional draconian sanctions on borrowers who default of their
student loans.443 For instance, in twenty states a default on a student
loan can result in the denial, loss, or suspension of a state-issued
professional license, and in two states such a default can result in the
loss of a driver’s license.444 The stunning counter-productiveness of
these sanctions has led to an across-the-aisle effort, spearheaded by
Senators Marco Rubio and Elizabeth Warren, to introduce legislation
to prevent their further enforcement.445

440. See supra notes 313–319 and accompanying text (explaining graduate
and professional students were no longer eligible for subsidized Stafford loans and
the sequester led to fee increases in both Stafford and PLUS loans).
441. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 223–224, 249 and accompanying text.
443. Christy Rakoczy, Facing Student Loan Default? You Could Lose Your
License in These States, STUDENT LOAN HERO, https://studentloanhero.com/featured/
unpaid-student-loans-facing-default-lose-license-states
[https://perma.cc/C3Z266GD] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (noting that some states impose sanctions for
defaulting on student loans, including the loss of ability to choose a payment plan,
damage to credit, wage garnishment, and loss of a professional license).
444. See Natalie Kitroeff, Rubio and Warren Seek to Protect Licenses of
Student-Loan Debtors, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
06/14/business/rubio-warren-student-loans.html
[https://perma.cc/M68B-3P6Y]
(noting that “a November report by The New York Times revealed that 20 states had
laws allowing government agencies to seize licenses from residents who had defaulted
on their education debts”); Rakoczy, supra note 443 (noting that there are four states
in which a default on a student loan will result in suspension of a professional license);
Jessica Siver-Greenberg, Stacy Cowley & Natalie Kitroeff, When Unpaid Student
Loan Bills Mean You Can No Longer Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business/student-loans-licenses.html [https://
perma.cc/FK8A-6MLV] (stating that “critics . . . say the laws shove some borrowers
off a financial cliff”).
445. See Kitroeff, supra note 444; see also Silver-Greenberg, Cowley &
Kitroeff, supra note 444.
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B. Predatory Lending Institutions
Predatory lending institutions and loan servicers have been
blamed for fomenting student loan defaults.446 While a direct loan
program may not have entirely avoided this result, nevertheless it
would have allowed the government greater oversight over these
lenders, and it would have afforded more advantages to students, such
as lower interest rates. As it is, these predatory lending institutions are
“monsters” of the government’s making because of the choices the
government has made.
The HEA, from its inception, provided for loans by private
lenders with an anticipated guarantee by the states,447 again, probably
to make the legislation more palatable politically. However, when the
states failed to assume their role,448 the federal government was forced
to increase its role in funding higher education in order to encourage
private lenders to participate.449 This role has continued to expand.
In 1980, the fourth reauthorization of the HEA under the Carter
Administration significantly extended the student loan program to
include PLUS loans for parents of college students.450 It also provided
a large increase in the federal subsidies for private lenders as an
additional incentive to participate in the program.451 But with the
election of Ronald Reagan later in 1980, the political differences in
funding policy for higher education became more pronounced. Shortly
after the Carter Administration’s 1980 expansion of the student loan

446. See supra notes 349–351 and accompanying text; see also Bill Fay,
Predatory Lending: Laws and Unfair Credit Practices, DEBT.ORG,
https://www.debt.org/credit/predatory-lending [https://perma.cc/Y75G-Q97Y] (last
visited Oct. 28, 2019) (defining predatory lending practices as including “a failure to
disclose information or disclosing false information, risk-based pricing and inflated
charges and fees”).
447. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
448. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 82–84 and 90 and accompanying text. Initially, the
government increased its funding role by agreeing to guarantee 80% of the loans. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text. In the second reauthorization of the HEA in
1972, Sallie Mae was created as a government-sponsored enterprise to provide
liquidity for the loans. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In the third
reauthorization of the HEA in 1976, the federal government finally stepped in and
agreed to guarantee 100% of student loans. See supra note 111 and accompanying
text.
450. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.
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program, the Reagan Administration pulled the rug out from under
student borrowers by making government loans more expensive.452
The sixth reauthorization of the HEA in 1992, under the George
H.W. Bush Administration, was friendlier to student borrowers
because both houses of Congress at that time were under the control
of the Democrats. This reauthorization created a direct loan pilot
program that would reduce the role of private lenders.453 The following
year, with the Democrats still in control of Congress, this program was
expanded under the Clinton Administration.454
In 1994, however, the Republicans won control of both houses
of Congress, and they immediately bowed to pressure from the private
lending industry to jettison the direct loan program, despite studies
showing that direct loans are more cost effective for the government.455
This resulted in the guaranteed loan program once again gaining
traction.456 Later, private loans also may have received a boost from
the debacle over the fixed versus variable student loan interest rates,457
which may have persuaded some borrowers to forego government
loans in favor of private loans. Nevertheless, in the midterm elections
in 1994, the Republicans won a major victory, regaining control of
both chambers of Congress and completing the political polarization
of education funding policy.458
In 1996, in the wake of its declining stock value, Congress
approved Sallie Mae’s request for privatization, which was completed
in 2004.459 It then became the largest student loan lender in the
country,460 although its track record in servicing student loans has been
abysmal.
Navient Solutions, the spin-off student loan servicer of Sallie
Mae, has been the subject of more complaints than any other student
loan lender.461 It is currently facing lawsuits by the attorneys general
452. See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 211–212 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 171, 215–219 and accompanying text.
456. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 250–257 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text.
460. See Largest Education Lenders, FIN. AID, www.finaid.org/loans/
biglenders.phtml [https://perma.cc/KE28-Y46E] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
461. See Zack Friedman, Navient Ranks Highest for Student Loan Complaints,
(Jan.
14,
2019,
8:32
am),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
FORBES
zackfriedman/2019/01/14/navient-complaints-student-loans/#6f4b0fe35152; Dieter
Holger, Most Complaints About Student Loan Debt are About These Five Issues,
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of three states plus the CFPB for violations of the consumer protection
laws.462 In 2015, the Department of Justice announced that nearly
78,000 military service members and disabled borrowers would begin
receiving nearly $60 million in compensation for being charged excess
interest on their student loans and having their credit ruined by
Navient.463
Navient’s abysmal record did not dissuade Secretary DeVos in
2017 from contemplating the award of the then $1.3 trillion in student
loan contracts to a single vendor, of which Navient was one of four
contenders.464 She abandoned that plan only when forced after
receiving strong backlash from consumer advocates and members of
Congress.465
The stock of Navient, however, soared in the wake of DeVos’s
actions.466 Despite the complaints and lawsuits against it, the Trump
Administration has shown no concern for Navient’s bad behavior or
for the plight of student borrowers, many of whom are at the mercy of
predatory lenders like Navient. In fact, Secretary DeVos has
hamstrung the CFPB by prohibiting the DOE from sharing
information on its then $1.3 trillion in student loans with the Bureau.467
QUARTZ (Feb. 28, 2018), https://qz.com/1217456/most-complaints-about-studentdebt-are-about-these-five-issues [https://perma.cc/2BZT-F32A].
462. See Nykiel, supra note 350. Among the myriad charges against Navient
is that it cheated borrowers by steering them away from repayment options that could
lower their monthly payments. See id. In some cases, borrowers have charged that
because of misrepresentations by Navient and other lenders, loans on which they had
been paying for years and which they thought were eligible for the PSLF Program are
actually not eligible and the years of payments that they had made on these loans will
not count toward forgiveness. See Weingarten, supra note 6. Thus, they will have to
start over repaying the loans for ten additional years in order to obtain forgiveness.
See id. As of 2017, only 96 borrowers out of 28,000 who sought relief under the PSLF
program had actually had their loans discharged. Id.
463. See Nearly 78,000 Service Members to Begin Receiving $60 Million
Under Department of Justice Settlement with Navient for Overcharging on Student
Loans, U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE (May 28, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nearly78000-service-members-begin-receiving-60-million-under-department-justicesettlement [https://perma.cc/X7ZX-VG63]; see also Morgenson, supra note 376.
464. See supra notes 374–376 and accompanying text.
465. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
466. See Shahien Nasiripour, DeVos Undoes Obama Student Loan
Protections, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.timesunion.com/business/
article/DeVos-Undoes-Obama-Student-Loan-Protections-11066031.php
[https://
perma.cc/D4PA-ZJAG].
467. Shahien Nasiripour, DeVos Tells CFPB to Back Off On Student Loans,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/business/
article/DeVos-tells-CFPB-to-back-off-on-student-loans-12183394.php
[https://
perma.cc/87NA-G3PM]; see supra notes 383–384 and accompanying text.
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Navient, as one of the largest lenders, stands to benefit from this
action.
There has been a sea change in higher education policy from the
Obama Administration to the Trump Administration. The policy of the
Obama Administration was to focus on protections for student loan
borrowers. So far, the Trump Administration seems intent on undoing
these protections and instead favoring loan servicers by eliminating
further regulation or restrictions on those servicers. This is a policy
that makes no sense because not only are student loans likely to be
more expensive,468 creating serious problems in access to higher
education, but the bad behavior of the most notorious student loan
lenders, like Navient, will be encouraged. The plight of hapless
student borrowers then will be worsened, the outstanding amount of
student loan debt will be increased, and taxpayers will be more at risk
of having to pay the ultimate bill.
C. Proprietary Educational Institutions
In 1952, when the original GI Bill was nearing its end, Congress
decided, with bipartisan support, to extend its benefits to veterans of
the Korean War.469 At that time, there were numerous reports of abuses
by proprietary schools that included targeting veterans for their
benefits while offering them worthless degrees.470 To curb this abuse,
Congress made the decision to award these benefits directly to
students rather than to educational institutions.471 This brought the
468. For example, among the Obama-era borrower protections that DeVos has
eliminated is the sixty-day grace period for borrowers in default who formerly could
avoid a fee of 16% of their loan balance. See Donna Rosato, Complaints About Student
Loan Servicers Mount as Protections Erode, CONSUMER REPS. (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.consumerreports.org/student-loans/student-loan-servicers-complaintsmount-as-protections-erode [https://perma.cc/KWZ7-MD75].
469. See generally Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L.
No. 82-550, 66 Stat. 663 (extending benefits to veterans of the Korean war).
470. See generally David Whitman, Truman, Eisenhower, and the First GI
Bill Scandal, CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/trumaneisenhower-first-gi-bill-scandal (discussing reports by the VA, Congress, and the
General Accounting Office).
471. See id. The 1952 GI Bill also included an “85-15” rule to address abuses
by proprietary institutions. See id. Under this rule, a school could receive no federal
funds if more than 85% of its students were veterans using federal funds for their
education. See Pub. L. No. 82-550, § 226, 66 Stat. at 667. The Bill also provided that
only an accredited school could receive federal funds. See § 242. The U.S. Department
of Education was tasked with publishing a list of reliable accrediting agencies. See §§
241–45.
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expansion of proprietary schools to an immediate halt,472 at least for
the time being.
Although proprietary schools were not included under either the
original 1965 HEA legislation or the federal guaranteed student loan
program, they were covered under a smaller program for vocational
schools for better oversight.473 However, in the first reauthorization of
the HEA in 1968, the decision was made to merge the two programs474
even though Congress was fully aware of the problems with these
schools.475 This decision led to the opening of the floodgates that have
allowed proprietary schools to flourish.476
In 1972, during the second reauthorization of the HEA, Congress
chose to continue to award federal aid to students rather than to
educational institutions.477 This was a momentous decision because it
affected not only veterans but all lower-income and lower-middleincome students, and it applied to students at all schools—public,
private, nonprofit, for-profit, and vocational—even though concern
was expressed at the time about extending federal aid to proprietary
institutions.478 This concern, however, was not heeded, and the result
was another proliferation of proprietary schools.479
The concern over the predatory practices of proprietary
institutions and the growing number of student loan defaults, most of
which were attributable to these institutions, worsened during the
early 1970s.480 There were restrictions placed on these schools at that
time to address the same problems we continue to see today. In 1976,
an 85-15 restriction was placed on proprietary institutions in an
attempt to curb the abuse of targeting veterans and other students for
their federal aid dollars.481 This restriction resulted in a decline in
student loan default rates.482 Despite that decline and despite
complaints of fraud, misrepresentation, and deception by these
institutions, the for-profit lobby prevailed, and the restriction was

472. See Whitman, supra note 470.
473. See Protopsaltis & Masiuk, supra note 76.
474. See id.
475. See id.
476. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10.
477. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
479. See NCES, supra note 70, at 403 tbl.303.10 (showing an enrollment
increase of over 62% from 1972 to 1973 at proprietary schools).
480. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
481. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
482. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 12.

958

Michigan State Law Review

2019

weakened during the Carter Administration.483 From 1979 to 1980,
enrollment in these institutions experienced one of the greatest
increases in their history.484 Not surprisingly, there also was an
increase in the student loan default rate.485 But instead of addressing
the real problem, Congress chose to “punish” students by including
private student loans within the exception to nondischargeability in
bankruptcy.486
Meanwhile, concern continued to be expressed into the 1980s
about the high default rate of these institutions,487 but further
restrictions were opposed by the Democrats, who saw these
institutions as opportunities for low-income, underprivileged
students.488 Thus, there were no noteworthy actions taken in the 1980s
to curb the default rate of these institutions.489
Consequently, in 1990, default rates at proprietary institutions
reached an all-time high, and Congress was then forced to act by
placing restrictions on these institutions.490 These restrictions reduced
the student loan default rate at these schools.491
During the Clinton Administration, a Republican-controlled
Congress loosened the eligibility restrictions on proprietary
institutions, yet afterward there was a decline in default rates.492 This
483. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
484. See supra note 138.
485. See Student Loan Default Rate Soars, supra note 154.
486. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. Government loans had been
nondischargeable since 1976. See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text.
487. See Student Loan Default Rate Soars, supra note 154.
488. See supra notes 162166 and accompanying text.
489. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
490. See Education Policy: Debt, Default and Collections, NEW AMERICA,
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/topics/higher-education-funding-andfinancial-aid/federal-student-aid/federal-student-loans/debt-default-and-collections
(last visited Dec. 6, 2019). The result was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
which provided that any school with a cohort default rate equal to or greater than 35%
in the following two years would be ineligible for federal loans. See supra notes 175–
176 and accompanying text. Afterward, the rate would drop to 30%. See supra note
177 and accompanying text.
491. The five-year default rate at for-profit institutions fell from 62% in 1988–
1989 to 29% in 1998–1999. See Trends in Higher Education, Five Year Federal
Student Loan Default Rates by Institution Type Over Time, COLL. BD.,
https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid/figures-tables/five-year-federal-studentloan-default-rates-institution-type-over-time [https://perma.cc/SB5J-AX6K] (last
visited Oct. 28, 2019).
492. See supra notes 243–244 and accompanying text. The eligibility
restrictions on proprietary institutions were loosened when the 85/15 rule that had
been implemented in 1992 was changed to a 90/10 rule so that these institutions could
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decline was attributable to the sixth reauthorization of the HEA that
slashed student loan interest rates and restricted any college with a
default rate of 25% or greater for three consecutive years (40% or
more in a single year) from participating in any federal student loan
program.493
During the George W. Bush Administration, there was a
significant enrollment increase in proprietary schools, despite the
publicity surrounding the sudden closure of some of these
institutions.494 This increase was attributable primarily to the financial
crisis of 2008 plus an increase in eligibility and size of Pell grants.495
During the Obama Administration, a government study
concluded that students at proprietary institutions were more likely to
default on their loans.496 Another study by the same government body
concluded that these schools were continuing to engage in fraud and
misrepresentation.497 This prompted the Administration to issue the
“gainful employment” regulation and later the “defense to borrower
repayment” regulation to provide protections to students.498 In 2016,
however, the Republicans gained control of both Congress and the
White House, and newly appointed Secretary of Education, Betsy
DeVos, decided to delay the implementation of the Obama
regulations, making it more difficult for students to obtain relief from
predatory institutions.499 Moreover, her action in severing ties between
the DOE and the CFPB500 is a clear message that the Trump

derive no more than 90%, instead of 85%, of their revenues from Title IV funds. See
supra note 241 and accompanying text. Another contributing factor to the decline in
default rates was the increase in the period of nonpayment or underpayment from 180
days to 270 days before a delinquent borrower was considered in default. See supra
note 243 and accompanying text. The three most common factors leading to default
are lack of postsecondary degree, lack of an adequately paying job, and an increase in
interest rates. See Common Reasons for Student Loan Default and How You Can
RAPTOR
https://www.collegeraptor.com/paying-forAvoid
It,
COLL.
college/articles/student-loans/common-reasons-student-loan-default-can-avoid
[https://perma.cc/A9Y8-F2S8] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
493. See supra notes 243–244.
494. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.302.30.
495. See supra notes 301304 and accompanying text.
496. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-600, supra note 325 and
accompanying text.
497. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-948T, supra note 326
and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 329, 346 and accompanying text.
499. See supra notes 357359 and accompanying text.
500. See Kreighbaum, supra note 383.
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Administration favors predatory proprietary institutions, as opposed
to safeguarding students.501
The problems of abuse, waste, incompetence, fraud, and
misrepresentation at proprietary schools have not only continued since
the 1970s; they have significantly worsened.502 The restrictions that
Congress has imposed to curb some of these problems have waxed and
waned over the years. In the years in which the restrictions have been
more lax, there has been an uptick in student loan defaults;503 and
conversely, when the restrictions have been tighter, there has been a
corresponding decline in student loan defaults.504
So with such a tangible link between the relaxation of
restrictions on these institutions and student loan defaults, why does
the government not impose strict requirements on these institutions to
prevent these defaults, protect students, and prevent waste of taxpayer
money? There are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, these
organizations have very effective lobbyists, and they contribute
generously to congressional campaigns of both political parties.505
Second, these schools exist in every congressional district, making it
difficult for Representatives and Senators to criticize their
constituents. Third, these schools have bipartisan appeal: to
Republicans they are businesses that have existed for generations; for
Democrats they represent access to education for lower-income
students.506 Thus, a political solution to this problem does not appear
to be on the horizon. However, enrollment in these institutions has
declined because of a stronger economy and declining public

501. See For-Profit Colleges Struggle Despite Assist from DeVos, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 7, 2018, 9:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/education/profit-collegesstruggle-despite-assist-betsy-devos-n863641
[https://perma.cc/352V-DKBX]
(indicating the Trump Administration favors for-profit institutions through the fact
that DeVos has staffed the DOE with for-profit industry insiders and has halted further
investigation into proprietary schools).
502. See supra notes 296–299, 325–333, 343–345 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 162–165, 172 and accompanying text; see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-600, supra note 325 (CAO report showing
that students at proprietary institutions were more likely to default on their loans).
504. See supra notes 114115, 243244 and accompanying text.
505. See Polis, supra note 12.
506. See Whitman, supra note 172, at 8.
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confidence.507 For this reason, some for-profit institutions are seeking
non-profit status.508
III. PENDING LEGISLATION TO REAUTHORIZE THE HEA: WILL IT
HELP OR HURT?
In the 115th session of Congress, congressional leaders indicated
an interest in reauthorizing the HEA.509 To begin the process, the
parties each drafted bills: the Republican’s “Promoting Real
Opportunity, Success, and Prosperity through Education Reform”
(PROSPER) Act and the Democrat’s Aim Higher Act.510 These bills,
however, are polar opposites. The question is whether and how each
bill addresses the salient problems facing students (and taxpayers) in
higher education: the spiraling costs of tuition, crippling student loan
debt, defaults, predatory lenders, and unscrupulous proprietary
institutions.
A. The PROSPER Act
The PROSPER Act was reported out of the House Committee
on Education and the Workforce during the 115th Congress on a

507.
See Doug Lederman, For-Profit Free Fall Continues, U.S. Data Show,
INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 6, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/
quicktakes/2018/06/06/profit-free-fall-continues-us-data-show.
508. See Michelle Hackman, After Obama-Era Crackdown, For-Profit
Colleges Seek Nonprofit Status, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-obama-era-crackdown-for-profit-colleges-seeknonprofit-status-1527681600. In addition, some unscrupulous schools are claiming
non-profit status “without adopting non-profit financial controls”; such “covert”
status is undertaken to dupe students and keep an income stream flowing to the
owners. See Robert Shireman, These Colleges Say They Are Nonprofit—But Are
FOUND.
(Sept.
5,
2019),
https://tcf.org/
They?,
CENTURY
content/commentary/colleges-say-theyre-nonprofit.
509. See Teri Lyn Hinds, PROSPER Act: The House Higher Education Act
Reauthorization Bill, NASPA (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.naspa.org/blog/prosperact-the-house-higher-education-act-reauthorization-bill
[https://perma.cc/MM7HD7ZG]. The HEA has been reauthorized eight times. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text. So, if enacted, it will be the ninth reauthorization. See
Reauthroization of the Higher Education Act of 1965, FinAid, https://www.finaid.org/
educators/reauthorization.phtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). The provisions of the last
reauthorization expired in 2013 but have been extended each year. See Hinds, supra.
The next reauthorization originally was scheduled for 2014, but it is currently more
than five years behind schedule. See id.
510. See id.

962

Michigan State Law Review

2019

partisan vote and was awaiting consideration by the House.511 Since
the Democrats took control of the House in the 2018 elections, there
is virtually no chance this bill will pass in its current form.512
Nevertheless, the bill is important because it is indicative of the Trump
Administration’s policy on higher education. It is also an attempt to
secure Trump’s spurned budgetary requests through legislation.513
The PROSPER Act does nothing to address the most important
problem facing students in higher education, which is the spiraling
cost of tuition and fees,514 most of which is attributable to the decline
in state support for higher education.515 This problem affects access
and completion rates, particularly of minorities and lower-income
individuals.516
Despite its title, this bill significantly cuts funding to higher
education, making student loans more expensive, which would
particularly affect the neediest students.517 In the interest of
“simplifying” and “streamlining” financial aid, the bill eliminates the
SEOG grant, the academic competitiveness grants, and the federal

511. H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018). There has been concern
expressed about the process through which this bill was pushed through the
committee. See Hinds, supra note 509. Teri Lyn Hinds, writing for NASPA–Student
Affairs Administrators in Higher Education, explained,
For legislation of such magnitude, the unusually fast pace with which it was
pushed through the Ed and Workforce Committee is both concerning and
problematic . . . . [T]he bill was prepared behind closed doors with little to
no opportunity for association input, and then rushed almost immediately to
mark-up, preventing legislators from seeking or providing input on key
provisions prior to having to vote on the legislation.
Id.
512. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Seeking Votes on PROSPER, GOP Appears to
HIGHER
E D.
(June
14,
2018),
Come
Up
Short,
INSIDE
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/06/14/no-movement-prosper-act-aftergop-vote-count [https://perma.cc/PGX2-HZZZ]. The bill also had little support from
Republicans after strong criticism from various groups, including veteran’s
representatives. See id.
513. See supra notes 352–353 and accompanying text.
514. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, What You Need to Know About
the House Higher Education Bill, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (Dec. 7, 2017, 1:33 PM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/12/
07/443915/need-know-house-higher-education-act-bill
[https://perma.cc/T8TZV7DD]. The costs of undergraduate education, according to one source, have risen
20% since the last HEA reauthorization in 2008. Id.
515. See supra notes 103, 119, 311 and accompanying text.
516. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
517. See id.
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PSLF program, among others.518 It provides one loan and one grant—
the Pell grant.519 While it eliminates loan origination fees, it
consolidates subsidized Stafford and PLUS loans into a single
unsubsidized federal ONE loan.520 Thus, under this bill, student loans
will begin to accrue interest immediately, making them more costly,
particularly for the neediest students who otherwise would have
qualified for federally subsidized loans.521 Further, there is a proposed
cap on the amount that can be borrowed under the ONE loan.522
Despite its name, the loan amount varies according to the borrower’s
status as dependent student, independent student, graduate student, or
parent.523 This will force more borrowers to turn to private loans,
which will mean not only that the loans will cost more,524 but these
borrowers will be at the mercy of predatory private lenders.525
518. See H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. § 406(b) (2d Sess. 2018) (repealing SEOG);
§§ 423–425 (outlining loan forgiveness for teachers, for those who serve in areas of
national need, and for civil legal assistance attorneys). It also eliminates the academic
competitiveness grants, the Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnership program,
and the Robert C. Byrd Honors Scholarship program, and it allows the TEACH grants
to expire. See §§ 406–407. The SEOG grant currently provides $732 million in aid to
1.6 million students each year. CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
519. See H.R. 4508, at 291 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1087). In an effort to
encourage earlier completion, the bill provides an additional $300 bonus for Pell Grant
recipients who take extra courses each term. See id. at 163–64. However, the bill
eliminates the current annual increases in the grant tied to inflation. This means that
the value of the grant will erode even faster over time. In an earlier article, I predicted
this problem and suggested a solution to it. See Camilla E. Watson, The Future of
Lower Income Students in Higher Education: Rethinking the Pell Program and
Federal Tax Incentives, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1152 (2018).
520. See H.R. 4508, at 321 (noting that interest begins to accrue on day loan
is disbursed). An exception is provided in which no interest will accrue for active duty
service members. Id. at 319.
521. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. This proposed
provision is estimated to affect six million borrowers and to cost students $27 billion
over the next decade. Id. By one estimate, a student who borrows $19,000 over four
years and makes timely payments will realize a 44% increase in the cost of the loan.
See Hinds, supra note 509.
522. See H.R. 4508, at 303–07.
523. See id. For undergraduates, the amount increases in each year of the first
three years of instruction. Id. at 303–05.
524. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514 (stating that the
interest rate generally is higher on private loans than on government loans). In
addition, there is no subsidized interest, no six-month grace period before repayment,
no forbearance or deferral, generally no income-based repayments, and no loan
forgiveness with private loans. See Federal Versus Private Loans, supra note 423. In
contrast, federal loans, unlike many private loans, do not require repayment until the
student graduates, drops out, or enrolls on a less than half-time basis. See id.
525. See supra Section II.B.
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This bill also would have a particularly detrimental effect on
graduate students. It would place a lifetime cap on the amount they
would be able to borrow under the ONE loan program,526 it would
forbid them from participating in the federal work-study program,527
and the immediate accrual of interest would make their combined
undergraduate and graduate loans much more expensive.528
The bill offers borrowers two repayment plans: a standard
repayment plan with equal payments stretched over ten years and an
income-based plan based on 15% of the borrower’s discretionary
income over an indefinite period, with no real forgiveness of
principal.529 For those borrowers who may be struggling financially,
there is forgiveness only after they have paid an amount equal to what
they would have paid under the standard plan.530 Thus, some borrowers
may never reach forgiveness. In addition, current income-based plans
generally provide for payments of 10% of the borrower’s discretionary
income.531 While a higher percentage payment will result in lower
interest charges because the loan ideally would be paid off faster,
nevertheless these higher payments come at a time when the borrower
has just graduated and is starting out in the world.532 Thus, borrowers
would make higher payments when they are most vulnerable
financially.
While the elimination of loan origination fees is a positive aspect
of the bill, the amount the government will save under the bill through

526. See H.R. 4508, at 306.
527. See id. at 250.
528. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
529. H.R. 4508, at 325–26. It allows for limited payment deferral in the event
of economic hardship, unemployment, or illness. See id. at 373, 375, 377.
530. See id. at 331–32.
531. Income-Driven Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven [https://perma.cc/V28F-BBBL] (last
visited Oct. 28, 2019). There currently are four income-based repayment plans:
REPAYE, PAYE, IBR and ICR. See id. These are based on percentages of
discretionary income, which differ with each plan and in cases of low income and
larger family size may require no payment at all. See id. REPAYE and PAYE plans
require a payment of 10% of discretionary income but not above the ten-year standard
repayment amount; IBR plans also require a 10% payment limited by the standard
repayment amount if the recipient is a new borrower on or after July 1, 2014. See id.
A new borrower is someone who has no outstanding balance under the William D.
Ford Direct Loan Program on or after July 1, 2014. See id. Under the ICR plan, the
repayment amount is the lesser of 20% of discretionary income or the amount that
would be paid under a fixed repayment plan over twelve years. See id.
532. See Federal Versus Private Loans, supra note 423.

Federal Financing of Higher Education at a Crossroads

965

cuts to student benefits would be greater than the costs.533 Critics have
expressed concern that the cost of cuts in areas that are profitable for
the government, such as graduate and parent loans, may be driving
proposed cuts to subsidized loans and restrictions in borrowing under
this bill.534
Among conservatives, there has been resistance to any
expansion of the government student loan program because of its
cost.535 But the cost of the program is a matter of debate because it
depends on the accounting method used.536 In 1990, Congress enacted
the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA),537 which changed the
accounting method of the federal student loan program to more
accurately reflect its cost.538 The current debate centers on whether the
FCRA or the fair value accounting method is the most accurate cost
indicator of the program.539 The fair value method, unlike the FCRA,
takes into account the risk that the projected budget estimates under
the FCRA will be wrong.540 This is known as a market value discount
rate.541 Examples of such risks include a downturn in the economy, an
increase in defaults, or an increase in administrative costs of the
program. The difference in projected cost between the two methods
can be significant. For instance, in 2017 the FRCA predicted a profit
533. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
534. See id.
535. See, e.g., Jason Delisle, The Spiraling Costs of a Student Loan Relief
Program, POLITICO (July 21, 2017, 5:33 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/
story/2017/07/21/public-service-loan-forgiveness-cost-double-000478
[https://
perma.cc/RB74-JA8K]; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, It’s Going to Cost
Taxpayers $108 Billion to Help Student Loan Borrowers, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2016,
4:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/11/30/itsgoing-to-cost-taxpayers-108-billion-to-help-student-loan-borrowers/
?utm_term=.f5e99 [https://perma.cc/59TU-NWLS].
536. See Preston Cooper, Why Government Doesn’t Profit from Student
Loans, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2017, 11:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
prestoncooper2/2017/08/04/why-government-doesnt-profit-from-studentloans/#b68308ceb630 [https://perma.cc/VS4U-PRBZ].
537. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990).
538. See Jason D. Delisle, Costs and Risks in the Federal Student Loan
Program: How Accountability Policies Can Protect Taxpayers, AM. ENTER. INST. 7
(Jan. 30, 2018).
539. See, e.g., id.; see also Matthew Yglesias, Fair Value Accounting
Overestimates Lending Costs, SLATE (Apr. 10, 2012, 8:26 PM),
https://slate.com/business/2012/04/fair-value-accounting-overestimates-lendingcosts.html [https://perma.cc/SWF2-7H2Z].
540. See Yglesias, supra note 539.
541. See id.
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of $28 billion in the federal student loan program over the next ten
years, while fair value accounting predicted that taxpayers would
suffer a loss of $183 billion over that same time period.542 Both of these
methods have been criticized as inaccurate.543
The current student loan program can be reformed to avoid the
issue of whether it results in too much profit or loss. Matthew M.
Chingos of the Brookings Institute proposed in 2015 that the risk be
shifted from the government to borrowers through a “guarantee fund”
in which borrowers would pay a fee that would be escrowed in a trust
fund to cover the losses the government would suffer through loan
defaults.544 Under this proposal, students who successfully repay their
loans would receive a refund, with interest, at the end of their
repayment period of any money remaining in the fund for their cohort
of borrowers.545
The beauty of a guarantee system is that it functions as a selfinsured plan in which borrowers would self-insure against the risk that
others would default.546 Thus, the government would not profit off
student loans and would only suffer a loss if the defaults were so
unexpectedly high as to exhaust the guarantee fund.547 The guarantee
fee could be covered through a small loan origination fee, with the
remainder prorated over the life of the loan and added to the principal
amount.548 Since the government currently charges interest at a rate
equal to around two-percentage points above the ten-year Treasury
rate, it would have no need to charge a higher interest rate to cover its
542. See Cooper, supra note 536.
543. See Donald B. Marron, The $300 Billion Question: How Should We
Budget for Federal Lending Programs?, URBAN INST. (Sept. 2014) (discussing the
methods and proposing an “expected returns” method to combine “the best of FRCA
and fair value”).
544. See Matthew M. Chingos, End Government Profits on Student Loans:
Shift Risk and Lower Interest Rates, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/end-government-profits-on-student-loans-shiftrisk-and-lower-interest-rates [https://perma.cc/2C4Q-653D]. Chingos based his
proposal on a similar trial plan undertaken in the 1920s by the Harmon Foundation, a
philanthropic entity. See id.
545. See id.
546. See id.
547. See id.
548. See id. (noting that federal student loan borrowers currently pay a loan
origination fee). The PROSPER Act proposes to eliminate this loan origination fee.
See supra note 520 and accompanying text. Chingos suggests retaining that fee, set at
a level to cover administrative costs, and further suggests that both the loan origination
fee and the guarantee fee “could be rolled into the balance of the loan.” See Chingos,
supra note 544, at n.5.
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anticipated losses.549 Thus, borrowers’ interest rate on the loans would
be lower (i.e., equal to the government’s borrowing rate).550 Instead of
a refund with interest, as Chingos proposes, during the last year of the
loan borrowers could reduce their payments to reflect the payment
record of their cohort.551 As Chingos acknowledges, the guarantee fee
and any potential refund could entail increased administrative costs.552
However, those could be factored into the amount of the loan
origination fee,553 as could the costs of forebearance and the PSLF
program.
A 100% government loan program still would require private
companies to service the loans. Thus, there would have to be adequate
oversight over these companies to ensure that borrowers, both current
and future, are treated fairly by these companies. Under the Trump
Administration, however, there has been no real oversight over student
loan lenders and servicers,554 and there is no indication that would
change under the PROSPER Act.
While the PROSPER bill purports to “give our students the
opportunity to prosper,”555 it primarily gives proprietary institutions
the opportunity to prosper by paving the way for greater Title IV
federal aid access for these schools. The bill does this in two ways.
First, it would blur the distinction between private institutions and
proprietary institutions by providing a single definition of an
“institution of higher education.”556 Second, it would measure
academic legitimacy based on demonstrated mastery of subject matter,
instead of number of credit hours completed.557 This could open the

549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.

See Chingos, supra note 544, at n.5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 366–368, 374–379, 459–467 and accompanying text.
From Staff Reports, Giving Students the Opportunity to Prosper,
LAGRANGE DAILY NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017, 6:27 PM), www.lagrangenews.com/
2017/12/08/giving-students-the-opportunity-to-prosper
[https://perma.cc/2EJPYMEJ].
556. H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. §101 (2d Sess. 2018) (amending 20 U.S.C. §
1001). The bill requires a proprietary institution or nonprofit or public institution that
offers only non-degree programs to have been in existence for at least two years in
order to meet the definition. See § 101(b). Also, proprietary institutions would be
ineligible for Titles III and V funds for minority-serving institutions. See id.
557. §§ 103(e), 104(a)(1)(A). The PROSPER bill refers to this as
“Competency-based education.” § 103(e) (amending 20 U.S.C. §1003); see also §
104(a)(1)(A) (repealing definition of “credit hour”).
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floodgates to Title IV funds not only to vocational schools, but to
proprietary schools as well.
In addition to this proposed funding boost to proprietary schools,
the bill would eliminate the 90/10 rule,558 the strongest incentive for
proprietary institutions to do a better job of serving students. This
would open the door for proprietary schools to receive full federal
funding.559 The bill also would eliminate the gainful employment and
borrower defense regulations,560 and it would remove the
postsecondary institution performance rating system,561 thereby
protecting the worst performing schools. Further, it would eliminate
the requirement that online schools acquire state authorization before
enrolling students in that state.562
The PROSPER bill would fundamentally change the oversight
role of both the DOE and the CFPB, while reducing the accountability
of predatory for-profit institutions.563 The bill would limit state efforts
to oversee schools (especially proprietary schools) and loan servicers
and would limit the DOE’s ability to conduct oversight.564 It would add
a new seven-person advisory board to oversee the Office of Federal
Student Aid.565 This office oversees thousands of educational
558. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
559. See id.
560. See §§ 104(a)(1)(B)–(C); see also supra notes 329–331, 346–347 and
accompanying text. The elimination of the borrower defense regulations will mean
that there will be a reversion to the prior rule on borrower defense to repayment, in
which defrauded students had to file separate actions within a narrow time frame
(three years from the date of any fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of contract) and
the case had to be heard by an administrative law judge or through arbitration, rather
than by allowing borrowers their day in court. See supra note 346 and accompanying
text.
561. See § 104(b)(3). This elimination is in the guise of providing “regulatory
relief.” The Postsecondary Institution Rating System (PIRS) was a proposal of the
DOE during the Obama Administration to increase transparency and accountability.
See Tim Harmon & Anna Cielinski, Transparency and Accountability: Implementing
a Postsecondary Institution Rating System that Empowers Students while Avoiding
Unintended Consequences, CTR. FOR POSTSECONDARY & ECON. SUCCESS 1, 3 (Nov.
2014). It proposed specifically to help disadvantaged students by providing
information on which schools might offer them the most in terms of resources. See id.
While the system did not seek to rank schools overall, it did rank schools according
to improvement in performance. See id. President Obama had proposed to use the
system in allocating student aid. See id.
562. See § 495(b).
563. See §§ 495–497.
564. See id. (noting the repeal and prohibition on state authorization
regulations; limitation on authority of DOE).
565. See § 131(f).
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institutions and is responsible for eradicating waste, fraud, and abuse
in the federal financial aid programs. While an advisory board may be
a positive addition, the role of this board is solely to oversee the
distribution of federal aid and the office’s management of its loan
portfolio.566 This narrow role is a concern in light of the Secretary’s
efforts to undermine the CFPB, the other major regulator of higher
education financial aid.567
The bill further deliberately cripples the ability of the DOE to
issue new regulations by providing mandated periods of
Congressional comment prior to the issuance of new regulations.568
The chicanery of this is evident in the fact that Congress already has
the ability to comment on rules through the legislative process.
Providing an additional period for comment will favor lobbyists,
political action committees, and others with enough resources to pay
for congressional access. This means that proprietary institutions, in
particular, will be advantaged at the expense of students.569
The bill eliminates the cohort default rate that requires schools
to keep their student loan default rates below a certain threshold in
order to receive federal funds.570 Instead, it substitutes a new measure
assessed at the program level.571 Under this new measure, schools
would remain eligible for federal funds only if at least 45% of their
borrowers have not defaulted and are less than ninety-days delinquent
at the end of the third fiscal year in repayment.572 While the cohort
default rate eliminated very few schools from eligibility for federal
funds, this new measure is an unknown, so it remains to be seen
whether it will be a better gauge of eligibility and whether it will hold
the worst performing schools accountable.573

566. See § 131(f)(3).
567. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
568. See § 492. This is a nebulous period that is “10 days after the Secretary—
(I) receives and addresses all comments from the authorizing committees; and (II)
responds to the authorizing committees in writing with an explanation of how such
comments have been addressed.” Id. In addition, the bill prohibits the Secretary from
promulgating “any rule or regulation that exceeds the scope of the explicit authority
granted to the Secretary under this Act.” § 117 (amending Part B, Title I, 20 U.S.C. §
1011 et seq.).
569. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
570. See § 426.
571. See § 481B.
572. Id.
573. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514 (noting that
there were only ten schools affected by the cohort default rate).
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The bill provides that schools with few resources and those
supporting minority students which receive funding under Titles III
and V of the HEA remain eligible for federal funding only if they have
a combined completion and transfer rate of 25% or greater.574 While
an accountability measure is to be applauded, nevertheless it is
troubling that the bill applies the requirement only to underfunded
schools serving low-income students, while relaxing the
accountability requirements for proprietary schools.575
The bill provides questionable oversight because it allows
accreditors to waive out of its requirements if they deem it necessary
to encourage innovation, improve the delivery of services to students,
or reduce the administrative burden to schools.576 While that in itself
is not necessarily bad, the bill contains no process to evaluate these
waivers to ensure that they achieve their goals, and it provides no
safeguards, such as loan forgiveness, for students who may be harmed
by the waivers.577
The bill further significantly changes funding and accountability
for teacher preparedness.578 It eliminates Title II of the HEA and
substitutes a so-called “In-Demand Apprenticeships” program to
provide a closer link between higher education and the marketplace.579
While that, in itself, may be an admirable goal, nevertheless the bill
provides inadequate standards and reporting requirements for this
program.580 Since students in this program will have access to little
training and accountability, they may be unaware that they are
registered in a low-quality program that will not train them properly
to pass the licensure and certification requirements to enable them to
begin a teaching career.581

574. See § 301 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1057 et seq.).
575. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
576. See § 496(q).
577. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
578. See id.
579. See §§ 201–202 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.). According to the
bill, the purpose of this change is to “expand student access to, and participation in,
new industry-led earn-and-learn programs leading to high-wage, high-skill, and highdemand careers.” Id.; see also § 407 (providing for the sunset of TEACH grants).
580. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514.
581. See id.
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B. The Aim Higher Act
There is a world of difference between the PROSPER Act and
the Aim Higher Act (AHA).582 Unlike the PROSPER Act, the AHA
focuses on and attempts to address the problems of equal access,
affordability, completion rates, and fairness in funding of higher
education.583
The AHA addresses the problem of access to higher education
in several different ways. First, it encourages high school students to
earn college credits and at little to no cost.584 It does this by creating a
matching grant program to encourage postsecondary institutions to
partner with K-12 school districts to promote “dual enrollment and
early college high schools.”585 Second, unlike the PROSPER Act, the
AHA would provide federal aid to foster and homeless students,
undocumented students, Native Americans, students in U.S.
territories, and incarcerated individuals to enable them to obtain access
to higher education.586 Third, the AHA would strengthen programs
designed to identify and assist students from disadvantaged
backgrounds to enroll in higher education.587 Fourth, it would simplify
the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and would
provide automatic Pell grants to those students with the lowest
incomes who received means-tested federal benefits in the previous
two years.588 Fifth, it would provide improved data on postsecondary
institutions to allow students to make more informed decisions.589
Sixth, in stark contrast to the PROSPER Act, the AHA would
strengthen institutional accountability and quality by requiring the
DOE, rather than state accreditors, to conduct Title IV compliance
checks and by allowing the DOE to veto accreditor-set standards it
deems too low.590 It also would establish multiple thresholds to require
institutions to improve their cohort default rate metric.591 Finally,
582. See H.R. 6543, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
583. See §§ 2002–2003.
584. See EDUC. & LABOR COMM., Aim Higher Act, H.R. 6543 Bill Summary 2
(July 26, 2018).
585. Id. The Bill would invest $250 million in the first year to provide funding
to the states for this partnership. Id.
586. See id. at 2–3.
587. See id. at 4.
588. See id.
589. See id.
590. See id. at 4–5.
591. See id. at 5. Currently, institutions can “game” the system by staying just
under the mandated threshold to avoid improvement. The AHA encourages
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instead of opening the federal coffers to proprietary schools, as the
PROSPER Act does, the AHA protects students by raising the 90/10
rule to 85/15,592 and by closing the loophole that allows these
institutions to obtain funding from other federal programs without
penalty.593 It further prohibits schools that spend less than half their
tuition revenue on instruction from “using federal funds for marketing,
advertising, recruiting or lobbying.”594 It also would maintain the
“gainful employment” requirement and would further protect students
who have been defrauded by their institutions by providing them full
relief and allowing them their day in court.595
The AHA addresses college affordability in several different
ways. First, instead of eliminating the SEOG and TEACH grants, as
the PROSPER Act does, it strengths these grants596 and permanently
indexes the Pell grant to inflation to maintain its purchasing power.597
It also extends Pell grant eligibility to quality short-term programs “to
strengthen the workforce.”598 Second, instead of narrowing the federal
work-study program to eliminate participation by graduate students,
the AHA maintains graduate student participation and changes the
funding allocation formula from one based on length of participation
in the program to one based on number of low-income students plus
unmet need at that institution.599
Unlike the PROSPER Act, which would cut funding to student
aid programs and push students into more expensive private loans, the
AHA simplifies the repayment process and helps borrowers manage
their repayments to avoid default. It does this by reviving the expired
Perkins loan program for needy undergraduate and graduate students
and providing better loan counseling to apprise students of the
improvement by providing technical and financial support with a high adjusted cohort
default rate. Id.
592. See supra notes 114, 194–195, 241–242 and accompanying text.
593. See EDUC. & LABOR COMM., supra note 584, at 5.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 5–6.
596. See id. at 6–7. The AHA does this by changing the formula for federal
funding of the SEOG by allocating federal funds based on the level of unmet need
plus the number of low-income students at that school, instead of the current
allocation based on length of time the school has been participating in the program.
See id. at 7. The AHA further protects recipients of the TEACH grants from their
grants being inadvertently converted to loans, and it retains the teacher loan
forgiveness programs, both of which are eliminated under the PROSPER Act. See id.
597. See id. at 7.
598. Id.
599. See id. at 8. In addition, the AHA provides a bonus funding allocation for
institutions in the top “20% in serving and graduating Pell students.” Id.
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amounts they have borrowed and what their repayments will be.600
Similar to the PROSPER Act, the AHA eliminates the loan origination
fee.601 But unlike the PROSPER Act, the AHA allows borrowers to
refinance their debt at the prevailing interest rates offered to new
borrowers.602 It also maintains the PSLF program and expands it to
include farmers and those who work for Veteran Service
Organizations.603 It simplifies repayment by replacing the current four
repayment plans with one fixed-payment plan and one income-based
repayment (IBR) plan.604 The IBR plan provides more generous
repayment terms for low- and middle-income borrowers, and for those
earning below 250% of the federal poverty level, no repayment would
be required until their earnings rise above that level.605 It further
provides for automatic recertification of income for those borrowers
enrolled in IBR,606 which would eliminate the need for annual reenrollment that is currently required. Moreover, it extends eligibility
for an IBR plan to parent PLUS loans and consolidated loans that
repay PLUS loans, and it extends disability forgiveness to PLUS loans
if the student should become totally and permanently disabled.607
Borrowers who are more than 120 days delinquent on their loans will
be automatically enrolled in the IBR plan.608 Borrowers who
consolidate their student loans with those of their spouses will be
allowed to separate their remaining balance and be liable only for their
particular portions, instead of the entire amount.609 The AHA stipulates
that states have the right “to enact, regulate, and enforce consumer
protection laws that protect their residents.”610
The AHA also operates to make higher education more
affordable in general by providing incentive grants to states to increase
education funding.611 These grants would be provided to states that
600. See id.
601. See id.
602. See id.
603. See id. at 9. These include the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign
Wars (VFW). Id. The expansion also includes doctors employed by non-profit
hospitals or other health care facilities “in states that prohibit the direct hiring of these
individuals, such as California and Texas.” Id.
604. See id.
605. Id.
606. See id.
607. See id.
608. Id.
609. See id.
610. Id.
611. See id. at 6.
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make tuition more affordable and to those that strive to make public
two-year colleges free to every student.612
The AHA would support lower-income students by providing
additional funding to community colleges, particularly those that are
underfunded and with high levels of low-income and minority
students.613 This funding is intended to encourage these institutions to
develop “high quality career and technical education programs,”614
improve remedial education, and provide financial advising, as well
as financial assistance, to offset costs that otherwise may lead to delay
in degree completion.615
In contrast to the PROSPER Act, the AHA would strengthen
Title II of the HEA to provide support for programs to recruit, retain,
and support teachers and school leaders.616 It would further provide
graduate fellowships for students pursuing careers in underserved
areas such as special education, English-language instruction, STEM
courses, and computer science.617
The primary drawback to the AHA, however, is its cost, an issue
that the bill does not purport to address. The provisions of the AHA
will require a considerable increase in education funding, which may
be offset to some extent by a partnership with the states and with the
alleviation of much fraud and abuse through increased regulation.618
Another potential cost offset, albeit more long-term, is the increase in
tax revenue from the stimulation of the economy by a more educated
612. See id. at 10. The AHA also provides grants to “low-income students who
transfer from a community college to a Minority-Serving Institution (MSI) for the
remainder of their degree.” Id. In addition, the bill provides for grants to schools that
expand the use of open textbooks to help cut students’ costs. See id.
613. See id. The AHA also provides support for students with disabilities, in
addition to the support for foster and homeless students. See id. at 12.
614. Id. at 11.
615. See id at 11–12. The bill also requires evaluation of program
effectiveness to determine which programs are more likely to lead to degree
completion. Id. In addition to other costs, the AHA would increase funding to
CCAMPIS (Child Care Access Means Parents in School) and for programs to prevent
and treat substance abuse. See id. at 12–13. It also would increase funding for veterans
to address their discrete needs, such as coordination of benefits and development of a
national website to allow institutions to share information on how best to support
completion by veterans. See id. at 13.
616. See id. at 14.
617. See id.
618. See Delece Smith-Barrow, With the New “Aim Higher Act,” House
Democrats Want States to Make Community College Free, HECHINGER REP. (July 27,
2018)
https://hechingerreport.org/with-the-new-aim-higher-act-house-democratswant-states-to-make-community-college-free [https://perma.cc/G3R2-77QT].
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workforce. In the shorter term, perhaps the reinstatement of the loan
origination fee could be used to defray some of the costs.619
CONCLUSION
Over the years, politics have had a profound effect on federal
education financing. The problems of higher education today—
spiraling costs, unequal access, burgeoning debt, unscrupulous forprofit institutions, and predatory student loan lenders—are all
problems that should have been addressed in a meaningful way by
Congress years ago. But since the late 1950s, federal education
financial aid policy has been used to advance political agendas.620 This
has become more problematic over time as political discourse has
become increasingly polarized, rather than focused on a clearly
reasoned educational aid policy.
Unfortunately, the problems of higher education will have
tangible effects on the national economy, not only because of the huge
amount of outstanding student loans but also because these problems
will negatively affect the supply of educated, skilled workers and
professionals, unless they are adequately addressed. In addition, they
will affect the ability of current and future borrowers to contribute in
a meaningful way to the economy through new home, car, and other
major purchases, and they will negatively affect the creation of new
businesses.621
Unless there is a change in congressional attitude from regarding
federal funding for higher education as a “free ride” or a “handout” to
viewing it as an investment in the future of this country, the spiraling
amount of student loan debt will remain on a collision course with the
economy. The federal government, in partnership with the states, must
act to remedy the situation by providing affordable education and by
adequately regulating unscrupulous proprietary institutions and
student loan lenders.622 It also must act to ensure that there is equal and
fair access to higher education by lower-income individuals and that
student loan borrowers are treated fairly.
When Congress addresses the next reauthorization of the HEA,
it must give meaningful consideration to the direction in which the
government should be heading in funding for higher education. This
619. See supra notes 544–553 and accompanying text.
620. See supra Part I.
621. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
622. See supra Sections II.B–C (discussing the government’s limited
regulation of student loan lenders and proprietary institutions, respectively).
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should not be a political issue; such a meaningful discussion cannot
occur if lobbyists control the process and there is no bipartisan
discussion and cooperation.623 The two bills currently pending to
reauthorize the HEA indicate the polarity of congressional opinion on
education funding policy.624 The salient issue is the focal point at
which the problems should be addressed. The resolution of this issue
will determine the outcome of federal education policy for generations
to come. For instance, if the focal point is on protecting large lenders
and servicers and proprietary institutions, then the next reauthorization
of the HEA will do nothing to solve the problems of access, high cost
of tuition, and crisis level student loan debt. In fact, these problems
may be exacerbated through decreased access, more expensive student
loans, and increasing defaults.625 But if the focal point is on the needs
of students, both undergraduate and graduate, and on what is best for
the country in the long run, then Congress will have taken an important
step toward addressing these critical problems.
Congress should learn from the mistakes of the past. There
should be less focus on loans and more focus on grants, the federal
work-study program, and aid from both state and federal levels to
educational institutions. Those who have borrowed and will borrow in
the future to fund their education should be treated fairly. It is
fundamental that these borrowers obtain value for their investment—
a degree that will allow them to comfortably repay their loans and lead
productive lives. This will not happen, however, if the government
does not strictly regulate certain educational institutions. Proprietary
educational institutions have a place in higher education because some
offer a valuable education and provide access to lower-income and
nontraditional students, particularly those with an interest in
vocational education. But many of these institutions target students for
their federal aid dollars while offering them worthless degrees.626 If
these institutions are not strictly regulated, the government will
continue to waste taxpayers’ money on them. These institutions must
623. See, e.g., Polis, supra note 12 (complaining that Republicans are shutting
Democrats, and even other Republicans, out of the deliberative process).
624. See H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (the PROSPER Act proposed
by Republicans); H.R. 6543, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (the Aim Higher Act
proposed by Democrats); supra Part III (comparing the two).
625. See John F. Wasik, Why Trump’s Education Plan Will Make Student Debt
Crisis Worse, FORBES (May 26, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
johnwasik/2017/05/26/why-trumps-education-plan-will-make-student-debt-crisisworse/#1b747cd7721c [https://perma.cc/AU4R-SVGR].
626. See supra notes 499–504 and accompanying text.
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be strictly regulated, and the gainful employment regulation should be
reinstated to determine eligibility for federal funding of these
institutions.
Students who have been defrauded by educational institutions or
have been unable to complete their course of study because of school
closure should be able to discharge their debts. The fact that they are
suffering this hardship means that the government has not done a
thorough job of regulating and overseeing these institutions. Since
these institutions operate with a substantial amount of government
funding,627 it is to be expected that the government would exert strong
oversight as a responsible steward of taxpayers’ money. If it fails to
do that, the government, not the students, should suffer the
consequence.
If these problems are not resolved, they will only worsen over
time with devastating consequences to borrowers, to taxpayers, and to
the economy. The time to act is now, with a thoughtful and meaningful
reauthorization of the HEA, and the stakes could not be higher.

627. See Stuart Shepard and James Agresti, Government Spending on
Education Is Higher Than Ever. And For What?, FOUND. FOR ECON. ED. (Mar. 1,
2018),
https://fee.org/articles/government-spending-on-education-is-higher-thanever-and-for-what.

